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INTRODUCTION 
The most famous doctrine in antitrust law is the “Rule of 
Reason.” And anyone who knows anything about the Rule of 
Reason knows that courts and juries applying the Rule balance 
the anticompetitive effects of the antitrust agreement at issue 
against its procompetitive effects.1 Any antitrust practitioner 
can explain that whichever side of the scale weighs heavier de-
termines the outcome: if the court finds that the anticompeti-
tive effects predominate, it invalidates the agreement; if the 
procompetitive effects win out, it upholds the agreement. 
Guess what? Everyone is wrong. 
This Article takes a new look at the Rule of Reason. It sur-
veys all of the Rule of Reason cases in the modern era and finds 
that, in reality, courts rarely conduct the balancing for which 
the Rule is known. The Article concludes that in an astonishing 
 
 1. This Article will henceforth refer to and consider balancing only by courts. 
Instances in which courts have balanced anticompetitive and procompetitive effects or 
have passed upon the validity of jury verdicts can be discovered by traditional research 
tools; jury balancing cannot. That juries may play a marginally more significant role 
than can be pinpointed does not affect the conclusions drawn by this Article. 
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96% of Rule of Reason cases, courts do not balance anything.2 
Instead, many recent courts have engaged in an exercise of 
burden-shifting, typically dismissing the case at any one of 
three stages that precedes the ultimate balancing.3 In the ini-
tial stage, the plaintiff must show a significant anticompetitive 
effect resulting from the restraint.4 The plaintiff can clear this 
threshold by demonstrating either an actual adverse effect, 
such as a reduction of output or an increase in price, or a po-
tential adverse effect, which requires proof of market power.5 If 
the plaintiff cannot make this showing, the court will dismiss 
the case. In 84% of the cases, the lawsuit is disposed of at this 
stage. 
If the plaintiff can demonstrate an anticompetitive effect, 
the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate 
procompetitive justification for the restraint.6 The defendant’s 
failure at this step will lead to the invalidation of the restraint; 
this happened in 3% of the cases surveyed. If the defendant 
 
 2. This conclusion applies across the realm of antitrust cases. Courts deter-
mined the validity of restraints without balancing anticompetitive and procompetitive 
effects in 98% of the cases involving vertical restraints, 99% of refusal-to-deal cases, 
99% of exclusive dealing cases, 97% of tying cases, 94% of unfair competition cases, and 
86% of cases involving association rules or practices. See infra notes 18-207 and accom-
panying text. 
 3. Although the burden of production shifts between the parties at each stage, 
the burden of persuasion always remains on the plaintiff to show an unreasonable re-
straint of trade. See, e.g., Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 1983); 
Bellam v. Clayton County Hosp. Auth., 758 F. Supp. 1488, 1493 (N.D. Ga. 1990); VII 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND 
THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1507b, at 397 (1986). 
 4. See, e.g., Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 
537, 546 (2d Cir. 1993); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir. 1991); 
Nationwide R.A.C. Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., No. C 96-2877 FMS, 1997 WL 88399, 
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 1997). When this Article refers to the plaintiff’s proof of “anti-
competitive effect,” it implies that such effect is significant or substantial. A scintilla of 
an anticompetitive effect is not enough. 
 5. See, e.g., Flegel v. Christian Hosp., N.E.-N.W., 4 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 
1993); Capital Imaging Assocs., 996 F.2d at 546-47; Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1413. In a nar-
row subset of cases, those applying a “quick look” Rule of Reason, the court presumes 
harm to competition in the absence of both an actual adverse effect and a lack of mar-
ket power. In these cases, the parties typically have entered into a “naked” agreement 
not to compete in terms of price or output. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109-
10 (1984); see also Federal Trade Comm’n v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 
460-62 (1986); National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-93 
(1978). 
 6. See, e.g., Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997); 
K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Capital Imaging Assocs., 996 F.2d at 547; Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1413. 
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meets this burden, the burden then returns to the plaintiff to 
show either that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the restraint7 or that the objectives 
could be achieved by alternatives “less restrictive” of competi-
tion;8 at most, 1% of the cases were dismissed on this ground.9 
If the plaintiff satisfies this factor, then she prevails;10 if she 
does not, then the court balances the restraint’s anticompeti-
tive and procompetitive effects.11 Balancing occurred in only 4% 
of Rule of Reason cases. In short, by time the court balances 
anything, most cases have long since been disposed of. 
Part I of this Article surveys the cases in the modern era—
since the decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 
Inc.12—in which courts have applied the Rule of Reason.13 It 
 
 7. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. 
Ct. 65 (1998); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1368 (3d Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993); Yeager’s Fuel, Inc. v. 
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 953 F. Supp. 617, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
 8. See, e.g., Clorox, 117 F.3d at 56; K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., 61 F.3d at 127; 
Flegel, 4 F.3d at 688; Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1413. 
 9. Although courts in the majority of these cases found that the restraint was 
reasonably necessary, they did not follow the burden-shifting approach. See infra notes 
526-530 and accompanying text. 
 10. See VII AREEDA, supra note 3, ¶ 1507, at 397. 
 11. See id. 
 12. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 13. The Court in Sylvania held that courts are to consider vertical nonprice re-
straints under the Rule of Reason. See id. at 58-59. The survey’s twenty-two-year time 
frame provides a complete view as to courts’ treatment of Rule of Reason cases. If any-
thing, the period is overinclusive, as courts in 1999 have applied a marginally different 
analysis—articulating more specifically the burden-shifting approach—than was ap-
plied in 1977. But to the extent these figures do not accurately portray the actions of 
recent courts, they overstate the number of cases in which balancing occurs. Over the 
past two decades, courts have decided fewer and fewer cases by balancing. For exam-
ple, between 1978 and 1988, courts balanced in fourteen cases. In the next ten years, 
balancing occurred in only six cases. See infra note 548 and accompanying text. Given 
the significance of the Sylvania case, drawing the line in 1977 should not be a matter of 
controversy. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Beyond Chicago: Will Activist Antitrust Arise 
Again?, XXXIX ANTITRUST BULLETIN 1, 18 (1994) [hereinafter Lande, Beyond Chicago] 
(noting rise of the Rule of Reason since 1977); John E. Lopatka, Stephen Breyer and 
Modern Antitrust: A Snug Fit, XL ANTITRUST BULLETIN 1, 24 (1995) (dating the mod-
ern era of antitrust from 1977). To the extent that unreported jury verdicts are based 
on a proportionally higher degree of balancing, the figures may shift slightly. 
A word about the procedural stage of cases meriting inclusion in this survey. The 
survey includes all cases—discovered through broad searches on WESTLAW—in which 
a court has entered a final judgment in an antitrust dispute that it has decided (at 
least in part) under the Rule of Reason. Where courts have ruled upon jury verdicts, 
the judgments are included. Also included are judgments after nonjury trials and 
courts’ grants of summary judgment and motions to dismiss. All of the above observa-
tions apply only to the antitrust issues of a case; the continued vitality of non-antitrust 
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separately treats cases in six categories: (1) vertical nonprice 
restraints; (2) refusals to deal; (3) exclusive dealing arrange-
ments; (4) tying arrangements; (5) unfair competition practices; 
and (6) association rules and practices.14 Part I finds that, for 
all six types of restraints, courts overwhelmingly dispose of the 
case before balancing. In particular, courts typically conclude 
that the plaintiff fails to demonstrate a significant anticompeti-
tive effect. 
Part II begins to tackle the normative questions suggested 
by the descriptive survey of Part I. This Part explores whether 
courts should consider the factors examined: anticompetitive 
effect, procompetitive justifications, the reasonable necessity of 
the restraint, the presence of less restrictive alternatives, and 
balancing. Four sources inform the conclusions as to each fac-
tor: (1) the legislative history of the Sherman Act; (2) the com-
mon law preceding the Sherman Act;15 (3) an influential school 
of antitrust philosophy—the “Chicago School of Economics”; 
and (4) an offshoot of the Chicago School—the “Post-Chicago 
School.” 
Section A provides a brief overview of each of the sources. It 
does not pretend to offer a comprehensive study of each source; 
rather, it highlights characteristics relevant to an analysis of 
the various factors. Section B examines anticompetitive effect 
from the viewpoint of each of the sources. This Section con-
cludes that all four sources recommend the inclusion of anti-
competitive effect in the Rule of Reason analysis. Section C 
canvasses procompetitive justifications. This Section finds that 
 
claims does not affect the inclusion of the case in the survey. Finally, the survey does 
not include cases that have not reached a final determination, such as denials of sum-
mary judgment or motions to dismiss, or grants or denials of preliminary injunctions 
unaccompanied by final findings. 
 14. In the context of a noncategorical statute such as the Sherman Act, this 
stratification is, in a sense, artificial. For example, exclusive dealing and tying ar-
rangements could be grouped as vertical nonprice restraints. In addition, refusals to 
deal and tying arrangements could possess both vertical and horizontal components. 
The practices are differentiated here to gain a more precise view as to courts’ actions. 
In addition, a few cases will not fall systematically into particular categories. For cases 
involving claims in two or more categories, this Article groups the case in the category 
that appears integral to the restraint or that provides the basis for the court’s holding. 
Any disagreements at the margins as to the category in which certain cases appear do 
not affect the underlying thesis. No matter how the cases are categorized, the conclu-
sion is uniform: courts do not balance. 
 15. Of course, the common law did not stop in 1890. In fact, its development con-
tinues today. But the Article focuses only on the common law at the stage in which it 
fleshes out the legislative history—the common law of 1890. 
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three of the sources—the legislative history, Chicago School, 
and Post-Chicago School—support this factor, and that the 
fourth—the common law—is neutral. The Section concludes 
that courts should consider procompetitive justifications as an 
element of the Rule of Reason analysis. 
Section D explores the inquiries as to whether a restraint is 
reasonably necessary and whether there are less restrictive al-
ternatives. This Section finds that the sources come to contrary 
conclusions on the factors. The common law would provide sub-
stantial approval to courts’ consideration of both inquiries, but 
the Chicago School would not. The other two sources would not 
tilt the balance: the legislative history would be neutral and 
the Post-Chicago School would provide, at most, marginal sup-
port. The Section concludes that the sources provide lukewarm 
support for the factor. Section E addresses balancing. This Sec-
tion concludes that the sources provide moderate approval for 
this factor: the Chicago School would endorse a limited type of 
balancing; the Post-Chicago School would champion broad bal-
ancing; and the legislative history and common law would be 
neutral on the factor. The sources thus offer tentative support 
for balancing. 
Part III continues the normative analysis and supplements 
the conclusions of Part II by examining the capacities of courts. 
It first asks, as a matter of theory, whether courts can analyze 
each of the four factors of a Rule of Reason analysis. It then re-
views the cases in the survey to determine whether the empiri-
cal results conform to the conclusions based on hypothesis. Sec-
tion A concludes that courts can, as a matter of theory and 
practice, examine anticompetitive effect. Section B arrives at 
the same conclusion for procompetitive justifications. 
Section C finds that courts can determine whether a re-
straint is reasonably necessary but that they cannot conduct an 
analysis based on less restrictive alternatives. This finding, 
combined with the marginal support provided by the sources, 
leads to the conclusion that courts should not consider the fac-
tor of less restrictive alternatives in conducting analysis under 
the Rule of Reason. This Section also recommends a shift in the 
burden of proving reasonable necessity from the plaintiff show-
ing the absence of reasonable necessity to the defendant dem-
onstrating its presence. Such a shift would conform with the 
parties’ varying levels of access to evidence and would remedy 
the courts’ misunderstanding of the nature of the burden. As a 
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result of the shift, this Article recommends combining the sec-
ond and third stages of the current Rule of Reason analysis, 
thus requiring the defendant to demonstrate that the restraint 
is reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate procompetitive 
objective. Section D hesitantly concludes that courts can bal-
ance. This conclusion would be strengthened if courts continu-
ally referenced the overriding goals of consumer welfare and 
interbrand competition throughout balancing. 
Part IV wraps up by exploring the consequences of this Ar-
ticle. Primarily, it examines the likely effects of bridging the 
disconnect between what practitioners and courts think courts 
do (balance), on the one hand, and what courts actually do (not 
balance), on the other. It also explores the consequences of re-
moving the less restrictive alternative analysis from the equa-
tion.16 Section A looks to the effect on the parties. It concludes 
that a shift in thinking to accord with reality would decrease 
the number of suits filed and would focus the parties’ attention 
to a greater extent on the relevant factors in a Rule of Reason 
analysis (in particular) and competition (in general). Section B 
looks to the effect on courts. Admittedly, there would be less of 
an effect on courts. Even though they repeatedly cite the pre-
scription that they are to balance anticompetitive and procom-
petitive effects,17 the courts usually require the parties to clear 
the initial stages before balancing. The bridging of the discon-
nect nonetheless would have salutary effects, in particular by 
bringing the language and reasoning of antitrust opinions in 
line with the results, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of anti-
trust courts. Moreover, the elimination of the analysis based on 
less restrictive alternatives would prevent post hoc second-
guessing of the defendant’s justifications. 
I. NONBALANCING UNDER THE RULE OF REASON: THE SURVEY 
In only 20 out of 495 cases decided under the Rule of Rea-
 
 16. The shift in the burden of production on reasonable necessity should not have 
significant repercussions. 
 17. When confronted with Rule of Reason cases, courts usually cite Justice 
Brandeis’s instruction in Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States to consider 
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition be-
fore and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, 
actual or probable[, as well as] [t]he history of the restraint, the evil believed to ex-
ist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, [and] the purpose or end sought 
to be attained. 
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).  
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son in the modern era have courts balanced the anticompetitive 
and procompetitive effects of the restraints at issue.18 Part I di-
vides the universe of Rule of Reason analysis into six types of 
restraints: (1) vertical territorial, customer, and other similar 
restraints; (2) refusals to deal; (3) exclusive dealing arrange-
ments; (4) tying arrangements; (5) unfair competition practices; 
and (6) association rules and practices. Each of the Sections of 
this Part initially provides a brief description of the types of re-
straints. They then calculate and array the instances of each 
stage of resolution: anticompetitive effect, procompetitive justi-
fication, reasonable necessity, less restrictive alternatives, and 
balancing. Finally, the Sections provide synopses of cases in 
which courts conducted balancing and offer instances of courts’ 
application of the burden-shifting construct. 
A. Vertical Restraints 
Ever since the Supreme Court’s decision in Sylvania,19 
courts have applied the Rule of Reason to vertical nonprice re-
straints.20 Vertical restraints occur at different levels of the dis-
tribution chain, typically between manufacturers or suppliers, 
on the one hand, and dealers or distributors, on the other.21 
Such restraints generally reduce intrabrand competition—
competition among the distributors of a product of a particular 
manufacturer22—by limiting various types of competition 
among the distributors.23 On the other hand, vertical restraints 
 
 18. This Article uses the term “restraints” to refer to the agreements or arrange-
ments at issue. It is used in a broad sense and has no normative implications. 
 19. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 20. Sylvania overturned the emphasis on whether a manufacturer had passed 
title to a product to the dealer—holding vertical restraints to be per se illegal if title 
had passed, but analyzed under the Rule of Reason if it had not—that the Court had 
imposed in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See Sylvania, 
433 U.S. at 52, 58-59. The Sylvania Court recognized the complex effect of vertical re-
straints on competition because of the “potential for a simultaneous reduction of in-
trabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand competition.” Id. at 51-52. The 
Court confirmed that interbrand competition “is the primary concern of antitrust law.” 
Id. at 52 n.19. It also explained that the exploitation of intrabrand market power often 
would be counterbalanced by interbrand competition, through which consumers could 
always turn to different brands of a product. See id. 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972); Crane & 
Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802, 805 (6th Cir. 1988); VII AREEDA, 
supra note 3, ¶ 1437, at 3-4. 
 22. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19. 
 23. See id. at 54; VIII PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1602, at 23 (1989). 
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often promote interbrand competition—competition among the 
manufacturers of the same generic product24—by allowing 
manufacturers to achieve efficiencies (such as economies of 
scale) in product distribution. For example, manufacturers en-
tering a market may use the restrictions to encourage dealers 
to invest capital and labor in their product.25 Or the restraints 
may allow established manufacturers to induce dealers “to en-
gage in promotional activities or to provide service and repair 
facilities.”26 Such restrictions also may prevent “free-riding” by 
allowing dealers to recoup their investment.27 
1. Territorial, customer, and other restrictions 
Vertical nonprice restraints include territorial, customer, 
and other similar restrictions. A manufacturer might designate 
certain territories in which dealers are encouraged to distrib-
ute, or are prohibited from distributing, its products.28 Or the 
manufacturer could impose customer restraints by requiring 
distributors to sell only to certain customers, by requiring sale 
directly to customers, or by prohibiting certain types of distri-
bution, for example, mail order sales.29 The manufacturer could 
decide to add a new distributor or to prohibit a dealer’s transfer 
of ownership without consent.30 Or a franchisor could decide 
 
 24. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19. 
 25. Id. at 55; Westman Comm’n Co. v. Hobart Int’l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1227 
(10th Cir. 1986). 
 26. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55; see also Hobart, 796 F.2d at 1227; Cowley v. Braden 
Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 27. An oft-quoted example of free-riding occurs when a dealer provides helpful 
customer service (perhaps by hiring employees to explain and demonstrate the quali-
ties of a product) and is thereby forced to raise the price of the product. Yet the un-
grateful customer may, after receiving this service, buy the product from a competing 
dealer that offers limited services but lower prices. See VIII AREEDA, supra note 23, ¶ 
1601, at 14; 1 JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE 
REGULATION § 19.01[2], at 19-3 (1998); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Anti-
trust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 927 n.3 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, Chicago 
School]. 
 28. See, e.g., Jayco Sys., Inc. v. Savin Bus. Machs. Corp., 777 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 
1985); Cowley v. Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1980); Laurence J. Gordon, 
Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1144, 1153 (W.D. Wash. 1983); see generally VIII 
AREEDA, supra note 23, ¶ 1600, at 5. 
 29. See, e.g., Sports Ctr., Inc. v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1982); 
American Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Panasonic Indus. Co., No. Civ.A.87-4461, 1988 WL 76220 
(E.D. La. July 12, 1988); O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. 
Cal. 1985). 
 30. See, e.g., Desai v. Impacta, S.A., No. Civ.A.89-4817, 1990 WL 132709 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 7, 1990); Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Del Monte Corp., No. Civ.A.CA3-88-3012-D, 
CAR-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:24 AM 
1265] THE REAL RULE OF REASON 1275 
not to grant an additional franchise or to require franchisees to 
act consistently.31 
a. The results. The courts found that the plaintiff failed to 
demonstrate a significant anticompetitive effect in 105 out of 
118 cases (89%) involving vertical restraints. Nine of the cases 
did not fall into any category, as the courts, without consider-
ing the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects, found that 
the restraint at issue was not an unreasonable restraint of 
trade32 (or that there was no evidence of an unreasonable re-
straint33), was reasonable,34 was an unreasonable restraint,35 or 
was anticompetitive.36 Courts did not decide any of the cases on 
the ground that the defendant failed to demonstrate a procom-
 
1990 WL 291495 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 1990). 
 31. See, e.g., Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055 
(E.D. Pa. 1996); Great Clips, Inc. v. Levine, No. CIV.3-90-211, 1991 WL 322975 (D. 
Minn. Oct. 9, 1991); Blanton Enters., Inc. v. Burger King Corp., 680 F. Supp. 753 
(D.S.C. 1988); Blaine v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1107 (D. 
Conn. 1987). 
 32. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 694 F.2d 1132, 1139-40 (9th 
Cir. 1982); Northeastern Educ. Television v. Educational Television Ass’n, 758 F. Supp. 
1568, 1578 (N.D. Ohio 1990). 
  A court’s summary conclusion that a restraint is reasonable or unreasonable 
or its finding that there is no evidence of an unreasonable (or a reasonable) restraint 
cannot be viewed as a type of balancing for two related reasons. First, the court’s fail-
ure to explicitly discuss anticompetitive or procompetitive effects precludes an assump-
tion that the court considered these effects. A finding of reasonableness or its opposite 
may be a “gut reaction” as much as it may be implicit balancing, and in the absence of 
even a mention of anticompetitive or procompetitive effects, we cannot superimpose on 
the court, post hoc, an intention to balance. Second, even deferring to the court’s un-
supported conclusions leads to ambiguous results. For example, a court, in finding that 
there is no evidence of an unreasonable restraint, could mean that there is no evidence 
of (a) anticompetitive effects outweighing procompetitive effects or (b) any anticompeti-
tive effects at all. Similarly, the unsupported conclusion that a practice is reasonable or 
unreasonable may imply either implicit balancing or the absence of the countervailing 
factor (i.e., the absence of an anticompetitive effect if the restraint is found to be rea-
sonable). Therefore, the summary conclusions reached by courts when examining each 
of the six types of restraints that there is no evidence of an unreasonable (or reason-
able) restraint or that a restraint is reasonable or unreasonable or anticompetitive or 
procompetitive do not fit into any of the categories of the Rule of Reason analysis ex-
plored by this Article. 
 33. See Lee Klinger Volkswagen, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 583 F.2d 910, 915 (7th 
Cir. 1978); National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 572 F.2d 953, 960 (2d 
Cir. 1978). 
 34. See Mularkey v. Holsum Bakery, Inc., 146 F.3d 1064, 1065 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 465 F. Supp. 195, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v. 
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 442 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 (N.D. Ill. 1977). 
 35. See Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068, 1076-81 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 36. See Munters Corp. v. Burgess Indus. Inc., No. 75.Civ.4622, 1978 WL 1367, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1978). 
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petitive justification. One court held that the defendant showed 
that the restraint was reasonably necessary to achieve its ob-
jectives.37 In only 3 out of 118 cases (2.5%) did the courts bal-
ance the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the re-
straint. 
b. Three instances of balancing. In New York v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc.,38 the court upheld a system of territorial restraints 
that a brewer-manufacturer imposed on its distributors. The 
court found that the “numerous beneficial effects on interbrand 
competition,”39 namely maintaining quality by mandating in-
vestment, encouraging advertising and promotion, enabling 
more efficient distribution, and improving the performance of 
customer services,40 “dramatically outweighed”41 limited in-
trabrand effects. The court also found that the defendant 
lacked market power.42 
One case in which an adverse effect on intrabrand competi-
tion did affect interbrand competition is Graphic Products Dis-
tributors, Inc. v. Itek Corp.43 In Itek, a manufacturer with a 70% 
market share44 granted exclusionary territories to its distribu-
tors. The defendant’s market power provided the rare setting in 
which intrabrand competition “was an important source of 
competitive pressure on price”45 and in which the foreclosure of 
such competition could have “substantially adverse effects on 
price competition and consumer welfare.”46 The court also 
found that the defendant’s proffered procompetitive justifica-
tions—providing adequate servicing and enhancing market 
 
 37. See Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470, 475 (D.D.C. 1977). 
 38. 811 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 39. Id. at 876. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. at 877. 
 42. See id. at 873 (noting that defendant had small market share, there were no 
significant entry barriers, and the market was characterized by intense price competi-
tion). The court did not rest its holding on a lack of market power because of the deci-
sion in Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980), which held that an anti-
competitive effect on intrabrand competition alone could constitute an unreasonable 
restraint. See id. at 1081. The court in Eiberger may not yet have been operating under 
the mandate of Sylvania. See Anheuser-Busch, 811 F. Supp. at 872 n.69 (“The outcome 
in Eiberger may have resulted more from the case’s timing than its factual circum-
stances. . . . [T]he trial occurred while Schwinn was still the law of the land.”). 
 43. 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 44. See id. at 1570. 
 45. Id. at 1575. 
 46. Id. 
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penetration—were not reasonably necessary to achieve the de-
fendant’s goals.47 
In Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co.,48 the court upheld a 
change in a newspaper’s distribution system by which the 
newspaper replaced independent contract carriers with its own 
delivery agents.49 The court found that “the procompetitive ef-
fects generated by optimum monopoly pricing50 and the unique 
nature of a newspaper’s revenues51 outweighed the minimal 
anticompetitive effect of eliminating potential competition.”52 
2. Refusal-to-deal cases 
A refusal to deal can take multiple forms. A manufacturer 
may select distributors with whom it will deal or it may termi-
nate existing distributors.53 A supplier may decide not to deal 
with a particular purchaser,54 or vice versa.55 A hospital or 
group of medical providers may refuse membership to a doc-
tor.56 Refusal-to-deal cases also may have a horizontal compo-
 
 47. See id. at 1577-78. 
 48. 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 49. See id. at 694-95. 
 50. Under an optimum monopoly pricing theory, a monopolist’s vertical integra-
tion into a second market would not increase the price of the item in the second market 
because a monopolist could still only charge the price at which marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue. See id. at 701. 
 51. Because advertising constitutes a significant portion of a newspaper’s reve-
nues, the newspaper would have a greater incentive than would contract carriers “to 
keep the retail price as low as possible in order to increase circulation,” which would 
increase advertising revenues. Id. 
 52. Id. at 704 (internal footnotes added). 
 53. See, e.g., Sportswear Design, Inc. v. Canstar Sports USA, Inc., Nos. 93-2242, 
93-2294, 1995 WL 675615 (6th Cir. Nov. 9, 1995); R.W. Int’l Corp. v. Welch Food, Inc., 
13 F.3d 478 (1st Cir. 1994); Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 
802 (6th Cir. 1988); Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 833 F.2d 208 
(9th Cir. 1987); Filter Queen, Inc. v. Health-Mor Inc., No. 89C5511, 1990 WL 36824 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 1990). 
 54. See, e.g., Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Peterson, No. 86-C-29-C, 1987 WL 110400 
(W.D. Wis. June 1, 1987); Family Boating Ctr., Inc. v. Washington Area Marine Deal-
ers Ass’n, No. 81-694, 1982 WL 1815 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 1982). 
 55. See, e.g., Great Escape, Inc. v. Union City Body Co., 791 F.2d 532 (7th Cir. 
1986); Wimer v. Holzapfel, 868 F. Supp. 844 (E.D. Tex. 1994). 
 56. See, e.g., BCB Anesthesia Care, Ltd. v. Passavant Mem’l Area Hosp. Ass’n, 36 
F.3d 664, 667-68 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing cases); Lie v. St. Joseph Hosp., 964 F.2d 567 
(6th Cir. 1992); Tarabishi v. McAlester Reg’l Hosp., 951 F.2d 1558 (10th Cir. 1991); Ok-
sanen v. Page Mem’l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991); Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse 
Anesthetists v. Unity Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 694 (D. Minn. 1998); Davies v. Genesis Med. 
Ctr., 994 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Iowa 1998); Ginzburg v. Memorial Healthcare Sys., Inc., 
993 F. Supp. 998 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
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nent—e.g., where a manufacturer conspires with a dealer to 
boycott competitor dealers—and courts sometimes apply Rule 
of Reason analysis to these agreements.57 
a. The results. The nonbalancing continues in these cases. 
The courts dismissed 133 out of 142 refusal-to-deal cases it de-
cided under the Rule of Reason, or 94%, at the initial stage, 
finding that the plaintiff failed to prove a significant anticom-
petitive effect. Two cases were dismissed at the second stage on 
the ground that the defendant failed to come forward with le-
gitimate procompetitive justifications.58 Five of the cases did 
not fall into any category, as the courts found that there was no 
unreasonable restraint59 or affirmed jury verdicts of reason-
able60 or unreasonable61 restraints of trade. Finally, the courts 
balanced the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the 
restraint at issue in only 2 out of 142 cases (1.4%). 
b. Two instances of balancing. In Williamson v. Sacred 
Heart Hospital,62 a radiologist challenged a refusal to deal by 
an HMO. The court concluded that “the procompetitive benefit 
of allowing consumers the choice of an additional HMO out-
weighs the anticompetitive effect of the HMO structure.”63 The 
court also recognized the lack of anticompetitive effect: the de-
fendant had a market share of only 8%, its presence did not 
“appear . . . [to have] resulted in any detriment to competi-
tion,”64 and the plaintiff competed successfully in the market.65 
The second case conducted balancing even though it too 
could have disposed of the case based on a lack of significant 
 
 57. See, e.g., Doctor’s Hosp., Inc. v. Southeast Med. Alliance, Inc., 123 F.3d 301 
(5th Cir. 1997); Retina Assocs., P.A. v. Southern Baptist Hosp., Inc., 105 F.3d 1376 
(11th Cir. 1997); Thurman Indus., Inc. v. Pay ‘n Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
 58. See Wilk v. American Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352, 362 (7th Cir. 1990); Interna-
tional Wood Processors v. Power Dry, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 710, 722 (D.S.C. 1984). 
 59. See W.W. Blackburn v. Crum & Forster, 611 F.2d 102, 105 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Bernard v. Curtis Circulation and Manor Books, Inc., No. 77 C 1415, 1978 WL 1364, at 
*3 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 1978).  
 60. See Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243, 1249 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 61. See American Computech, Inc. v. National Med. Care, Inc., No. CV-84-1565-
S, 1992 WL 66641, at *4 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 1992); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 
Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 955-56, 983 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 62. No. 89-30084-RV, 1993 WL 543002 (N.D. Fla. May 28, 1993), aff’d, 41 F.3d 
667 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 63. Id. at *50. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. 
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anticompetitive effect. In Robinson v. Magovern,66 a surgeon 
challenged a hospital’s denial of staff privileges. The court 
stated that the procompetitive effects of the hospital’s staffing 
policy outweighed the anticompetitive effects.67 By granting 
staff privileges only to applicants “who meet very high stan-
dards,”68 the hospital increased interbrand competition and 
“raise[d] the prevailing level of care”69 for the public. Although 
the court stated that the anticompetitive effects of the policy 
were “not severe”70—because a surgeon would have access to 
other hospital facilities in the market—the court could have 
concluded that harm suffered by one doctor did not constitute 
an adverse effect on competition. In short, the two “balancing” 
cases in the refusal-to-deal context could have been resolved on 
the ground that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate an anticom-
petitive effect. 
c. Instances of burden-shifting. A handful of refusal-to-deal 
cases have explicitly articulated the three-stage burden-
shifting analysis. In these cases, the courts typically have dis-
missed the case on the ground that the plaintiff failed to carry 
its initial burden of showing a significant anticompetitive ef-
fect.71 The cases also confirm the benefits of the burden-shifting 
construct. In particular, the paradigm prevents the plaintiff 
from blinding the court with the alleged absence of a procom-
petitive justification in circumstances where the court should 
not even be looking at the issue because of the lack of anticom-
petitive effect.72 
 
 66. 521 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1981). 
 67. See id. at 919. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See, e.g., K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 
128-30 (2d Cir. 1995); Flegel v. Christian Hosp., N.E.-N.W., 4 F.3d 682, 688-91 (8th Cir. 
1993); Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 546-47 
(2d Cir. 1993); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1413-14 (9th Cir. 1991); Gin-
zburg v. Memorial Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 998, 1026-27 (S.D. Tex. 1997); 
Nationwide R.A.C. Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., No. C-96-2877 FMS, 1997 WL 88399, 
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 1997); Bogan v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 953 F. Supp. 
532, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Patel v. Scotland Mem’l Hosp., No. 3:94CV00284, 1995 
WL 319213, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 1995). 
 72. See Capital Imaging Assocs., 996 F.2d at 547 (stating that a demonstration of 
procompetitive justifications is unnecessary where plaintiff has not carried initial bur-
den of showing anticompetitive effect: “[o]nly after a plaintiff has successfully met its 
initial burden under the rule of reason must an antitrust defendant offer evidence to 
exonerate its conduct.”); Patel, 1995 WL 319213, at *1 n.4 (dismissing plaintiff’s argu-
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3. Exclusive dealing 
An exclusive dealing agreement typically requires a buyer 
to purchase products or services from a particular seller for an 
extended period of time.73 One type of exclusive dealing ar-
rangement, a requirements contract, provides that the buyer 
will purchase all of its requirements from the seller.74 Under 
another type of arrangement, an output contract, a seller sup-
plies all of its output to the buyer.75 The concern with exclusive 
dealing agreements is that they foreclose a segment of the 
market from competing purchasers.76 On the other hand, such 
agreements can have procompetitive benefits, such as enlisting 
dealers to promote a seller’s product and discouraging free rid-
ing.77 
a. The results. Courts dismissed 62 out of 70, or 89% of, ex-
clusive dealing cases on account of the plaintiffs’ failure to 
demonstrate a significant anticompetitive effect. One case was 
dismissed for the defendant’s failure to show a procompetitive 
effect.78 Six of the cases do not fit into any category, as courts 
summarily found that the agreement was an unreasonable re-
straint of trade,79 was not an unreasonable restraint,80 was rea-
 
ment that defendants “have failed to set forth any pro-competitive justifications for 
their actions” because these explanations are required only where plaintiff satisfies 
initial burden of showing anticompetitive effect). 
 73. See XI HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1800, at 3 (1998); 1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 
27, § 23.01[1] at 23-2. 
 74. See, e.g., City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641 (10th 
Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Lab. Corp., 117 
F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997); TCA Bldg. Co. v. Northwestern Resources Co., 873 F. Supp. 
29 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Taggart v. Rutledge, 657 F. Supp. 1420 (D. Mont. 1987); XI 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, ¶ 1800, at 4. 
 75. See, e.g., Garshman v. Universal Resources Holding Inc., 824 F.2d 223 (3d 
Cir. 1987); XI HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, ¶ 1800, at 4. 
 76. This foreclosure is a type of adverse effect on competition. See, e.g., M & H 
Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 987 (1st Cir. 1984); Satellite Tele-
vision & Associated Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevision, Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 357-
58 (4th Cir. 1983); Contractor Util. Sales Co. v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 638 F.2d 
1061, 1078-79 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 77. See, e.g., Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1234 & n.17 (8th Cir. 
1987); XI HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, ¶ 1812, at 130-36. 
 78. See Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 
1304-05 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 79. See Oltz v. St. Peter’s Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1988); 
Fishman v. Wirtz, Nos. 74-C-2814, 78-C-3621, 1981 WL 2153, at *56 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 
1981). 
 80. See Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139, 150-51 (3d Cir. 
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sonable,81 or promoted competition.82 In only 1 of the 70 cases 
(1.4%) did a court conduct any inquiry akin to balancing. 
b. One instance of balancing. In Servicetrends, Inc. v. Sie-
mens Medical Systems, Inc.,83 the court upheld an exclusive 
dealing agreement. It found that the foreclosure of 32 to 38% of 
the market, together with the longstanding practice at issue 
and the asserted business justifications for the agreement, led 
to the conclusion that the agreements did not “substantially 
foreclose”84 competition. The court’s consideration of foreclosure 
and the defendant’s justifications can be viewed, most broadly, 
as a form of balancing. 
c. Instance of burden-shifting. The case of Calculators Ha-
waii, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc.85 illustrates the benefits of the bur-
den-shifting approach. In particular, the case is an example of 
the paradigm operating to prevent courts from being distracted 
by an alleged absence of procompetitive benefit when they 
should (at least initially) be focusing on anticompetitive effect. 
The court in Brandt reversed a lower court’s judgment for the 
plaintiff that had been based on the insufficiency of the defen-
dant’s justification. The appellate court observed that the 
manufacturer’s refusal to sell repair parts to a dealer, on ac-
count of an exclusive dealing agreement into which it had en-
tered with another dealer, was “simply insufficient”86 to prove 
anticompetitive effect. 
4. Tying 
In a tying arrangement, a seller agrees to sell a product to a 
buyer only on the condition that the buyer purchases a second 
product from it, or agrees not to purchase a product from an-
other supplier.87 Courts have found tying agreements to be per 
se unlawful if four factors are present: (1) two separate prod-
 
1981). 
 81. See National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 507 F. Supp. 1113, 
1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 82. See Gemini Concerts, Inc. v. Triple-A Baseball Club Assocs., 664 F. Supp. 24, 
27 (D. Me. 1987); Woodbury Daily Times Co. v. Los Angeles Times-Washington Post 
News Serv., 616 F. Supp. 502, 511 (D.N.J. 1985). 
 83. 870 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Ga. 1994). 
 84. Id. at 1066. 
 85. 724 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 86. Id. at 1337. 
 87. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). 
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ucts or services; (2) an agreement to sell one product condi-
tioned on the sale of another; (3) economic power in the tying 
product market; and (4) a not insubstantial amount of inter-
state commerce in the tied product market.88 Courts also have 
examined such agreements under the Rule of Reason. In doing 
so, they require a showing of an anticompetitive effect in the 
tied product market.89 Tying agreements include more subtle 
forms of conditioning such as “line forcing” agreements, by 
which a manufacturer agrees to license a dealer to sell its 
products, but only on the condition that the dealer sells a full 
or a representative line of the products.90 The concern with ty-
ing arrangements is that a supplier can enhance its market 
power by forcing a purchaser to buy a product that it may not 
wish to purchase.91 
a. The results. In the tying cases in which courts applied the 
Rule of Reason, 29 out of 33, or 88%, were dismissed because 
the plaintiff failed to show a significant anticompetitive effect. 
One case was dismissed because the defendant failed to offer a 
procompetitive justification.92 Two cases did not fall into any 
category, as the courts found the agreement to be reasonable93 
or affirmed a jury verdict of unreasonableness.94 Only one case 
(3%) involved balancing. 
 
 88. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-64 
(1992). 
 89. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 761-63 
(7th Cir. 1996); L.A.P.D., Inc. v. General Elec. Corp., No. 94-C-664, 1994 WL 424120, at 
*4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 1994); Reisner v. General Motors Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1167, 1178-
79 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 90. See, e.g., Southern Card & Novelty, Inc. v. Lawson Mardon Label, Inc., 138 
F.3d 869 (11th Cir. 1998); Smith Mach. Co. v. Hesston Corp., 878 F.2d 1290 (10th Cir. 
1989); Ransomes Am. Corp. v. Spartan Distribs., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Mich. 
1996). 
 91. For an argument that tying cannot increase market power in the tied product 
market, because “an increase in the price charged for the tied product will . . . reduce 
the price that the purchaser is willing to pay for the tying product,” see Posner, Chi-
cago School, supra note 27, at 926; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrange-
ments and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 143-44 (1984) [hereinafter 
Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements]; Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional 
Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1997) (contending 
that tying arrangements are not the result of coercion). 
 92. See Barber & Ross Co. v. Lifetime Doors, Inc., 810 F.2d 1276, 1280 (4th Cir. 
1987) (noting that plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to support finding that defen-
dant’s justification was pretext). 
 93. See Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 94. See Parts and Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 826 F.2d 712, 721 (7th 
Cir. 1987). 
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b. One instance of balancing. In Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru, 
Inc.,95 the court reversed a judgment for a plaintiff car dealer 
who was required, in purchasing cars from a regional distribu-
tor, to purchase spare parts kits. It concluded that the plaintiff 
failed to show that the anticompetitive effects outweighed “le-
gitimate . . . business justifications”96 such as making certain 
that dealers had enough spare parts on hand to make repairs.97 
Balancing was unnecessary: the court found that the defen-
dants had a “miniscule”98 market share in the tying product, 
that there was no actual anticompetitive effect in the tied 
product market,99 and that the tie had, at most, “trivial ef-
fects.”100 
B. Horizontal Arrangements 
Courts have examined horizontal arrangements, or ar-
rangements between competitors,101 under both the per se rule 
and the Rule of Reason. Because many of these arrangements 
do not typically have any procompetitive benefits, courts have 
applied per se treatment to such horizontal activities as price 
fixing,102 agreements to limit output,103 and agreements to allo-
cate markets.104 Nonetheless, some horizontal arrangements 
have received treatment under the Rule of Reason as well. 
1. Unfair competition 
Certain types of horizontal arrangements can broadly be 
grouped under the heading “unfair competition.” For example, 
plaintiffs have challenged the appropriation of confidential re-
cords and customer lists by former employees,105 the appropria-
 
 95. 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 96. Id. at 799. 
 97. See id. at 793. 
 98. Id. at 797. 
 99. See id. at 799. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); Crane & 
Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802, 805 (6th Cir. 1988); 1 VON 
KALINOWSKI, supra note 27, § 8.03[4], at 8-30. 
 102. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
 103. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945). 
 104. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 
(1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). 
 105. See, e.g., Military Servs. Realty, Inc. v. Realty Consultants, Ltd., 823 F.2d 
829 (4th Cir. 1987); H.J. Hodes & Co. v. Triangle Brass & Specialties Co., No. 79-0673-
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tion of more general opportunities,106 and verbal attacks or 
defamation.107 Additionally, plaintiffs have challenged particu-
lar agreements, such as restrictive covenants,108 covenants not 
to compete,109 and blanket licenses.110 Although many of these 
actions may constitute, for example, state-law business torts, 
they typically do not present an injury to competition. 
a. The results. Of the 69 unfair competition cases courts 
have examined under the Rule of Reason, 58, or 84%, were 
dismissed on account of the plaintiff’s failure to show a signifi-
cant anticompetitive effect. Three cases did not fall into any 
category, as the court summarily found the challenged activity 
to be a reasonable111 or an unreasonable112 restraint, or it af-
firmed a verdict that a restraint was anticompetitive.113 Courts 
in three cases (4.5%) found that the defendant failed to show a 
legitimate procompetitive justification.114 One court disposed of 
a case by finding that the restraint was reasonably neces-
sary.115 In four cases (6%), the courts balanced anticompetitive 
and procompetitive effects. 
b. Four instances of balancing. In two of the balancing 
cases, the courts could have disposed of the case on the ground 
 
CV-W-3, 1979 WL 1804 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 11, 1979). 
 106. See, e.g., Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 107. See, e.g., Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1992); Bushnell Corp. 
v. ITT Corp., 973 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Kan. 1997). 
 108. See, e.g., Goodman v. Acme Mkts., Inc., Civ.A.No.88-6447, 1989 WL 42484 
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 1989); Coleman v. General Elec. Co., 643 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Tenn. 
1986). 
 109. See, e.g., Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1983); Caremark 
Homecare, Inc. v. New England Critical Care, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Minn. 1988); 
Westgo Indus., Inc. v. W.J. King Co., Civ. No. A3-75-82, 1981 WL 2064 (D.N.D. Mar. 
31, 1981). 
 110. See, e.g., F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, No. 81-1333, 1982 WL 
19198 (7th Cir. Mar. 25, 1982); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. American Soc’y of Com-
posers, Authors & Publishers, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980); National Cable Television 
Ass’n v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1991). 
 111. See Burchett v. General Tel. Co., 699 F. Supp. 114, 119 (E.D. Ky. 1988). 
 112. See International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 
1255, 1268 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 113. See Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342, 1353 
(5th Cir. 1980). 
 114. See In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, 955 F.2d 457, 471-72 (6th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 153-54 (E.D. Wis. 1983), aff’d, 
756 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1985); Countrie Butcher Shoppe, Inc. v. Foodarama Supermar-
kets, Inc., No. 81-5336, 1982 WL 1909, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1982). 
 115. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 767-72 (D. 
Del. 1981), aff’d, 691 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1982). 
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that the plaintiff failed to allege a significant anticompetitive 
effect. In Jetro Cash & Carry Enterprises, Inc. v. Food Distribu-
tion Center,116 the court upheld a restrictive covenant that al-
lowed vendors to sell their products in only 18 acres of a 400-
acre section of a market and prescribed the hours during which 
such products could be sold.117 The court found that, in light of 
the large geographic market and close proximity of other mar-
kets, “the covenant simply [did] not have a significant adverse 
effect on competition.”118 Rather than dismiss the case on this 
showing, however, the court found it “more important[]”119 that 
the restraints, by creating a “segregated market,”120 had pro-
competitive benefits: bringing together buyers and sellers and 
facilitating quality and price comparison.121 The court con-
cluded that “the insignificant adverse impact on trade is out-
weighed by the benefits.”122 
Similarly, in Net Realty Holding Trust v. Franconia Proper-
ties, Inc.,123 the court upheld a restrictive covenant requiring 
certain stores in a mall to operate as department stores for par-
ticular periods of time.124 The court found that the covenant 
had a “very slight” anticompetitive effect as it affected only a 
fraction of 1% of the market.125 It nonetheless considered the 
“many” procompetitive effects of the covenant: facilitating cost 
comparison and combating the free-rider problem by allowing 
“anchor” stores to recoup the benefit of contributing to the suc-
cess of the mall.126 The court concluded that the “minimal anti-
competitive impact”127 of the covenant is “far outweighed by 
[its] procompetitive effects.”128 
The other two balancing cases, in which the courts found 
the anticompetitive effects to predominate, reveal some of the 
dangers of balancing. In United States v. North Dakota Hospi-
 
 116. 569 F. Supp. 1404 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
 117. See id. at 1407-08. 
 118. Id. at 1416. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. No. 82-0318-A, 1983 WL 1786 (E.D. Va. Jan. 20, 1983). 
 124. See id. at *1. 
 125. Id. at *7. 
 126. See id. at *7-*8. 
 127. Id. at *8. 
 128. Id. 
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tal Ass’n,129 nonprofit hospitals (with operating margins 2 to 3% 
above cost) and a hospital association billed customers based on 
their actual costs rather than granting discounts.130 The Indian 
Health Service (“IHS”), an agency of the United States De-
partment of Health and Human Services, entered into con-
tracts with the hospitals for the treatment of eligible Native 
Americans.131 The local IHS then sought new contracts that 
would provide for payment based on a discounted Medicaid 
rate.132 The hospitals ultimately declined the reimbursement 
rate but temporarily agreed to an “open market limitation” of 
$10,000 per patient.133 The court’s treatment of anticompetitive 
effect was flawed because it failed to define a market in which 
IHS had market power, failed to credit properly the discounts 
in fact applied by the $10,000 limit per patient,134 and recog-
nized that the reimbursement method proposed by IHS was 
“inherently anticompetitive”135 because it “remove[d] the finan-
cial incentive for price competition and cost containment.”136 
The court also noted that the purpose of the restraint “was not 
to maximize . . . profits, but to protect other patients and pay-
ers from having to absorb the cost of granting discounts to the 
IHS.”137 Further, the procompetitive effects of the actions in 
creating a “single standardized reimbursement methodology”138 
facilitated price comparisons by purchasers. The court nonethe-
less concluded that “the anticompetitive harm of [the actions] 
outweigh[ed] the procompetitive benefits.”139 
In TV Signal Co. v. AT&T,140 the defendant telephone com-
pany enforced a policy of attaching a maximum of one cable per 
 
 129. 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.N.D. 1986). 
 130. See id. at 1030-31, 1039. 
 131. See id. at 1030. 
 132. See id. at 1031. 
 133. Id. at 1032-34. 
 134. See id. at 1039 (conceding that the restraint “did not actually have [an] ad-
verse effect on the price IHS paid for services”). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1038. See also id. at 1038-39 (explaining that the hospitals had endeav-
ored to prevent shifting the cost of the Medicaid discount onto other patients and pay-
ors; moreover, IHS had “repeatedly run out of funds before the end of the fiscal year, 
resulting in large sums of money for which the hospitals were never paid for services 
rendered to IHS patients”). 
 138. Id. at 1039. 
 139. Id. 
 140. No. Civ.70-6N, 1981 WL 2049 (D.S.D. Mar. 13, 1981). 
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telephone pole to the detriment of the plaintiff cable television 
company.141 The court conceded that, even “in spite of 
[d]efendants’ [p]olicy,”142 the plaintiff was able to enter the 
market. Not only did the court fail to examine any effect on 
competition, but it also neglected to review defendants’ claimed 
justifications for the policy: “[s]uch legitimate reasons may well 
exist, but when they travel in company with a significant anti-
competitive purpose and effect, they cannot sanitize the 
[d]efendants’ [p]olicy.”143 
c. Instances of burden-shifting. In Clorox Co. v. Sterling 
Winthrop, Inc.,144 the court articulated the burden-shifting 
paradigm and found no anticompetitive effect.145 The court rec-
ognized that its discussion of procompetitive effects was “im-
material” since the plaintiff did not meet its initial burden of 
showing a significant anticompetitive effect.146 
The court in Jim Forno’s Continental Motors, Inc. v. Subaru 
Distributors Corp.147 illustrated the dangers of not following the 
construct. In this case, the court found no anticompetitive ef-
fect but nonetheless accepted the argument by the plaintiff—
who was seeking “to resurrect his complaint”148—that proof of 
anticompetitive effect is not necessary if the restraint does not 
have a procompetitive justification.149 Even though the court in 
Jim Forno’s indicated that the plaintiff was stretching the case 
law,150 it addressed the plaintiff’s radical theory on its own 
terms: “[W]e do not believe that the challenged action, as a 
matter of law, could have no procompetitive effect.”151 Adher-
ence to the burden-shifting approach would prevent such er-
rors. 
 
 141. See id. at *2; see also TV Signal Co. v. AT&T, 617 F.2d 1302, 1305 (8th Cir. 
1980). 
 142. T.V. Signal Co. v. AT&T, 1981 WL 2049, at *5. 
 143. Id. 
 144. 117 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 145. See id. at 56-57. 
 146. See id. at 59-60. Another Second Circuit decision recognized the benefits of 
the initial requirement of anticompetitive effect, which “ensures that otherwise routine 
disputes between business competitors do not escalate to the status of an antitrust ac-
tion.” Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 147. 649 F. Supp. 746 (N.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 148. Id. at 754. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. Id. 
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2. Trade association rules and activities 
Trade associations typically consist of companies sharing a 
common interest in an industry.152 Although such associations 
often promote competition, they have the potential to harm 
competition, in particular, by promulgating certain rules,153 ex-
cluding prospective members,154 and disciplining current mem-
bers.155 Because courts have recognized that associations need 
certain criteria and rules to exist and function,156 the question 
addressed by courts often is whether the restraint is reasona-
bly necessary to attain the desired objective.157 By necessity, 
then, the instances of balancing and inquiries of reasonable ne-
cessity promise to be higher in this area. 
a. The results. The results bear out this prediction. In 31 
out of 63 association cases (49%), the court disposed of the case 
because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a significant anti-
competitive effect. In 7 of the 63 cases (11%), the court found 
that the defendant did not offer a legitimate procompetitive 
justification.158 In 4 of the 63 cases (6%), the court found for the 
defendant because the restraint was reasonably necessary159 or 
 
 152. See, e.g., 1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 27, § 15.03, at 15-17. 
 153. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (rule for televising 
product); National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (canon of 
ethics); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1988) (prod-
uct standard); Eliason Corp. v. National Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 
1980) (same); Weight-Rite Golf Corp. v. United States Golf Ass’n, 766 F. Supp. 1104 
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (prohibiting use of certain equipment). 
 154. See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994); Mid-
South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983); In re Appraiser Found. Antitrust 
Litig., 867 F. Supp. 1407 (D. Minn. 1994); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopae-
dic Surgeons, No. 80C1405, 1991 WL 5827 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 1991). 
 155. See, e.g., Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Wigod v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., No. 87C3743, 1989 WL 76865 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 
1989); Martin v. American Kennel Club, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Catrone 
v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 302 (D. Mass. 1988). 
 156. See, e.g., Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598-99 
(7th Cir. 1996); Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1580-81 
(11th Cir. 1991); Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d 445, 454-55 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 157. See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc., 36 F.3d at 970; National Bancard Corp. v. Visa 
U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 601 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 158. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459, 
462-64 (1986); Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113-20; National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 
U.S. at 693-96; Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021-24 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. 
Ct. 65 (1998); Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674-76 (7th 
Cir. 1992); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mardi-
rosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628, 648-51 (D.D.C. 1979). 
 159. See SCFC ILC, Inc., 36 F.3d at 971-72 (association bylaw reasonably neces-
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the plaintiff was not able to prove a less restrictive alterna-
tive.160 Twelve of the cases did not fall into any category, as the 
courts found the activity to be reasonable,161 procompetitive,162 
or not an unreasonable restraint of trade.163 Finally, courts in 
nine of the cases (14%) balanced the anticompetitive and pro-
competitive effects of the restraint. 
b. Nine instances of balancing. In 2 of the 9 balancing cases, 
the court found not only that the procompetitive effects out-
weighed the anticompetitive effects but also that the plaintiff 
failed to show an anticompetitive effect. In National Bancard 
Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.,164 the court upheld an interchange 
fee imposed by the financial institutions processing transac-
tions in a credit card system.165 The court held that the pro-
competitive effects of the fee—attaining widespread acceptance 
of the credit card system and allowing the creation of a product 
that member banks could not produce by themselves—
outweighed any anticompetitive effects.166 The court also found 
that the defendant, which possessed, at most, 5% of the rele-
 
sary to prevent free riding in competitive market); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 
382-83 (D. Ariz. 1983) (sanctions reasonably related to objectives and not overbroad); 
Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass’n, 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1117-21, 
1124 (D. Neb.), aff’d, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981) (association guideline reasonably re-
lated to legitimate goals and no more extensive than necessary). Although the holdings 
of these cases were based on reasonable necessity, the courts did not apply the burden-
shifting construct. 
 160. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319 (finding that association sanctions had anti-
competitive and procompetitive effects but that plaintiff failed to show that associa-
tion’s objectives could be achieved “in a substantially less restrictive manner”). 
 161. See McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344-45 (5th Cir. 1988); Independ-
ent Entertainment Group, Inc. v. NBA, 853 F. Supp. 333, 338-39 (C.D. Cal. 1994); Bis-
hara v. American Bd. of Orthopaedic Surgery, Inc., No. 85C3400, 1986 WL 15265, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1986); Cooney v. American Horse Shows Ass’n, 495 F. Supp. 424, 
431-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Paralegal Inst., Inc. v. American Bar Ass’n, 475 F. Supp. 1123, 
1130-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d, 622 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 162. See Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 
F.2d 1400, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986); Southtrust Corp. v. Plus Sys., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1517, 
1524-25 (N.D. Ala. 1995). 
 163. See Consolidated Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anchor Sav. Ass’n, No. 79-2260, 
1980 WL 4691, at *2 (10th Cir. July 24, 1980); Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Elec. 
Contractors Ass’n, 579 F.2d 484, 491-92 (9th Cir. 1978); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 
1136, 1140, 1153-54 (5th Cir. 1977); Western Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., 
Civ.A.No. 90-2063, 1994 WL 773361, at *2 (D.D.C. June 16, 1994); Admiral Theatre 
Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 437 F. Supp. 1268, 1294-95 (D. Neb. 1977), modified, 585 
F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1978). 
 164. 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 165. See id. at 594-95. 
 166. See id. at 605. 
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vant market, did not have market power.167 In Plueckhahn v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange,168 the court considered an em-
ployment policy of a group of insurance companies that limited 
conflicts of interest by preventing managerial employees in a 
supervisory regional office from working for those they had 
previously supervised.169 The court held that the procompeti-
tive effects of preventing impropriety “clearly outweigh the hy-
pothetical anticompetitive effects.”170 Again, the court could 
have dismissed the case because the plaintiff failed to demon-
strate anticompetitive effect, making balancing unnecessary.171 
In Cantor v. Multiple Listing Service, Inc.,172 a finding of no 
anticompetitive effect could have been made and would have 
changed the outcome. The court invalidated a real estate mul-
tiple listing service bylaw that allowed only one type of sign—
that of the multiple listing service—to be posted on the prop-
erty for sale.173 The court found that the anticompetitive effects 
of the bylaw outweighed the justifications of distributing com-
missions among members of the service.174 But the anticom-
petitive effect alleged was only “a substantial adverse impact 
on plaintiffs’ businesses.”175 Considering that the plaintiffs 
were 2 of over 600 licensed real estate brokers in the local 
market,176 the adverse effect appeared to be on a competitor 
rather than on competition.177 With no adverse effect on compe-
tition, the restraint should have been upheld. 
In two cases, the court found that the procompetitive effects 
outweighed anticompetitive effects. In Eureka Urethane, Inc. v. 
Professional Bowling Ass’n, Inc.,178 the court upheld a bowling 
association’s product standards and certification that precluded 
 
 167. See id. at 604-05. 
 168. 749 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 169. See id. at 244. 
 170. Id. at 247. 
 171. See id. 
 172. 568 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 173. See id. at 426-27. 
 174. See id. at 431. 
 175. Id. at 430. 
 176. See id. at 426. 
 177. The court’s discussion of anticompetitive effect confirms this conclusion. The 
court noted that plaintiffs’ compliance with the bylaw led to a decrease in business and 
“vitiated any competitive advantage” that plaintiffs sought to obtain in entering into an 
agreement with another real estate organization. Id. at 430. 
 178. 746 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Mo. 1990). 
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the use in televised tournaments of a bowling ball manufac-
tured by the plaintiff.179 The court found that the association’s 
right “to administer the sport of professional bowling”180 out-
weighed the anticompetitive effects of foreclosure of the bowl-
ing ball from the defined market.181 In NBA v. Williams,182 the 
court addressed the NBA’s collegiate draft, right of first re-
fusal, and salary cap.183 The court found that, because of the ex-
istence of a collective bargaining agreement between the play-
ers and the NBA, the restraints fell within the nonstatutory 
labor exemption to the antitrust laws.184 In dicta, the court 
summarily found that the players “have failed to show that the 
alleged restraints of trade are on balance unreasonably anti-
competitive,”185 and the procompetitive effects, such as main-
taining competitive balance, “may outweigh their restrictive 
consequences.”186 
The majority of cases finding that the anticompetitive ef-
fects of an association rule outweigh the procompetitive effects 
have occurred in the context of sports leagues. In Los Angeles 
Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL (“Raiders”),187 the 
court invalidated the NFL’s rules concerning the relocation of 
franchises. After finding that the rules had anticompetitive and 
procompetitive effects, the court concluded that less restrictive 
alternatives could have achieved the NFL’s objectives of achiev-
ing financial stability, recovering expenditures invested in sta-
diums and other facilities, and promoting fan loyalty.188 In par-
ticular, the court recommended that the NFL adopt relocation 
rules that incorporated objective factors.189 
In North American Soccer League v. NFL,190 the court in-
validated a proposed amendment to the NFL Constitution and 
By-laws that would have prevented NFL owners from “pos-
 
 179. See id. at 920-21. 
 180. Id. at 933. 
 181. See id. 
 182. 857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 183. See id. at 1071. 
 184. See id. at 1078. 
 185. Id. at 1079. 
 186. Id. 
 187. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 188. See id. at 1396. 
 189. See id. at 1397. 
 190. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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sess[ing] any interest in another major team sport.”191 The 
court found a limited market of “sports capital and skill”192 
composed in large part of owners of major professional sports 
teams.193 It further found that the foreclosure of this market by 
the cross-ownership rule outweighed procompetitive effects 
proffered by the NFL: ensuring the undivided loyalty of team 
owners, preventing disclosure of confidential information, pre-
venting the dilution of goodwill, avoiding a potential source of 
disruption of NFL operations, and preventing collusion be-
tween the leagues.194 Although the court credited the latter 
three of these rationales, it found the procompetitive effects to 
be “clearly outweighed” by anticompetitive effects.195 
In Eleven Line, Inc. v. North Texas State Soccer Ass’n,196 the 
court found unreasonable a soccer association’s rules on player 
registration that decreased options for consumers and that had 
the result of limiting indoor soccer contests.197 Finally, in Rose-
brough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Ass’n,198 the 
court struck down a rule adopted by a trade association of 
cemetery owners that limited the preparation of foundations 
for grave markers and monuments to the cemetery owning the 
lot.199 The court found that the rule reduced competition and 
that the anticompetitive effect was “obvious”200 and outweighed 
any procompetitive effects.201 
c. Instance of burden-shifting. The association cases also of-
fer one instance in which the court applied the burden-shifting 
approach to the benefit of the plaintiff. In Law v. NCAA,202 the 
court applied this approach to an NCAA rule that limited com-
pensation to entry-level college coaches known as “restricted-
 
 191. Id. at 1255. 
 192. Id. at 1259-60. 
 193. See id. at 1260. 
 194. See id. at 1261. 
 195. Id. For criticism of the Raiders and North American Soccer League cases, see 
infra notes 494-503, 591-602 and accompanying text. 
 196. No. CA-3-95-CV-3120-R, 1998 WL 574893 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 1998). 
 197. See id. at *3-5; Eleven Line, Inc. v. North Texas State Soccer Ass’n, No. CA-
3:95-CV-3120-R, 1997 WL 135684, at *1-3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 1997). 
 198. 666 F.2d 1130 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 199. See id. at 1136, 1140. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See id. 
 202. 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 65 (1998). 
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earnings” coaches.203 Under a “quick look” Rule of Reason 
analysis, the court found that the “artificial[] lowering [of] the 
price of coaching services”204 constituted an anticompetitive ef-
fect. The court then considered, and rejected, the three pro-
competitive justifications offered by the defendant, finding that 
(1) there was no evidence that the restraint allowed entry-level 
coaches to retain their positions; (2) the reduction of costs, 
standing alone, was not “a valid procompetitive justification”;205 
and (3) the restraint was not designed to achieve competitive 
balance.206 The court appropriately recognized that it did not 
need to address the issue of less restrictive alternatives,207 nor 
did it pursue balancing. In short, the burden-shifting approach, 
in addition to benefitting defendants by dismissing cases with 
no anticompetitive effect, can also benefit plaintiffs. 
C. Survey Results 
Summing up the results of Part I reveals that most courts 
have disposed of Rule of Reason cases on the ground that the 
plaintiff failed to prove a significant anticompetitive effect, and 
few courts have balanced anticompetitive and procompetitive 





418 out of 495 cases 
(84%) 
No procompetitive  
justification: 





6 out of 495 cases (1%) 
Balancing: 20 out of 495 cases 
(4%) 
 
This Article will now explore the normative consequences of 
these figures. Is it beneficial that courts dispose of most anti-
 
 203. Id. at 1013-14. 
 204. Id. at 1020. 
 205. Id. at 1022. 
 206. See id. at 1021-24. 
 207. See id. at 1024 n.16. 
 208. Again, the figures add up to less than 100% because some courts summarily 
found restraints to be, for example, reasonable or unreasonable. See supra note 32. 
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trust cases because the plaintiff has failed to prove a signifi-
cant anticompetitive effect? Is balancing justified? Are the 
other factors that courts examine justified? 
II. THE PROPRIETY OF THE RULE OF REASON FACTORS 
Part II draws on historical and contemporary sources to de-
termine whether courts should consider the factors utilized in a 
Rule of Reason analysis. In particular, it looks to the legislative 
history of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the common law that 
predated the Sherman Act, and two contemporary schools of 
antitrust philosophy—the “Chicago School of Economics” and 
the “Post-Chicago School.”209 Section A will introduce the four 
guideposts, and the four succeeding sections will apply each of 
the sources to the factors of anticompetitive effect, procompeti-
tive justifications, reasonable necessity, less restrictive alterna-
tives, and balancing. 
A. The Sources 
1. The legislative history of the Sherman Act 
Analysis of a statute normally begins with its text.210 In this 
instance, however, the text provides no assistance in our search 
for support for the factors of a Rule of Reason analysis. Section 
1 of the Sherman Act, the applicable statutory provision, pro-
vides, in relevant part: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to 
be illegal.211 
The text thus provides that every contract, combination, or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade is illegal. The courts, appropri-
ately, have not interpreted the statute literally. Instead, they 
have found that only unreasonable restraints are illegal. In any 
 
 209. Utilizing the legislative history and common law preceding the Sherman Act 
as interpretive tools should not be controversial. The deference accorded to the two con-
temporary schools will vary based on the reader’s outlook, but the schools nonetheless 
offer insights on the propriety of the factors. See infra text succeeding note 323. 
 210. See, e.g., Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 128 (1983); 
Bread Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm., 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982). 
 211. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997). 
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event, the text of the Sherman Act does not offer any clues 
upon which we can rely in analyzing the propriety of particular 
factors in a Rule of Reason analysis. We turn, therefore, to the 
legislative history of the Sherman Act. 
The Sherman Act was a consequence of the post-Civil-War 
era. The period between 1865 and 1890 witnessed remarkable 
developments and innovations in manufacturing, agriculture, 
transportation, and communication.212 These changes were fu-
eled by a laissez-faire governmental policy, along with in-
creases in investment, speculation, and private banking.213 In 
response to these changes, new forms of business organization 
developed, such as corporations, pools,214 and trusts.215 Trusts 
became the combination of choice for many businessmen be-
cause they were exempt from the restrictions that states im-
posed on corporations and they had the enforcement capabili-
ties that pools lacked.216 Consequently, trusts amassed 
significant power and came to dominate various industries. 
By the late 1880s, the accumulation of power by trusts had 
engendered public hostility.217 Farmers had suffered from the 
discriminatory railroad rebate system and small independent 
businessmen had often been harmed by their larger competi-
tors’ economic power.218 The public was dismayed that trusts 
were supported by tariffs, which limited foreign competition, 
and by instances of graft and political corruption.219 States 
could not effectively control the trusts because each state’s ju-
 
 212. See 1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 27, § 9.02[1], at 9-4; 1 THE LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 9 (Earl W. Kintner 
ed., 1978) [hereinafter 1 Kintner]. 
 213. See 1 Kintner, supra note 212, at 9. 
 214. Pools were formed by competitors that jointly agreed to wield their economic 
power through methods such as dividing markets, sharing profits, and discriminating 
against other entities. See id. at 10. 
 215. Trusts were “characterized by two or more corporations . . . secur[ing] cen-
tralized control over the businesses of the trust members.” 1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra 
note 27, § 9.02[2][a], at 9-5 n.10. Such centralization would be achieved when share-
holders of the member corporations transferred their shares to a single trustee or board 
of trustees, who would receive full control over the management of the trust. See id. 
 216. See 1 Kintner, supra note 212, at 10. 
 217. See id. at 11; William T. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 
1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 222-25 (1956) (public sentiment was “sufficient . . . 
to persuade Congress that something had to be done”). 
 218. See HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN 
AMERICAN TRADITION 58-62 (1955); 1 Kintner, supra note 212, at 11. 
 219. See THORELLI, supra note 218, at 62; 1 Kintner, supra note 212, at 11; Let-
win, supra note 217, at 235. 
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risdiction was limited to conduct occurring within its borders 
and the states lacked sufficient resources for enforcement.220 In 
short, the opportunity to address trusts was placed squarely 
before Congress. 
Congress realized the problem before it. The legislators in-
voked a menagerie of metaphors to describe the trusts: “tyran-
nies”;221 “commercial monsters”;222 entities that “devour the 
substance of the people and grind the faces of the poor.”223 The 
“oppressive and merciless character of the evils”224 that trusts 
inflicted upon consumers was “known and admitted every-
where.”225 Members of Congress felt that trusts presented the 
“gigantic commercial sin”226 of the era and were a “menace to 
republican institutions.”227 
On July 10, 1888, Senator John Sherman (R-Ohio) intro-
duced a resolution directing the Finance Committee to “inquire 
into . . . [the] control . . . [of] trusts.”228 On August 14, 1888, 
Senator Sherman introduced his initial antitrust bill, which 
declared unlawful 
all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combina-
tions . . . made with a view, or which tend, to prevent full and 
free competition in the production, manufacture, or sale of ar-
ticles . . . and all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, 
or combinations . . . designed, or which tend, to advance the 
cost to the consumer of any of such articles.229 
 Thus began debate on the Sherman Act. Most of the debate 
focused on issues not relevant here, such as the constitutional-
 
 220. See I EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 4.1, at 128 (1980) [here-
inafter I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW]. 
 221. 21 CONG. REC. 2726 (1890) (statement of Sen. Edmunds (R-Vt.)). 
 222. 20 id. at 1457 (1889) (statement of Sen. Jones (D-Ark.)). Senator Jones con-
tinued the theme: “[H]aving been allowed to grow and fatten upon the public, their suc-
cess is an example of evil that has excited the greed and conscienceless rapacity of 
commercial sharks until in schools they are to be found now in every branch of trade, 
preying upon every industry . . . .” Id. 
 223. 21 id. at 2647 (1890) (statement of Sen. Vance (D-N.C.)). 
 224. Id. at 2558 (statement of Sen. Pugh (D-Ala.)). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 140 (statement of Sen. Turpie (D-Ind.)); see also id. at 2598 (statement 
of Sen. George (D-Miss.)) (there was “no subject likely to engage the attention of the 
present Congress in which the people of this country are more deeply interested than 
in the subject of trusts and combinations”). 
 227. Id. at 3146 (statement of Sen. Hoar (R-Mass.)). 
 228. 19 id. at 6041 (1888). 
 229. S. 3445, 50th Cong. (1888). 
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ity of the Act,230 its potential efficacy,231 and an amendment 
covering options and futures.232 But the debate nonetheless 
covered ground that offers assistance in examining factors in 
today’s Rule of Reason analysis. Draft bills and legislators’ 
comments touched upon issues relating to a restraint’s anti-
competitive effects233 and procompetitive justifications.234 Sig-
nificantly, the Senators and Representatives debated the cru-
cial role that the common law was to play in courts’ analysis of 
antitrust cases. 
The legislators realized that they could not define “the pre-
cise line”235 between “lawful combinations in aid of produc-
tion”236 and “unlawful combinations to prevent competition and 
in restraint of trade.”237 That task was “left for the courts to de-
termine in each particular case.”238 But the courts were not 
without guidance; in particular, they were to turn to the “old 
and well recognized principles of the common law.”239 
 
 230. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2727-28 (1890) (statement of Sen. Edmunds); id. at 
2607-08 (statement of Sen. Platt (R-Ct.)); id. at 2601-02 (statement of Sen. Reagan (D-
Tex.)); id. at 2597-600 (statement of Sen. George); id. at 2570-71 (statement of Sen. 
Vest (D-Mo.)); id. at 2558-59 (statement of Sen. Pugh); id. at 2556-58 (statement of 
Sen. Turpie); id. at 2467-68 (statement of Sen. Hiscock (R-N.Y.)); id. at 2463-67 (state-
ment of Sen. Vest); id. at 2460-62 (statement of Sen. Sherman); id. at  1768-71 (state-
ment of Sen. George). 
 231. See, e.g., id. at 2645-46 (1890) (statement of Sen. Eustis (D-La.)); id. at 2571 
(statement of Sen. Hiscock); id. at 2570-71 (statement of Sen. Vest); id. at 2568-69 
(statement of Sen. Sherman); id. at 1765-68 (statement of Sen. George); 20 id. at 1459-
62 (1889) (statement of Sen. George). 
 232. See, e.g., 21 id. at 2651-57 (statements of various Senators); id. at 2648-51 
(statement of Sen. Ingalls); id. at 2648 (statement of Sen. Pugh); id. at 2646 (statement 
of Sen. Eustis); id. at 2566 (statement of Sen. Blair (R-N.H.)); id. at 2562-63 (statement 
of Sen. Sherman); id. at 2560 (statement of Sen. Reagan);. id. at 2559-60 (statement of 
Sen. Sherman); id. at 2462-63 (statement of Sen. Ingalls). 
 233. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 234. See infra Section II.C.1. 
 235. 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman). 
 236. Id. at 2456. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 2460 (“All that we, as lawmakers, can do is to declare general princi-
ples, and we can be assured that the courts will apply them so as to carry out the 
meaning of the law, as the courts of England and the United States have done for cen-
turies.”); id. at 4089 (statement of Rep. Culberson (D-Tex.)) (“Now, just what contracts, 
what combinations in the form of trusts, or what conspiracies will be in restraint of the 
trade or commerce mentioned in the bill will not be known until the courts have con-
strued and interpreted this provision.”). 
 239. Id. at 2456 (statement of Sen. Sherman); see also id. at 2457 (“It is the unlaw-
ful combination, tested by the rules of common law and human experience, that is 
aimed at by this bill, and not the lawful and useful combination.”); id. at 3152 (state-
ment of Sen. Hoar) (“The great thing that this bill does . . . is to extend the common-law 
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Throughout the debate, Senators added numerous amend-
ments to the bill, creating an unwieldy amalgam that eventu-
ally contained 16 sections and 309 lines.240 Because of concerns 
about the size241 and the constitutionality242 of the bill, it was 
referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee,243 which returned 
a simplified version of the bill.244 After limited debate, the Sen-
ate approved the bill by a vote of 52-1, with twenty-nine Sena-
tors not voting.245 The House approved the bill by a vote of 242-
0, with eighty-five not voting.246 President Benjamin Harrison 
signed the Sherman Act into law on July 2, 1890.247 
2. Common law 
As already mentioned, the Sherman Act framers intended 
that courts would draw the dividing line between reasonable 
and unreasonable restraints of trade by applying the common 
law. Even though the common law was not as fixed or lucid as 
the framers believed,248 it fills in some of the gaps in the text 
 
principles, which protected fair competition in trade in old times in England, to inter-
national and interstate commerce in the United States.”); id. at 3149 (statement of Sen. 
Morgan (D-Ala.)) (noting the use in the debate of “common-law terms” and “common-
law definitions”); id. at 3146 (statement of Sen. Hoar) (“We have affirmed the old doc-
trine of the common law in regard to all interstate and international commercial trans-
actions . . . .”); id. at 2456 (“The purpose of this bill is to enable the courts of the United 
States to apply the same remedies against combinations which injuriously affect the 
interests of the United States that have been applied in the several States . . . .”). 
 240. See S. 1, 51st Cong. (as amended, Mar. 26, 1890). 
 241. See 21 CONG. REC. 2651-61 (1890). 
 242. See id. at 2597-611. 
 243. See id. at 2731. 
 244. See id. at 3152-53 (1890). 
 245. See id. at 3153. 
 246. See id. at 6314. Prior to the vote of the House of Representatives, the House 
had added an amendment to the bill, id. at 4104; the Senate had added an amendment 
to the amendment of the House, id. at 4753; and both houses then had withdrawn the 
amendments, id. at 6208. 
 247. See 1 Kintner, supra note 212, at 30. 
 248. See, e.g., I PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 
104a, at 64 (rev. ed. 1997) (noting variations among the states and that the common 
law of competition was in “a state of flux”) [hereinafter I AREEDA]; Robert H. Bork, Leg-
islative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, IX JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
7, 37 (1966) [hereinafter Bork, Legislative Intent] (characterizing the “common law” as 
“an artificial construct, made up for the occasion out of a careful selection of recent de-
cisions from a variety of jurisdictions plus a liberal admixture of the senators’ own pol-
icy prescriptions” and contending that “[i]t is to this ‘common law,’ holding full sway 
nowhere but in the debates of the Fifty-first Congress, that one must look to under-
stand the Sherman Act”). 
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and legislative history of the Sherman Act. This Section will 
provide a brief overview of the English and American common 
law predating the passage of the Sherman Act. 
a. English common law. Between the fifteenth and the sev-
enteenth centuries, English courts held all covenants in re-
straint of trade to be unlawful.249 The term “restraint of trade” 
initially did not have the broad meaning it has today; it re-
ferred only to agreements by which one of the parties to a con-
tract was prevented from pursuing a particular occupation or 
trade, or was restricted in the means by which he could carry 
on his trade.250 Typically, such contracts would be incidental (or 
“ancillary”251) to the principal contract for the sale or lease of a 
business, or to employment contracts, partnership agreements, 
or contracts for the sale of goods.252 Such restraints were con-
demned because of the harm caused to the public by being de-
prived of the restrained party’s work and the harm to the party 
himself, who would lose his livelihood and would not be able to 
support himself.253 The historic setting explains this treat-
ment—one who could not pursue his trade likely would not 
work at all.254 
With the change in economic conditions in seventeenth-
century England, and with the recognition that the refusal to 
enforce restraints prevented everyday business transactions, 
the courts began to uphold certain types of restraints.255 The 
 
 249. See, e.g., Dyer’s Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. V Pasch. f. 5, pl. 26 (1415); THORELLI, su-
pra note 218, at 17. 
 250. See, e.g., I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 220, § 2.4, at 49. 
 251. See id. § 2.6, at 54. 
 252. See id. § 2.4, at 49; THORELLI, supra note 218, at 17. 
 253. See, e.g., Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 68 (1873); Nor-
denfelt v. Maxim-Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535, 565; Leather 
Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, 9 L.R.-Eq. 345, 354 (1869); Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 
190, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 350 (K.B. 1711) (noting the dangers of the restraints “to the 
party, by the loss of his livelihood, and the subsistence of his family” and “to the pub-
lick, by depriving it of an useful member”); Case of Tailors of Ipswich, 11 Coke 53a, 
53b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218, 1219 (K.B. 1614) (“The law abhors idleness, the mother of all 
evil . . . and especially in young men, who ought in their youth . . . to learn lawful sci-
ences and trades, which are profitable to the commonwealth, and whereof they might 
reap the fruit in their old age, for idle in youth, poor in age . . . .”). 
 254. See Herreshoff v. Boutineau, 17 R.I. 3, 6, 19 A. 712, 713 (1890) (“In the days 
of the early English cases, one who could not work at his trade could hardly work at 
all. . . . Contracting not to follow one’s trade was about the same as contracting to be 
idle . . . .”). 
 255. See, e.g., I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 220, § 3.3, at 84; 1 
VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 27, § 8.02[1], at 8-15. 
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courts drew one distinction between general restraints, which 
were not restricted as to time or space,256 and partial restraints, 
which were so limited.257 While the courts condemned general 
restraints,258 they upheld partial restraints that were reason-
able.259 In Mitchel v. Reynolds,260 for example, the court upheld 
a promise by the seller of a bakery that he would not compete 
with the buyer of the business for five years in a limited area.261 
The court sustained the partial restraint because it was based 
on “good and adequate consideration.”262 In the wake of 
Mitchel, courts compared the values of the consideration 
granted and the right given up,263 a project that some courts be-
lieved they had “no means whatever to execute.”264 
A test based on reasonableness replaced the emphasis on 
consideration in Horner v. Graves.265 In Horner, the court up-
held a covenant by which a dentist agreed not to practice 
within a certain location and determined whether such a re-
straint was reasonable by considering “whether the restraint is 
such only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the 
party in favour of whom it is given, and not so large as to inter-
fere with the interests of the public.”266 So too, the term “re-
straint of trade” gradually expanded throughout the nineteenth 
century to encompass agreements designed to limit competition 
or to gain control of the market.267 
 
 256. See 1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 27, § 8.03[4], at 8-33. 
 257. See id.; see also Broad v. Jollyfe, Cro. Jac. 596, 79 Eng. Rep. 509 (K.B. 1619); 
Rogers v. Parrey, 2 Bulst. 136, 80 Eng. Rep. 1012 (K.B. 1613). 
 258. See Davies v. Davies, [1887] L.R. 36 Ch.D. 359; Mallan v. May, 11 M. & W. 
653, 152 Eng. Rep. 967 (Ex. 1843). 
 259. See, e.g., I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 220, § 3.3, at 84-
85; 1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 27, § 8.02[1], at 8-15 to 8-16. 
 260. 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711). 
 261. See 24 Eng. Rep. at 352. 
 262. Id. at 349. 
 263. See, e.g., THORELLI, supra note 218, at 19. 
 264. Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Ad. & E. 438, 457, 112 Eng. Rep. 167, 175 (1837). In 
Hitchcock, the court relaxed the analysis of the value of consideration: “It is enough, as 
it appears to us, that there actually is a consideration for the bargain; and that such 
consideration is a legal consideration, and of some value.” Hitchock, 112 Eng. Rep. at 
175. 
 265. 7 Bing. 735, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831). 
 266. Horner, 131 Eng. Rep. at 287. 
 267. See, e.g., I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 220, § 2.4, at 50; 
THORELLI, supra note 218, at 52-53. By the end of the nineteenth century, the original 
“restraints of trade”—noncompetition agreements—were upheld since they did not re-
strict competition or lead to monopoly. Cartels, or combinations designed to restrict 
CAR-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:24 AM 
1265] THE REAL RULE OF REASON 1301 
The final step in the transition to an analysis based solely 
on the reasonableness of the restraint came in Nordenfelt v. 
Maxim-Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co.268 After various 
courts had laid the foundation for the emphasis on reasonable-
ness rather than the scope of the restraint,269 the court in Nor-
denfelt upheld a covenant that prevented the seller of a busi-
ness from participating in that business in any part of the 
world for a twenty-five year period. The court looked solely to 
the reasonableness of the restraint and dispensed with the re-
quirement that the restraint be limited in time and space.270 
b. American common law. Many of the factors traced by the 
English common law found their way across the Atlantic. The 
American courts tended to uphold, for example, partial (as op-
posed to general) restraints;271 internal restraints (affecting 
only the parties to the agreement) but not external restraints 
(directed at competitors);272 arrangements that did not control 
the market or constitute a monopoly;273 and agreements that 
did not address articles of “prime necessity.”274 Moreover, 
American courts were less affected than their English counter-
parts by the laissez-faire philosophy that counseled courts to 
refrain from interfering with the freedom of traders even if 
 
competition, on the other hand, were more readily condemned. See I AREEDA, supra 
note 248, ¶ 104, at 73. 
 268. [1894] A.C. 535. 
 269. See Watertown Thermometer Co. v. Pool, 4 N.Y.S. 861 (Sup. Ct. 1889); Dia-
mond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419 (N.Y. 1887); Hodge v. Sloan, 17 N.E. 335 (N.Y. 
1887). 
 270. See Nordenfelt v. Maxim-Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 
535; I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 220, § 3.3, at 85; THORELLI, su-
pra note 218, at 20. Whether a Rule of Reason applied to all, or only to ancillary, re-
straints is an inquiry that has never definitively been settled. Some have argued that 
common law courts did not distinguish between restraints. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. 
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911); see also Wickens v. Evans, 3 Y. & J. 318, 148 
Eng. Rep. 1201 (Ex. 1829); Jones v. North, 19 Eq. 426 (1875); Collins v. Locks, [1879] 4 
App. Cas. 674 (P.C.). Others have argued that the Rule applied only to ancillary re-
straints. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281-82 (6th Cir. 
1898). 
 271. See, e.g., Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 527 (1880); Kellogg v. 
Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 133, 56 Am. Dec. 164, 173 (Wis. 1851). 
 272. See, e.g., Central Shade-Roller Co. v. Cushman, 9 N.E. 629, 631 (Mass. 1887); 
Dolph v. Troy Laundry Mach. Co., 28 F. 553, 555-56 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1886); Jones v. 
North, 19 L. R.-Eq. 426, 430 (1875); see generally THORELLI, supra note 218, at 31 
(“[W]hen the parties only restrain their own trade and leave more or less ample leeway 
for outsiders to enter or carry on the same trade the restriction is not unlawful . . . .”). 
 273. See Dolph, 28 F. at 555-56; Larkin, 56 Am. Dec. at 176. 
 274. See, e.g., Cushman, 9 N.E. at 631; Dolph, 28 F. at 555. 
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their actions raised prices.275 
Drawing broad generalizations about the treatment of vari-
ous types of arrangements, American common law courts gen-
erally viewed vertical nonprice restraints as ancillary to trans-
actions such as the sale of goods,276 and upheld the 
restraints.277 Horizontal arrangements encountered more hos-
tile treatment. Agreements to control supply or production, for 
example, were usually held to be unenforceable.278 Thus, a 
court held unenforceable arrangements by which all the sup-
pliers in an area separately agreed to sell only to one pur-
chaser,279 by which eight firms agreed not to engage in cotton 
bagging for a period of time without the consent of the major-
ity,280 and by which firms established a common marketing 
agency to fix prices, divide profits, and restrict output.281 At-
tempts to corner a market also were held to be unenforce-
able.282 Finally, the courts refused to enforce agreements to di-
vide territories—e.g., where companies refrained from 
supplying a product to certain areas283 or where they estab-
lished a committee that divided the market and fixed prices.284 
The courts also examined the activities of the trusts. In 
cases referenced by Senator Sherman in the debate over the 
 
 275. See, e.g., ELEANOR M. FOX & LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON ANTITRUST 16 (1989). 
 276. See, e.g., I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 220, § 3.9, at 99; 
Stanley D. Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45 
CORNELL L.Q. 254 (1960). 
 277. See, e.g., Brown v. Rounsavell, 78 Ill. 589 (1875); Palmer v. Stebbins, 20 
Mass. (3 Pick.) 188 (1826); Newell v. Meyendorff, 23 P. 333 (Mont. 1890); Live Stock 
Ass’n v. Levy, 54 N.Y. Super. 32 (1886); Matthews v. Associated Press, 32 N.E. 981 
(N.Y. 1883). 
 278. See, e.g., I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 220, § 3.6, at 92 
(citing sources). 
 279. See Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558 (1877); see also Santa 
Clara Valley Mill & Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 18 P. 391 (Cal. 1888) (similar scheme). 
 280. See India Bagging Ass’n v. B. Kock & Co., 14 La. Ann. 168 (1859); see also, 
e.g., Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., 24 N.E. 660 (Ohio 1890); McBirney & Johnston White 
Lead Co. v. Consol. Lead Co., 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 762 (Super Ct. 1883). 
 281. See Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666 (1880). 
 282. See, e.g., Pacific Factor Co. v. Adler, 27 P. 36 (Cal. 1891) (refusing to enforce 
option because party had entered into similar agreements in the goal of monopolizing 
the market); Samuel v. Oliver, 22 N.E 499 (Ill. 1889) (holding that broker employed to 
corner the market cannot recover money advanced, nor could employer recover money 
received by broker). 
 283. See Chicago Gas-Light & Coke Co. v. People’s Gas-Light & Coke Co., 13 N.E. 
169 (Ill. 1887). 
 284. See Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 (1871). 
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Sherman Act, the courts struck down trusts that controlled 
price285 or divided the market286 or profits.287 Generally, courts 
struck down trusts that restricted competition288 or injured the 
public.289 
3. Chicago School of Economics 
The Chicago School of Economics290 champions the use of 
economics, in particular neoclassical price theory, in antitrust 
analysis.291 Proponents of the Chicago School contend that effi-
ciency (sometimes phrased in terms of “consumer welfare”)292 is 
the sole purpose of the antitrust laws.293 Only efficiency, claim 
the proponents, conforms to the legislative history of the 
 
 285. See Handy v. Cleveland & Marietta R.R. Co., 31 F. 689, 692 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 
1887); Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346 (1875); 21 CONG. REC. 2458 (1890) (citing 
Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. (Pa. 1879)). 
 286. See Chicago Gas-Light & Coke Co., 13 N.E. at 174-75. 
 287. See New York v. North River Sugar-Refining Co., 7 N.Y.S. 406, 415 (Sup. Ct. 
1889). 
 288. See McConoughy, 79 Ill. at 350; Nebraska v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 46 N.W. 
155, 161 (Neb. 1890). 
 289. See Chicago Gas-Light & Coke Co., 13 N.E. at 174-75; North River Sugar-
Refining Co., 7 N.Y.S. at 415; Pennsylvania v. Carlisle, Brightly’s N.P. 36, 40 (Ct. of 
Nisi Prius 1821). 
 290. This Article speaks of the Chicago School as a monolithic force, and for pur-
poses of the Article, differences within the school are not relevant. But like most 
movements, Chicago School adherents sometimes disagree. See, e.g., Jerome Ellig, Un-
twisting the Strands of Chicago Antitrust, XXXVII THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN 863, 864, 
877 (1992) (distinguishing between “new Chicago” school believing in perfectly com-
petitive equilibrium and “market rivalry” school viewing competition as process of ri-
valry). 
 291. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 8, 84 (1978) [hereinafter BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX]; Posner, Chicago School, 
supra note 27, at 928, 933-34. 
 292. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 51. For a claim that the term 
“consumer welfare” deceptively implies a concern with the welfare of consumers rather 
than total welfare, see Robert H. Lande, Chicago’s False Foundation: Wealth Transfers 
(Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust, 58 ANTITRUST LAW J. 631, 638 (1989) 
[hereinafter Lande, Chicago’s False Foundation]. For a distinction between the terms 
“efficiency” and “consumer welfare,” see Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of An-
titrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1020 (1987). 
 293. See, e.g., BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 81-89; Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1984) [hereinafter Easter-
brook, Limits of Antitrust]; Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust 
Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV. 705, 716 (1982); Richard A. Posner, Exclusionary Practices and 
the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 506, 507 (1974) [hereinafter Posner, Exclusion-
ary Practices]. 
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Sherman Act,294 offers the courts a workable standard to ap-
ply,295 and promotes “fair warning” for the parties.296 Chicago 
School proponents contend that courts’ consideration of any 
standard besides efficiency is a recipe for disaster.297 Adherents 
of the School put their faith in the market, believing that it can 
solve problems better than the government.298 
The Chicago School would significantly confine the range of 
restraints that courts could consider under a Rule of Reason 
analysis. Vertical restraints, for starters, would not threaten 
an adverse effect on competition, and so should be outside the 
realm of antitrust analysis.299 Some in the School would include 
within the antitrust laws only cartels, horizontal mergers that 
are large enough to create a monopoly or to facilitate carteliza-
tion by significantly reducing the number of sellers in a mar-
ket, and perhaps “[d]eliberate predation.”300 So in one sense, 
the Chicago School would treat application of the Rule of Rea-
 
 294. See, e.g., BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 61, 71, 89 (“The leg-
islative history of the Sherman Act . . . displays the clear and exclusive policy intention 
of promoting consumer welfare.”); Thomas C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The 
Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1223-24 (1988); Bork, Legisla-
tive Intent, supra note 248, at 7, 11. 
 295. See, e.g., BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 71 (“Should consis-
tency be sought by introducing values other than consumer welfare into the law about 
cartels, antitrust would lose much in ease of administration and therefore in effective-
ness.”). 
 296. See, e.g., id. at 81-82. 
 297. See id. at 85 (“Where the common denominator of consumer welfare is aban-
doned, an antitrust court that attempts to avoid the appearance of complete subjectiv-
ism, that tries to explain its decision, will be driven to distinctions without any real-
ity.”); Posner, Chicago School, supra note 27, at 944-45 (explaining that the goal of 
dispersing concentration is not significant because excessive profitability would lead to 
new entry that would cause prices to fall to competitive levels). 
 298. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 15-16; Posner, 
Exclusionary Practices, supra note 293, at 534-35. 
 299. See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 288, 290, 297 (“[A]ll verti-
cal restraints are beneficial to consumers and should for that reason be completely law-
ful.”); William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the 
“Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 697 (1982); Posner, Ex-
clusionary Practices, supra note 293, at 534-35 (arguing that practices by which firms 
attempt to exclude a rival by means other than lower costs and lower prices—such as 
predatory pricing, tying arrangements, vertical integration, exclusive dealing, and 
group boycotts—are not sufficiently dangerous to justify enforcement). 
 300. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 406; see also, e.g., Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1701 (1986); Posner, 
Chicago School, supra note 27, at 928; Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Anti-
trust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 24 
(1981) [hereinafter Posner, Per Se Legality]. 
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son by courts today as overbroad, encompassing far more re-
straints than it should. But as far as the type of analysis that 
courts conduct pursuant to the Rule of Reason—an inquiry fo-
cused on competition—the Chicago School would voice its sup-
port. 
4. Post-Chicago School 
A look to the Post-Chicago School reveals the influence of 
the Chicago School, particularly since many in the Post-
Chicago School recognize efficiency as a legitimate goal of the 
antitrust laws.301 Yet the many strands of the Post-Chicago 
School302 overlap in the belief that efficiency is not the sole ob-
jective of the antitrust laws.303 These criticisms, from “outside” 
the Chicago School model, posit alternate goals that courts 
should consider: dispersing concentrated economic power,304 
preventing transfers of wealth from consumers to firms with 
market power,305 maintaining the process of competition,306 and 
promoting individual liberty.307 Some in the School have al-
 
 301. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilib-
rium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1140, 1191 (1981); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Con-
tent of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1075 (1979). 
 302. See, e.g., Lande, Chicago’s False Foundation, supra note 292; Fox, supra note 
301; Pitofsky, supra note 301; Lawrence A. Sullivan, Post-Chicago Economics: Econo-
mists, Lawyers, Judges, and Enforcement Officials in a Less Determinate Theoretical 
World, 63 ANTITRUST LAW J. 669 (1995) [hereinafter Sullivan, Post-Chicago Econom-
ics]. 
 303. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 301, at 1146, 1152, 1154, 1178-79; Lande, Chicago’s 
False Foundation, supra note 292, at 631.  In addition, members of the School may con-
template lower thresholds for demonstrating anticompetitive conduct. 
 304. See Fox, supra note 301, at 1153, 1182, 1185-88 (positing “dispersion of eco-
nomic power” as goal of antitrust laws); Pitofsky, supra note 301, at 1053-55 (contend-
ing that antitrust policy should take into account “[f]ear of [c]oncentrated [e]conomic 
[p]ower” and stating that “historical and contemporaneous democracies are almost in-
variably associated with market systems, while totalitarian regimes (fascist and com-
munist) almost always are not”). 
 305. See Lande, Beyond Chicago, supra note 13, at 5-6; Lande, Chicago’s False 
Foundation, supra note 292, at 631 (“The main purpose of the antitrust laws is to pre-
vent firms from acquiring and using market power to force consumers to pay more for 
their goods and services.”). 
 306. See Fox, supra note 301, at 1169, 1174-76, 1191 (contending that the notion of 
“competition as process” promotes “vigorous rivalry” that leads to “efficiency and pro-
gressiveness”; proponents of the idea “place value on diversity and pluralism” and en-
deavor to preserve “lower barriers to entry and greater opportunity for entry and suc-
cess of unestablished firms” rather than to promote “productive efficiency of 
established firms”); Pitofsky, supra note 301, at 1063-64.  
 307. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 301, at 1056-57. 
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leged a potential conflict between general government policy 
undertaking wealth-distribution activities and antitrust policy 
pursuing only the goal of efficiency.308 
Post-Chicago School theorists also voice criticisms from “in-
side” the model; in particular, they criticize the Chicago 
School’s conception of efficiency. They argue that efficiency is 
not as neutral309 or as easily applied310 as its proponents con-
tend. Post-Chicago adherents also charge that it relies on a 
static rather than dynamic market,311 it focuses excessively on 
the long-run effects of practices,312 it fails to incorporate non-
quantifiable goals,313 and it ignores the problem of consumer 
free-riding.314 Finally, proponents contend that the Chicago 
School does not adequately consider such concepts as market 
imperfections,315 externalities,316 and the problem of the “second 
best.”317 
 
 308. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
213, 247 (1985). 
 309. See, e.g., Edward O. Correia, Antitrust and Liberalism, XL ANTITRUST 
BULLETIN 99, 122 n.76 (1995) (noting the political value judgments underlying neutral-
ity and the maximization of allocative efficiency); Fox, supra note 301, at 1158, 1168; 
Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Anti-
trust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 579-80 (1986) (assumptions underlie “sim-
plicity” of economic models); Hovenkamp, supra note 308, at 235-36 (questioning “con-
stant dollar welfare assumption” that the transfer of a dollar from a consumer to a 
monopolist has no welfare implications); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeco-
nomics, and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 12 
(1980) [hereinafter Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics]. 
 310. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 301, at 1158; Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Jus-
tice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 27 (1982); Pitofsky, supra note 
301, at 1065-66. 
 311. See Symposium: Post-Chicago Economics, 63 ANTITRUST LAW J. 445, 445 
(1995) [hereinafter Symposium]; Hovenkamp, supra note 308, at 256-60. Hovenkamp 
notes that this weakness leads to a failure to adequately recognize strategic behavior, 
or behavior designed to injure competitors. See id. at 256, 260-83. 
 312. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 308, at 247, 264-84. 
 313. See, e.g., John J. Flynn & James F. Ponstoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Ju-
risprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis 
in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125, 1133 (1987). 
 314. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 308, at 244. 
 315. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 301, at 1160 & n.88 (noting “malfunctions” caused 
by “monopoly, the absence of information, and government regulation”). 
 316. See, e.g., id. at 1160 n.88 (noting that externalities are costs imposed but not 
borne by a company, such as pollution, and that they lead to “inefficiently high” output 
because consumers buy too much of a product whose price does not reflect its full cost); 
Hovenkamp, supra note 308, at 244. 
 317. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 301, at 1160 n.88 (observing that “an apparently 
second best solution may be no solution at all” because corrective action in one market 
does not necessarily improve resource allocation); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Book Review: 
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Post-Chicago School analysis is heavily fact-oriented, with 
less deference to economic theory.318 Advocates from the School 
also are skeptical that the market will correct imperfections 
and thus see a greater need for judicial intervention.319 Imper-
fect information is one reason for this skepticism.320 Some Post-
Chicago commentators also have emphasized the danger to 
competition from a firm’s raising its rivals’ costs.321 
Presenting the mirror image of the Chicago School, the 
Post-Chicago School would defend the range of restraints con-
sidered under the Rule of Reason. Commentators in the School 
would, however, take issue with the overriding emphasis on 
competition encompassed in the factors of the Rule, and would 
contend that other goals should be taken into account.322 
5. Applying the sources 
By reference to these four sources, this Article will deter-
mine whether courts should consider various factors in a Rule 
of Reason analysis. How are the sources to be weighed? A con-
sistent conclusion (for or against the inclusion of a factor) re-
sulting from the application of the sources will lead to an easy 
answer. Divergent conclusions will be more difficult, and will 
 
Trade Regulation, Cases and Materials, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1214, 1220-21 (1975) 
(“Given the persistence of other deviations (other monopolies, cartels, tariffs, and dis-
torting taxes), there is no basis for assuming that doing away with any one or more de-
viations from optimality would improve efficiency at all. A priori, it is just as likely to 
do the opposite . . . .”). 
 318. See, e.g., Sullivan, Post-Chicago Economics, supra note 302, at 672. 
 319. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Informa-
tion Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANTITRUST LAW J. 193, 193 
(1993) [hereinafter Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin]; Steven C. Salop, Kodak as 
Post-Chicago Law and Economics, C847 ALI-ABA 27, 30 (1993); Symposium, supra 
note 311, at 446. 
 320. See, e.g., Lande, Beyond Chicago, supra note 13, at 6-9; Lande, Chicago Takes 
It on the Chin, supra note 319, at 193, 197-98 (noting that imperfect information can 
create market power and can affect competition in “entire markets”). 
 321. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics that Chal-
lenge Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST LAW J. 645, 647-48 (1989); Thomas G. Krat-
tenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs To 
Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986) (introducing two-step analysis to 
determine existence of anticompetitive effects: whether conduct of challenged firm in-
creases costs of competitors and whether this enables the firm to exercise monopoly 
power); Lande, Beyond Chicago, supra note 13, at 3-5. 
 322. See, e.g., Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics, supra note 309, at 
2-3 (noting that “only competitive effects” (which “usually means efficiency effects”) are 
relevant under the Rule of Reason and that consequently “Reason” is “becoming blind 
to other social consequences”). 
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be resolved by analyzing the relative significance of the sources 
and the capacities of courts.323 
The legislative history, as supplemented by the common 
law, is the most important source. Regardless of what philoso-
phical school one adheres to, proper interpretation begins 
(though it obviously does not end) at the beginning—with the 
framers of the Sherman Act. So if the legislative history and 
common law disapprove of a factor, the odds are against its in-
clusion. Where these sources are neutral (i.e., where the actors 
did not consider a particular factor), strong support must come 
from the other sources and the capacities of courts. For if the 
sources provide only lukewarm support for, and courts cannot 
analyze, a particular factor, then the inclusion of the factor in a 
Rule of Reason analysis would not elicit confidence in the 
analysis undertaken by antitrust courts. This Article now turns 
to the application of the sources. 
B. Anticompetitive Effect 
Each of the four sources provides support for the courts’ 
consideration of anticompetitive effect as an element of a Rule 
of Reason analysis. 
1. Legislative history 
Achieving “full and free competition”324 was the primary 
goal of the framers of the Sherman Act.325 This focus on compe-
tition pervaded the draft bills and amendments that the fram-
ers considered. For example, Senator Sherman’s first bill de-
clared invalid all agreements that tend to prevent “full and free 
competition.”326 Additionally, an amendment introduced by 
Senator Reagan defined a trust, in part, as a combination “[t]o 
prevent competition.”327 The framers’ debate returned repeat-
 
 323. The capacities of courts are discussed below. See infra Part III. 
 324. S. 3445, 50th Cong. (1888). 
 325. The Sherman Act framers proclaimed the norm of free competition “too self-
evident to be debated, too obvious to be asserted.” THORELLI, supra note 218, at 226 
(citation omitted). 
 326. S. 3445, 50th Cong. (1888). Similar language appears in the resolution by 
which Senator Sherman directed the Finance Committee “to inquire into . . . control . . . 
[of] trusts.” See 19 CONG. REC. 6041 (1888). 
 327. 21 CONG. REC. 1772 (1890); see also S. 3510, 50th Cong. (1888) (bill intro-
duced by Sen. Cullom (R-Ill.)) (directed against combinations “to prevent full and free 
competition,” to limit trade, or to “increase or reduce the price” of goods). 
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edly to the theme of allowing the unfettered operation of com-
petition. They bemoaned that trusts “prevent competition 
and . . . restrain trade,”328 “destroy[] legitimate competition,”329 
“interfer[e] with competition,”330 and “hinder, interrupt, and 
impair the freedom and fairness of commerce.”331 
Executive speeches mirrored legislative pronouncements on 
competition. President Grover Cleveland, in his third annual 
message to Congress on December 6, 1887, lamented the 
“strangl[ing]”332 of competition by trusts, “which have for their 
object the regulation of the supply and price of commodities.”333 
President Benjamin Harrison, in his first annual message on 
December 3, 1889, decried trusts to be “dangerous conspiracies 
against the public good”334 because they were organized “to 
crush out all healthy competition.”335 In fact, the antitrust 
plank of the Democratic Party Platform in 1888 railed against 
trusts that “rob the body of our citizens by depriving them of 
the benefits of natural competition.”336 
To be sure, the competition of 1890 is not the competition of 
1999. In particular, the Sherman Act framers’ views of compe-
tition were not infused with the neoclassical conceptions that 
underlie today’s notions of efficiency.337 In addition to an em-
phasis on increased output and lowered price resulting from 
competition, the Sherman Act framers’ conception included a 
concern for protecting small businesses against mammoth 
 
 328. 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman); see also 21 CONG. 
REC. 2459 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (noting the courts’ “vigorous[]” use of 
judicial power to “subvert[]” trusts whose “plain tendency is to prevent competition”). 
 329. Id. at 4100 (statement of Rep. Mason (R-Ill.)). 
 330. Id. at 4102 (statement of Rep. Fithian (D-Ill.)). 
 331. Id. at 2558 (statement of Sen. Pugh). 
 332. 19 CONG. REC. 9 (1887). 
 333. Id. 
 334. 2 THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS 1790-1966, at 
1639 (F. Israel ed., 1966). 
 335. Id. 
 336. T. MCKEE, THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND PLATFORMS OF ALL POLITICAL 
PARTIES 1789-1905, at 235 (1906). The Republican Party platform also addressed 
trusts, declaring its opposition to combinations that “control arbitrarily the condition of 
trade” and recommending the enactment of legislation that would “prevent the execu-
tion of all schemes to oppress the people by undue charges on their supplies.” Id. at 
241. 
 337. See John J. Flynn, The Reagan Administration’s Antitrust Policy, “Original 
Intent” and the Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 THE ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 
272-73 (1988). 
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trusts.338 Indeed, one can even conceive of the framers viewing 
the process of competition itself as being significant.339 Further 
complicating the mapping to today’s environment, the framers 
generally did not distinguish between injuries to competitors 
and injuries to consumers.340 
Despite the inexact congruity between conceptions of com-
petition a century apart, the initial threshold of anticompeti-
tive effect examined by courts today is a logical extrapolation 
from the framers’ discussions of competition. That other eco-
nomic constructs could have developed similarly consistent 
with the debates does not lessen the support today’s analysis of 
anticompetitive effect garners from the legislative history. Ce-
menting the consonance between the two competitions are the 
overlapping building blocks of price and output. At the founda-
tion of microeconomic inquiry today, the blocks were also cen-
tral to the framers’ debate. Of the two, the framers tended to 
focus on price.341 
Draft bills explicitly accentuated the factor of price. Senator 
Sherman’s original bill invalidated “all arrangements, con-
tracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations . . . designed, or 
which tend, to advance the cost to the consumer”342 of imported 
or domestic goods. An amended version of the bill contained a 
clause allowing consumers who were “put to additional cost by 
the advancing of the price”343 of goods to recover their damages. 
Another amendment to the bill defined a trust, in part, as a 
combination “to increase or reduce the price of merchandise or 
 
 338. See 21 CONG. REC. 3147 (1890) (statement of Sen. George) (explaining that 
the “great evil” at which the Act was directed was the “crush[ing]” of “small men en-
gaged in competition with [trusts]”); id. at 2460 (statement of Sen. Sherman) (promot-
ing rights of individuals “as against associated and corporate wealth and power”); 20 
CONG. REC. 1458 (1889) (statement of Sen. George) (contending that defensive alli-
ances of farmers and laborers should not be covered by bill). 
 339. See Fox, supra note 301, at 1169, 1174-76, 1191. 
 340. See I AREEDA, supra note 248, ¶ 103c, at 52-53 (noting that contemporary 
distinctions between the two types of injury are “the product of a century of economic 
analysis that had not yet occurred when the Sherman Act was passed”; moreover, the 
divisions between competitors and consumers were more blurred a century ago than 
they are today). 
 341. Some Sherman Act framers recognized that a reduction in output affects 
price. See 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) (statement by Sen. Sherman) (“The price to the 
consumer depends upon the supply, which can be reduced at pleasure by the combina-
tion.”). 
 342. S. 3445, 50th Cong. § 1 (1888). 
 343. S. 3445, 50th Cong. (as amended, Jan. 25, 1889). 
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commodities”344 or to enter into an agreement by which the 
price of a good could be “establish[ed] or settle[d].”345 
Debate also focused on the trusts’ power to affect price. 
Senator Sherman referenced pricing in explaining its scope: 
“All [the bill] says is that the people producing or selling a par-
ticular article shall not make combinations to advance the price 
of the necessaries of life.”346 The Senator honed in on the pow-
ers of trusts to affect price: 
[the trust] can control the market, raise or lower prices, as 
will best promote its selfish interests, reduce prices in a par-
ticular locality and break down competition and advance 
prices at will where competition does not exist. . . . Such a 
combination is far more dangerous than any heretofore in-
vented, and, when it embraces the great body of all the corpo-
rations engaged in a particular industry in all of the States of 
the Union, it tends to advance the price to the consumer of any 
article produced.347 
Other framers lamented the trusts’ control over prices. 
They emphasized that the trusts “increase beyond reason the 
cost of the necessaries of life and business. . . . They regulate 
prices at their will, depress the price of what they buy and in-
crease the price of what they sell.”348 Trusts “enhance the price 
of commodities to the people beyond an honest profit.”349 The 
universal reach of the trusts was deplored: “There is scarcely 
any article of prime necessity in this country as to which the 
people do not complain that its price has been enhanced by 
these combinations.”350 And again: “the trusts which control the 
markets on sugar, nails, oils, lead, and almost every other arti-
cle of use in the commerce of this country have advanced the 
 
 344. S. 1, 51st Cong. (as amended, Mar. 25, 1890). 
 345. Id.; see also id. (other definitions include “[t]o fix a standard or figure 
whereby the price to the public shall be in any manner controlled or established” and to 
agree to keep the price of a good at a “fixed or graduated figure”). 
 346. 20 CONG. REC. 1458 (1889). 
 347. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (emphasis added). 
 348. Id. at 1768 (statement of Sen. George); see also id. at 3147-48 (statement of 
Sen. George). 
 349. Id. at 4102 (statement of Rep. Fithian). 
 350. Id. at 2647 (statement of Sen. Vance). Even the few Senators who were not 
convinced of the benefits of competition and low prices recognized the goals of the bill. 
See id. at 2729 (statement of Sen. Platt) (“[T]his bill proceeds upon the false assump-
tion that all competition is beneficent to the country, and that every advance of price is 
an injury to the country.”) 
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cost of such articles to every consumer.”351 
Although discussed less frequently than price, output—in 
particular, the trusts’ reduction of it—also occupied the fram-
ers’ attention. An amendment to the bill under debate defined a 
trust, in part, as a combination “[t]o limit or reduce the produc-
tion . . . of merchandise or commodities,”352 or to enter into an 
agreement “not to manufacture, sell, dispose of, or transport”353 
any good. A House bill defined a trust as a combination “for the 
purpose of . . . limiting the production, increasing or reducing 
the price of merchandise or commodities, or preventing compe-
tition.”354 Debate among the congressmen continued this theme. 
Senator Sherman bemoaned that trusts could reduce, “at 
pleasure,”355 the supply of a product. A member of the House of 
Representatives protested that trusts aim “to repress, reduce, 
and control the volume of every article that they touch, so that 
the cost to consumers is increased while the expenditure for 
production is lessened.”356 Trusts were viewed as “the latest 
and most perfect form of combination among competing pro-
ducers to control the supply of their product, in order that they 
may dictate the terms on which they shall sell in the mar-
ket.”357 
In short, the framers recognized the adverse effects on price 
and output brought about by trusts and sought to promote un-
bridled competition. Today’s courts, by requiring plaintiffs to 
demonstrate an anticompetitive effect, preserve the framers’ 
focus on competition. More specifically, contemporary courts’ 
focus on price and output as indicators of anticompetitive effect 
draws direct support from the framers’ intent. The initial 
threshold of anticompetitive effect is firmly ensconced in the 
 
 351. Id. at 4101 (statement of Rep. Heard (D-Mo.)). The beef industry in particular 
drew the wrath of several Representatives. See id. at 4098 (statement of Rep. Taylor 
(R-Ohio)) (“The beef trust fixes arbitrarily the daily price of cattle, from which there is 
no appeal, for there is no other market. The farmers [are able to save] from one-third to 
half of the former value of their cattle and yet beef is as costly as ever.”); id. at 4091 
(statement by Rep. Henderson (R-Iowa)) (same); id. at 2640 (statement of Sen. Spooner 
(R-Wis.)) (lamenting the sugar trust, whose object “is to keep up to consumers the price 
of sugar” and the beef trust, which has maintained at the “war rate” the price of beef to 
consumers). 
 352. S. 1, 51st Cong. (as amended Mar. 25, 1890). 
 353. Id. 
 354. H.R. 11401, 50th Cong. (1888). 
 355. 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890). 
 356. Id. at 4101 (statement of Rep. Heard (D-Mo.)). 
 357. Id. at 4092 (statement of Rep. Wilson (D-W.Va.)). 
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legislative history. 
2. Common law 
A bit further removed from contemporary understandings 
of competition were the common law courts. These courts typi-
cally focused on the effect of agreements on the contracting 
parties and emphasized the tendency of an agreement to limit 
competition rather than an actual effect on competition.358 So 
even if a combination reduced prices, the combination’s ability 
to raise prices would lead courts to invalidate the arrange-
ment.359 The reverse also held true: courts upheld price-fixing 
by parties that could not affect the market as a whole.360 More-
over, common law decisions often depended on the facts of the 
cases.361 Consequently, the common law “present[ed] a picture 
of great confusion and intermingling of ideas.”362 
Despite these caveats, common law courts invalidated 
trusts that restricted competition363 or injured the public.364 
Agreements to control supply or production, for example, were 
usually held to be unenforceable,365 as were agreements to di-
vide territories.366 Courts also linked the concepts of competi-
 
 358. See, e.g., Richardson v. Buhl, 43 N.W. 1102, 1111 (Mich. 1889); Atcheson v. 
Mallon, 43 N.Y. 147, 149 (1870); Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio 434 (N.Y. 1848); Central 
Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666, 672 (1880). 
 359. See, e.g., Buhl, 43 N.W. at 1111 (Champlin, J., concurring) (discounting a 
combination’s reduction of the price of an article and stating that “[t]he fact exists that 
it rests in the discretion of th[e] [combination] at any time to raise the price to an exor-
bitant degree”). 
 360. See Hearn v. Griffin, 2 Chitty 407, 408 (1815). 
 361. See 1 A. EDDY, THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS §§ 301-03, at 207 (1901). 
 362. THORELLI, supra note 218, at 50; see also id. at 36. 
 363. See Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346, 350 (1875); Nebraska v. Nebraska Dis-
tilling Co., 46 N.W. 155, 161 (Neb. 1890). 
 364. See Chicago Gas-Light and Coke Co. v. People’s Gas-Light and Coke Co., 13 
N.E. 169, 174-75 (Ill. 1889); Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 527 (1880); 
Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 366 (N.Y. 1888); New York v. North River Sugar-
Refining Co., 7 N.Y.S. 406, 415 (Sup. Ct. 1889); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Car-
lisle, Brightly’s N.P. 36, 40 (Ct. of Nisi Prius 1821); see generally THORELLI, supra note 
218, at 18. 
 365. See, e.g., I KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 220, § 3.6, at 92 
(citing sources); Santa Clara Valley Mill and Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 76 Cal. 387 (1888); 
India Bagging Ass’n v. B. Kock & Co., 14 La. Ann. 168 (1859); Arnot v. Pittston & El-
mira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558 (1877); Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., 24 N.E. 660 (Ohio 1890); 
Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666 (1880); McBirney & Johnston White 
Lead Co. v. Consolidated Lead Co., 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 762 (Super. Ct. 1883); Cousins 
v. Smith, 33 Eng. Rep. 397 (Ch. 1807). 
 366. See Chicago Gas Light & Coke Co., 13 N.E. 169; Morris Run Coal Co. v. Bar-
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tion and monopoly, refusing to enforce restraints that “de-
stroyed all competition and created a monopoly.”367 
Other distinctions drawn by common law courts, although 
phrased differently from their present-day counterparts, may 
be viewed as consistent with today’s emphasis on an adverse 
effect on competition. For example, early common law courts 
invalidated general restraints, which affected the market as a 
whole, but upheld a subset of partial restraints (those that 
were reasonable). That the general/partial divide did not pre-
cisely trace a contemporary notion of anticompetitive effect (a 
few general restraints eventually were upheld and some partial 
restraints were found unenforceable) does not negate a sub-
stantial overlap with contemporary notions of anticompetitive 
effect. 
Yet another distinction that laid a foundation for anticom-
petitive effect was that between internal restraints (affecting 
only the parties to the agreement) and external restraints (af-
fecting third parties). Courts tended to uphold internal re-
straints that did not affect competition as a whole, but refused 
to enforce external restraints.368 
Because of the common law courts’ concern with the con-
tracting parties to an agreement, the courts’ emphasis on the 
tendency of an agreement rather than its effect, and the ab-
sence of a consistent common law rule,369 any attempts to map 
the common law onto contemporary notions of competition 
must be made with caution. Nonetheless, the courts’ refusal to 
enforce general restraints, external restraints, and agreements 
that adversely affected competition or the public provides sup-
port for contemporary courts’ consideration of anticompetitive 
effect as an element of today’s Rule of Reason analysis. 
3. Chicago School 
The Chicago School would support a court’s consideration of 
 
clay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 (1871). 
 367. Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346, 350 (1875); see also Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. at 
672 (because the clear tendency of the agreement at issue was “to establish a monop-
oly, and to destroy competition, . . . courts will not aid in its enforcement”); see gener-
ally THORELLI, supra note 218, at 30, 39. 
 368. See supra note 272 and accompanying text. 
 369. See, e.g., I AREEDA, supra note 248, ¶ 302, at 3; S. CHESTERFIELD OPPENHEIM 
ET AL., FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: CASES, TEXT, AND COMMENTARY 4-5 (4th ed. 1981); 
1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 27, § 8.01[2], at 8-9. 
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anticompetitive effects. Chicago School proponents champion 
efficiency, defined in terms of competition, as the sole goal of 
the antitrust laws. Accordingly, a practice that does not have 
an adverse effect on competition or efficiency obviously should 
lie outside the realm of antitrust analysis. This conclusion is 
buttressed by the range of restraints the Chicago School re-
moves—because they arguably cannot have an anticompetitive 
effect—from the realm of Rule of Reason analysis: tying ar-
rangements, exclusive dealing agreements, and territorial, cus-
tomer, and other vertical restrictions.370 Similarly, those re-
straints left standing for review—mergers to a high market 
share and cartel-facilitating restraints—have obvious anticom-
petitive effects.371 The Chicago School’s overriding focus on 
competition renders anticompetitive effect a vital element of a 
Rule of Reason analysis. 
4. Post-Chicago School 
The Post-Chicago School differs from the Chicago School in 
treating efficiency as only one goal, rather than the sole goal, of 
the antitrust laws. Most Post-Chicagoans do not claim that 
there is no role for efficiency;372 rather, they posit other roles 
besides efficiency.373 Therefore, the School would view the 
threshold of anticompetitive effect (a prerequisite to a finding 
of inefficiency) as a sufficient but not necessary factor in the 
continuation of the Rule of Reason analysis.374 That is, where 
an anticompetitive effect is present, the School would encour-
age the court to proceed to analyze other factors. But where an 
anticompetitive effect is absent, the School would not necessar-
ily shut down the inquiry, because other goals could be threat-
ened even in the absence of an anticompetitive effect. There-
 
 370. See Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra note 91, at 135, 151-52, 168-
69; Posner, Chicago School, supra note 27, at 929; Posner, Exclusionary Practices, su-
pra note 293, at 508. 
 371. See Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra note 91, at 153, 168. Further 
supporting this conclusion, the “filters” developed by Judge Easterbrook to limit the 
instances of a full-fledged Rule of Reason analysis include standard indicators of anti-
competitive effect: market power, harm to consumers (tied to a defendant’s profits), and 
whether the evidence is consistent with a reduction in output. See Easterbrook, Limits 
of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 17-35. 
 372. See Fox, supra note 301, at 1140, 1174-75; Pitofsky, supra note 301, at 1075. 
 373. See supra notes 3034-307 and accompanying text. 
 374. See, Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 321, at 214, 250-51, 253-66 (setting 
forth test to determine likelihood of anticompetitive effects). 
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fore, within a Rule of Reason inquiry, the Post-Chicago School 
would support the use of the factor of anticompetitive effect. 
That they would envision a broader Rule of Reason analysis 
that would be triggered by predicates other than anticompeti-
tive effect does not negate the useful role played by anticom-
petitive effect. 
C. Procompetitive Justifications 
The sources also support courts’ consideration of a defen-
dant’s procompetitive justifications as an element of the Rule of 
Reason analysis. The legislative history, Chicago School, and 
Post-Chicago School all would endorse the factor, and the 
common law would be neutral. 
1. Legislative history 
Throughout the debates on the Sherman Act, the framers 
made it clear that they did not wish to penalize all restraints of 
trade. Senator Sherman emphasized that the Act would cover 
“unlawful combinations to prevent competition”375 but not “law-
ful combinations in aid of production.”376 The bill would “not in 
the least affect combinations in aid of production where there is 
free and fair competition.”377 Senator Sherman explained that 
the Act would not apply to partnerships, which were “an aid to 
production.”378 Similarly, corporations were “the most useful 
agencies of modern civilization”379 that “have enabled individu-
als to unite to undertake great enterprises only attempted in 
former times by powerful governments.”380 The Act also would 
not “interfere in the slightest degree” with “voluntary associa-
tions made to affect public opinion to advance the interests of a 
particular trade or occupation”381 such as farmers’ associa-
 
 375. 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890). 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. at 2457. 
 378. Id. Senator Sherman elaborated: 
The right to combine the capital and labor of two or more persons in a given pur-
suit with a community of profit and loss under the name of a partnership is open 
to all and is not an infringement of industrial liberty, but is an aid to produc-
tion. . . . [W]hile [a partnership] is a combination, it does not in the slightest de-
gree prevent competition. 
Id. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id. at 2562 (statement of Sen. Sherman). 
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tions382 or laborers.383 The House also engaged in limited debate 
regarding a defendant’s quality justifications.384 
Restraints today do not fall neatly into the bifurcated cate-
gories contemplated by the framers—restrictions imposed by 
mammoth trusts, on the one hand, and defensive combinations 
by small businesses struggling to compete, on the other. For 
example, in which category would vertical restraints by mid-
sized companies, which often limit intrabrand competition in 
the hopes of increasing interbrand competition, belong? In 
which category would a local hospital’s refusal to deal with a 
doctor fall? An unfair competition claim between two rivals? An 
association standard? Today’s antitrust restraints are more 
nuanced than the dichotomy envisioned by the Sherman Act 
framers. That said, the framers’ desire not to punish parties 
who took actions promoting (the framers’ conception of) compe-
tition must be considered in any analysis of competitive ef-
fects.385 In order to know, then, if the anticompetitive effect of a 
restraint is justified, a court following the guidance of the legis-
lative history must allow the defendant to introduce its pro-
competitive justifications. 
2. Common law 
The common law preceding the Sherman Act did not exam-
ine a defendant’s procompetitive justifications. The focus of the 
common law courts was on the contracting parties themselves 
and the benefits that would inhere to these parties by the en-
forcement of agreements. As one court explained: “The only 
reason ever assigned in support of . . . restrictions [not to com-
pete] is, that they are necessary or useful to the party with 
 
 382. “Farmers’ Alliances and farmers’ associations . . . are not business combina-
tions. They do not deal with contracts, agreements, etc., . . . And so the combinations of 
workingmen to . . . get their fair share in the division of production, are not . . . in-
cluded in the words or intent of the bill . . . .” Id. 
 383. See id. at 2561 (statement of Sen. Teller) (“[W]e can not deny to the laborers 
of the country the opportunity to combine either for the purpose of putting up the price 
of their labor or securing to themselves a better position in the world.”). 
 384. See id. at 5954 (statement of Rep. Morse (D-Mass.)) (manufacturers should 
have the right to set the price of their goods to ensure “a high grade and uniform qual-
ity of goods” which would help the purchaser determine “what he is buying and what to 
depend upon”). 
 385. The dichotomy considered by the framers also could be viewed as supporting 
exemptions from the antitrust laws for certain categories of restraints. This conclusion 
does not diminish the support for considering procompetitive justifications under the 
Rule of Reason. 
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whom the contract is made as a protection to him in the prose-
cution of his business.”386 Similarly, a partial restraint not in-
terfering with the interests of the public at large would be up-
held where it “affords a fair protection to those in whose favor 
it is made.”387 Again, contracting parties that pursued their 
own interests provided the “just cause or excuse”388 necessary 
to protect their behavior.389 As one commentator put it, where 
the public was not “serious[ly] inconvenience[d]”390 by the par-
ties’ control of the market, the combination would be sustained 
as long as “the advantages of the combination to the parties 
thereto seemed to be of a legitimate character.”391 
Common law courts did not focus on the benefits of agree-
ments for the public as a whole, nor did they hint at contempo-
rary indicators of procompetitive effect, such as increased out-
put or decreased price. Even analyzing common law decisions 
on their own terms does not alter the analysis. The courts, for 
example, did not examine an agreement’s tendency to produce 
procompetitive effects. Although they examined a tendency to-
ward anticompetitive effects, the absence of such a tendency 
did not equate with a finding of procompetitive effects. In short, 
the focus of common law courts on the parties themselves nei-
ther supports nor proscribes the consideration of procompeti-
tive justifications in today’s Rule of Reason analysis. 
3. Chicago School 
Just as the Chicago School’s focus on efficiency and compe-
tition requires the plaintiff to show anticompetitive effects, it 
also allows the defendant an opportunity to offer procompeti-
tive justifications for the restraint.392 On its most fundamental 
level, consideration of the justifications for an agreement is 
consistent with a focus on allocative efficiency.393 That is, courts 
can best judge whether a restraint will contribute to the opti-
 
 386. Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 132 (Wis. 1851); see THORELLI, supra note 218, 
at 48 n.144. 
 387. Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 527 (1880). 
 388. Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613 (1889), 
aff’d, A.C. 25 (1892). 
 389. See THORELLI, supra note 218, at 34. 
 390. 1 EDDY, supra note 361, § 303, at 207. 
 391. Id. 
 392. See Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 17. 
 393. See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 91-104. 
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mal allocation of resources in society by taking into account 
justifications designed to show a positive effect on competition 
in the market as a whole. 
The Chicago School also would offer substantial deference 
to the proffered justifications. The “incommensurability of the 
stakes,”394 as Judge Easterbrook has put it, is one explanation 
for such deference. If a court errs by invalidating an act that 
promotes competition, the argument goes, “the benefits may be 
lost for good.”395 But, if the court errs by allowing a practice 
harmful to competition, “the welfare loss decreases over 
time”396 since monopoly prices eventually attract entry by other 
firms.397 Another rationale for the Chicago School’s deference to 
a defendant’s procompetitive justifications is the beneficial na-
ture of most forms of cooperation.398 In short, the Chicago 
School would welcome the defendant’s procompetitive justifica-
tions in determining the effect of a restraint on competition. 
4. Post-Chicago School 
As in the discussion of the Post-Chicago School’s view on 
anticompetitive effects, the discussion of procompetitive effects 
is similarly constrained. The School would consider more than 
just competitive effects. But within an efficiency analysis, and 
after the showing of an anticompetitive effect, the School would 
allow the defendant to offer procompetitive justifications.399 
Similar to the analysis for anticompetitive effect, the defen-
 
 394. Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 2. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. 
 397. See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 133 (noting that “mis-
taken rules of law” may prevent efficiency where, for example, other paths to efficiency 
“are too expensive, but a market position that creates output restriction and higher 
prices will always be eroded if it is not based upon superior efficiency”); Easterbrook, 
Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 15-16 (“A beneficial practice may reduce the 
costs of production for every unit of output; a monopolistic practice imposes loss only to 
the extent it leads to a reduction of output.”). 
 398. See Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 15. 
 399. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 321, at 277-82 (“[W]e think it would 
not be unreasonable to leave defendants with the burden of proving measurable, spe-
cific, countervailing efficiency justifications in specific exclusionary rights cases in 
which plaintiffs have proved actual or probable competitive injury.”). See also Robert 
Prentice, Vaporware: Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real Antitrust Liability in a 
Post-Chicago World, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 1196 (1996) (citing ABA Antitrust Section, 
Monograph No. 18 (Nonprice Predation Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act) (1991)) 
(recommending assessment of efficiencies as factor in determining whether certain 
nonprice behavior is predatory). 
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dant’s showing of procompetitive justifications would be a suffi-
cient, but not necessary, condition for the Rule of Reason 
analysis to continue to the next step. That is, the presence of a 
legitimate justification would allow the court to continue the 
inquiry. But even if a legitimate justification is offered, that 
may not save the restraint if it infringes other, nonefficiency 
goals. For example, Robert Pitofsky has contended, in discuss-
ing the exclusion of efficiencies in merger litigation, that an 
“occasional loss of efficiency as a result of antitrust enforce-
ment can be tolerated and is to be expected if antitrust is to 
serve other legitimate values.”400 The sufficiency of procompeti-
tive justifications in the Rule of Reason analysis—particularly 
in the strand focused on competitive effects—counsels in favor 
of its inclusion. 
D. Reasonable Necessity or Less Restrictive Alternatives 
The sources provide only precarious support for the factors 
of reasonable necessity and less restrictive alternatives. Of the 
two sources that provide the most direct feedback on the fac-
tors, one (the common law) would support both factors and the 
other (the Chicago School) would not support either. The other 
two sources would be relevant only at the margins: the legisla-
tive history is neutral on the issue, and the Post-Chicago 
School would provide, at most, limited support for the factors. 
1. Legislative history 
Because the Sherman Act framers envisioned only two 
types of combinations—trusts preventing competition and 
small businessmen defending themselves—they never ad-
dressed (or implicitly provided fodder for or against) the issues 
of reasonable necessity or less restrictive alternatives. Stepping 
back to the framers’ era and confronting them with the issue 
still would not provide guidance. The framers likely would say 
that the competition-limiting trusts were not pursuing legiti-
mate objectives, thus making the inquiry of reasonable neces-
sity irrelevant. The framers also would presume that the re-
straints adopted by combinations of small businessmen to 
counteract the trusts were reasonably necessary. 
The same would hold true for the less restrictive alternative 
 
 400. Pitofsky, supra note 301, at 1074. 
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analysis. Again, because the trusts were not pursuing a legiti-
mate objective, the framers would find that the inquiry into 
less restrictive alternatives was irrelevant. On the other hand, 
they would not second-guess restraints adopted by combina-
tions of farmers or laborers that would foster competition and 
allow them to compete more effectively against the trusts. In 
short, the legislative history of the Sherman Act is neutral on 
the factors of reasonable necessity and less restrictive alterna-
tives. 
2. Common law 
The common law would support the factors of reasonable 
necessity and less restrictive alternatives. Whether or not 
common law courts enforced a restraint depended in large part 
upon whether the restraint was reasonably necessary.401 This 
test was articulated most explicitly in Horner v. Graves,402 
which advised courts to focus on “whether the restraint is such 
only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in 
favour of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with 
the interests of the public.”403 The Horner court continued: 
“Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the 
party, can be of no benefit to either, it can only be oppressive; 
and if oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law, unreasonable.”404 
Other cases confirm the common law courts’ emphasis on 
reasonable necessity. The seminal case of Nordenfelt empha-
sized the reasonableness of the restraint.405 Even an arrange-
ment designed to prevent competition among the contracting 
parties was upheld because the parties used “proper means,”406 
or, more particularly, “provisions reasonably necessary for 
[their] purpose.”407 Courts applied an initial version of the Rule 
 
 401. See, e.g., Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] 
A.C. 535. 
 402. 7 Bing. 735, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831). 
 403. 131 Eng. Rep. at 287. 
 404. Id. (emphasis added). Even if the common law courts focused on the reason-
able necessity of a restraint for parties (rather than competition), the analysis still pro-
vides support for use of the factor in today’s Rule of Reason analysis. 
 405. See Nordenfelt, [1894] A.C. at 565 (holding that a restraint is reasonable if it 
“afford[s] adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is imposed, while at the 
same time it is in no way injurious to the public”); see also Skrainka v. Scharring-
hausen, 8 Mo. App. 522, 527 (1880). 
 406. Collins v. Locke, 4 A.C. 674, 685 (1879). 
 407. Id. 
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of Reason by finding a restraint reasonable “if it is not larger—
more extensive—than the necessary protection of the parties 
requires.”408 
The above discussion also reveals support for the factor of 
less restrictive alternatives. A direction to enforce only re-
straints that are no larger than necessary is but another way of 
saying that there are no less restrictive alternatives. Stated 
positively, a restraint that is broader than necessary, by defini-
tion, has less restrictive alternatives.409 In conclusion, the 
common law would support the factors of reasonable necessity 
and less restrictive alternatives. 
3. Chicago School 
The Chicago School would not support an inquiry into 
whether a restraint is reasonably necessary or whether there 
are alternatives less restrictive of competition. The School 
would withhold its support because of the administrative diffi-
culties of examining these factors and the “inhospitality tradi-
tion of antitrust.”410 
In contrast to a targeted inquiry into price or output, de-
termining a restraint’s reasonable necessity or less restrictive 
alternatives threatens to bog down a court with unknowable 
and fact-intensive matters. These matters include whether hy-
pothetical substitute restraints could achieve the defendant’s 
objectives, whether to second-guess the defendant’s intentions 
and rationales for business decisions, and the necessity of par-
ticular restraints. Therefore, inquiries as to reasonable neces-
sity and less restrictive alternatives could be resolved only on a 
case-by-case basis, with little guidance provided to businesses, 
future potential defendants, and antitrust courts. 
The “inhospitality tradition” articulated by the Chicago 
School supports this conclusion. According to this tradition, 
judges cast a wary eye on defendants’ business practices, “al-
ways wondering how firms are using [them] to harm consum-
ers.”411 If the defendant cannot convince the judge that its prac-
tices are an essential feature of competition—and often, it will 
 
 408. THORELLI, supra note 218, at 52 (noting also that the restraint must not be 
“obviously injurious to the interests of the public”). 
 409. This assumes, of course, that the less restrictive alternatives would protect 
the parties as effectively as the restraint at issue. 
 410. Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 4. 
 411. Id. 
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not, as the “gale of creative destruction”412 known as competi-
tion “produces victims before it produces economic theories and 
proof of what is beneficial”413—the judge prohibits the practice. 
A judge knowingly or unknowingly following this tradition 
will inquire suspiciously whether a restraint is reasonably nec-
essary. The court will second-guess the means of attaining the 
objectives, and often find that the restraint really was not nec-
essary. The analysis based on less restrictive alternatives 
would be even worse. After the fact, a judge can always un-
earth such an alternative, and this project would take prece-
dence over the inquiry as to whether the alternative would as 
effectively achieve the defendant’s goals.414 Because the third 
prong of the Rule of Reason analysis would give courts unbri-
dled discretion to invalidate practices that they mistrusted and 
because of the indeterminacy of the inquiries introduced by the 
factors, the Chicago School would proscribe examination of the 
inquiries of reasonable necessity and less restrictive alterna-
tives. 
4. Post-Chicago School 
The Post-Chicago School would provide a modicum of sup-
port for the factors of reasonable necessity and less restrictive 
alternatives. Generally speaking, the School would support 
such fact intensive inquiries.415 Whether a restraint is reasona-
bly necessary would be a factor the court would utilize in de-
termining the sufficiency of the defendant’s procompetitive jus-
tifications. Similarly, the presence of less restrictive 
alternatives would be a factor providing information on the in-
quiry regarding competition. On the other hand, the two in-
quiries are little more than sideshows. For competition is only 
one of multiple goals the School would champion. For example, 
in the pursuit of goals such as the dispersion of power or the 
promotion of competition as process, the factors are besides the 
 
 412. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAN CAPITALISM SURVIVE? 24 (1978), quoted in 
Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 5. 
 413. Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 5. 
 414. See id. at 9 (“The alternatives may be more costly, but the defendant will not 
be able to show the amount of the difference. Because alternatives exist, the explana-
tion for a particular practice may appear a too-clever effort to avoid the customary legal 
rules.”). 
 415. See supra note 318 and accompanying text. 
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point.416 And even within the competition inquiry, the goals 
would play a more tangential role than the key factors of anti-
competitive and procompetitive effects. In short, the Post-
Chicago School would provide, at most, limited support for the 
factors. 
E. Balancing 
The sources provide slightly stronger support for balancing. 
The Chicago School would endorse a very limited type of bal-
ancing, and the Post-Chicago School would approve of broader 
balancing. The legislative history and the common law appear 
neutral on the factor. Altogether, then, the sources would pro-
vide more support for balancing than for the factors of reason-
able necessity and less restrictive alternatives, but less support 
than was accorded to anticompetitive and procompetitive ef-
fects. 
1. Legislative history 
Similar to the reasonably-necessity or less-restrictive-
alternative analysis, balancing finds neither support nor oppo-
sition in the legislative history. According to the Sherman Act 
framers, the association at issue was either an “unlawful com-
bination[] to prevent competition”417 or a “lawful combination[] 
in aid of production.”418 It was not a mixture of the two. It did 
not lean toward one more than the other. It was one or the 
other. The association was either a trust that prevented compe-
tition or a combination of small businesses or farmers not cov-
ered by the Act. It simply did not cross the minds of the fram-
ers that a restraint could have both anticompetitive and 
procompetitive effects. Therefore, a contemporary court’s bal-
ancing of anticompetitive and procompetitive effects garners 
neither support nor opposition from the legislative history. 
The conclusions relating to balancing and the factors of rea-
 
 416. One could imagine an inquiry as to whether there are alternatives less re-
strictive of these other noncompetition goals, but such explorations are outside the 
realm of today’s (most broadly conceived) Rule of Reason analysis, and threaten to im-
pose additional layers of complexity that lie beyond the scope of this Article. 
 417. 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman). 
 418. Id. (statement of Sen. Sherman); see also id. at 2457 (statement of Sen. 
Sherman) (“It is said that this bill will interfere with lawful trade, with the customary 
business of life. I deny it. It aims only at unlawful combinations. It does not in the least 
affect combinations in aid of production where there is free and fair competition.”). 
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sonable necessity and less restrictive alternatives are not sur-
prising given the task that confronted the framers. The framers 
focused primarily on issues such as the constitutionality of the 
Sherman Act.419 To the extent they explored the reasonableness 
of restraints, they endeavored to delimit the types of restraints 
that would fall within, or outside of, the Act.420 Their canvas 
contained but two water colors—the evil trusts and the defen-
sive alliances of small businessmen. Exploring gradations be-
tween the two polarities was thus not only useless, it was be-
yond contemplation. Moreover, the framers understood that the 
courts would play a significant role—as they already had in de-
veloping the common law—in distinguishing between reason-
able and unreasonable restraints. 
2. Common law 
Common law courts did not balance the anticompetitive and 
procompetitive effects of restraints. Because they focused on 
classifying the restraint in certain categories—general or par-
tial, external or internal, unreasonable or reasonable421—they 
did not contemplate that restraints could contain elements of 
the contrasting categories. Just to pick one example, a restraint 
could not be both general and partial. The emphasis by com-
mon law courts on the tendency of a combination to restrict 
competition, as opposed to its effect, confirms this observation. 
This tendency, to the extent it existed, weighed in the direction 
of a restriction of competition. To the extent it did not exist, it 
leaned toward no such restriction. That is, the absence of such 
a tendency did not lean in the direction of a beneficial effect on 
competition. So the focus on tendency, in reality, replaced the 
competing paradigm of balancing. In the common law setting, 
where courts discounted actual beneficial effects, such as a 
lowering of price, and treated as dispositive the potential to 
harm competition, balancing was beyond the realm of possibili-
ties. 
 
 419. See supra note 230. 
 420. See 21 CONG. REC. 2562 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (noting that Act 
does not interfere with farmers’ organizations, which “are not business combinations” 
and “are not affected in the slightest degree [by the Act], nor [are] they included in the 
words or intent of the [Act]”). 
 421. See supra notes 271-274 and accompanying text. 
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3. Chicago School 
Expansive balancing, requiring a consideration of efficiency 
and nonefficiency factors, would be anathema to the Chicago 
School. In contrast to their esteemed efficiency formulas, which 
Chicago School proponents contend are as uncontroversial as 
they are easy to apply, balancing introduces everything the 
Chicago School deplores—judicial discretion, indeterminacy, 
and a lack of guidance for businesses and future defendants. 
Judge Bork, for example, has argued that courts should not 
consider goals other than consumer welfare because the adop-
tion of non-economic approaches “would create uncertainties 
that the courts would not long tolerate”422 and that would be 
replaced by rigid rules.423 
Judge Easterbrook has gone further, criticizing the balanc-
ing called for by the contemporary Rule of Reason. Easterbrook 
has contended that the formulations articulated by Justice 
Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade424 are “empty.”425 Judges 
“cannot do what such open-ended formulas require [because 
w]hen everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive.”426 Easter-
brook laments that the formulation fails to assist businesses in 
planning their conduct and results in costly litigation burdened 
by endless discovery.427 
With regard to vertical restraints, in particular, Easter-
brook deems “pointless”428 the balancing of interbrand and in-
trabrand competition: “There is no ‘loss’ in one column to ‘bal-
ance’ against a ‘gain’ in the other”429 because a reduction in 
rivalry among a manufacturer’s dealers on price is only the 
“tool” employed by the manufacturer to attain enhanced com-
 
 422. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 87. 
 423. See id. (“Area after area has been taken over by harsh rules, and sometimes, 
as in the law of requirements contracts, the Court has pointed to the need for certainty 
as justifying a rigid rule that was, admittedly, not the best resolution of the economic 
considerations.”) (citation omitted). 
 424. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); see supra note 17 and 
accompanying text. 
 425. Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 12. 
 426. Id. 
 427. See id. at 12-13 (“Litigation costs are the product of vague rules combined 
with high stakes, and nowhere is that combination more deadly than in antitrust liti-
gation under the Rule of Reason.”). The same point is made by Judge Posner. See Pos-
ner, Per Se Legality, supra note 300, at 14-18. 
 428. Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 13. 
 429. Id. at 14. 
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petition on service.430 He further notes that courts cannot de-
termine the level of increased interbrand competition that will 
justify various levels of reduction in intrabrand competition.431 
However, even given all of the above, there is room for a 
limited type of balancing in the Chicago world—balancing 
along the lines of the net effect of a restraint on output, for ex-
ample. Certain restraints will fall “on a continuum between ef-
ficiency and restriction of output”432 and the court must deter-
mine “which is the more probable effect.”433 Determining a net 
effect on competition is the type of inquiry “familiar to 
courts.”434 This type of balancing accords with today’s Rule of 
Reason analysis, where the restraint’s anticompetitive and pro-
competitive effects constitute the first two steps of the analysis. 
Therefore, the Chicago School would support a limited type of 
balancing, but only in those (few) cases in which there is an an-
ticompetitive effect and balancing could take place along a nar-
row continuum such as output. 
4. Post-Chicago School 
The Post-Chicago School would embrace balancing; it would 
consider anticompetitive and procompetitive effects in deter-
mining an outcome on an axis of efficiency or competition, 
while also considering other factors in the equation.435 In “tie-
breaker” situations, nonefficiency factors could make the dif-
ference.436 Thus, proponents of the School would examine the 
effect of the restraint on, for example, concentration in the 
market, a competitive process, or individual freedom. While 
 
 430. See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 290 (“The manufacturer 
shares with the consumer the desire to have distribution done at the lowest possible 
cost consistent with effectiveness. That is why courts need never weigh the opposing 
forces of lessened intrabrand and heightened interbrand competition.”); Easterbrook, 
Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 13-14; Lopatka, supra note 13, at 58 (“[A] verti-
cal restraint imposed by a single manufacturer does not impede competition in a rele-
vant antitrust sense when a brand is not a market. . . . A restraint on rivalry among 
dealers is not a reduction in intrabrand competition that needs to be offset by an in-
crease in interbrand competition.”); Posner, Per Se Legality, supra note 300, at 18-21. 
 431. See Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, supra note 293, at 14. 
 432. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 291, at 85. 
 433. Id. Similarly, when courts decide whether to interfere with a monopoly, they 
are to weigh “gains in destruction of monopoly power” against “losses in efficiency.” Id. 
at 79. 
 434. Id. at 85. 
 435. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 301, at 1073. 
 436. See id. at 1067 n.44. 
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recognizing that a multifactored morass helps neither the 
courts nor the parties, the School nonetheless would support 
balancing that considers at least a restraint’s anticompetitive 
and procompetitive effects. 
III. THE CAPACITIES OF COURTS 
Naturally following Part II, which explored what courts 
should do, comes Part III, which looks to what courts can do. 
This Part supplements Part II, particularly for those factors of 
the Rule of Reason analysis for which the sources provide only 
lukewarm support. Part III determines the capacities of courts 
as a matter of both hypothesis and practice. The underlying fo-
cus of this Part, like the focus of the Rule of Reason itself, is 
competition.437 
Before getting into the details of each of the factors, a brief 
comment on the burden-shifting concept. As a matter of proce-
dure, the delineation and application of predictable and orderly 
burdens, shifting between the parties, is a task that courts can 
perform. Further, it is a task that courts can do better than the 
competing alternative: general balancing from the outset of 
each case. A shifting of burdens, in contrast, puts the parties 
on notice as to the most significant factors and the order in 
which they will be considered. And it assists the courts for 
similar reasons: predictability, consistency, and legitimacy.438 
The application of the burden-shifting concept has had 
benefits in practice. It fosters judicial efficiency: the courts can 
 
 437. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984); see also, e.g., North-
ern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman Act was designed 
to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfet-
tered competition as the rule of trade. . . . [T]he policy unequivocally laid down by the 
Act is competition.”). Although the term “competition” does not have one precise mean-
ing, courts typically have looked to the effect of a restraint on output, price, and, to a 
lesser extent, quality. See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99, 109 n.38; Broadcast Music, Inc. 
v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 
(1972); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993); Tunis Bros. Co. v. 
Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 728 (3d Cir. 1991); Wilk v. American Med. Ass’n, 895 
F.2d 352, 359 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 438. The Supreme Court’s decision in California Dental Ass’n v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 119 S.Ct. 1604 (1999), renders the burden-shifting approach even more 
compelling. In that case, the Court found that an association’s restrictions on certain 
types of advertising were subject to more than “quick look” scrutiny but less than the 
“fullest market analysis” of the Rule of Reason. California Dental, 119 S.Ct. at 1617. In 
calling for “an enquiry meet for the case,” id. at 1618, the Court provided no guidance 
on the level of scrutiny to be applied or the order in which the analysis would proceed. 
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dispose of those cases with no anticompetitive effect or procom-
petitive justification before engaging in the time-consuming 
and costly balancing analysis. In addition, it reduces errors by 
preventing courts from being swayed by plaintiffs who cannot 
demonstrate an anticompetitive effect but who nonetheless fo-
cus on the defendant’s alleged lack of procompetitive justifica-
tions.439 Of course, a burden-shifting approach is only as defen-
sible as the factors composing the construct. It is to these 
inquiries that this Article now turns. 
A. Anticompetitive Effect 
As much as any inquiry in the field of antitrust law, courts 
can analyze the building blocks of anticompetitive effect. 
1. Output 
Courts can determine a restraint’s effect on output. 
Whether a restraint has resulted in an increase or a decrease of 
(or has had no effect on) output is a matter that a court can 
analyze. With the benefit of a developed record, a court can de-
termine if the number of suppliers or products in a market has 
risen,440 remained unchanged,441 or decreased.442 The court also 
 
 439. See Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 
547 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding procompetitive justifications “unnecessary” where plaintiff 
“has not carried its own initial burden” of showing anticompetitive effect); Calculators 
Hawaii, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 724 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1983) (reversing court that 
“addressed and disconnected [the defendant’s] business justification for the [challenged 
practice] without ever having assessed the impact upon competition”); Patel v. Scotland 
Mem’l Hosp., No. 3:94CV00284, 1995 WL 319213, at *1 n.4 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 1995) 
(finding plaintiff’s argument that defendants “have failed to set forth any pro-
competitive justifications for their actions” to be “without merit” because plaintiff failed 
to carry its initial burden of showing anticompetitive effect); Jim Forno’s Continental 
Motors, Inc. v. Subaru Distribs. Corp., 649 F. Supp. 746, 754 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (rejecting 
argument that “no allegation of anticompetitive effect is necessary if the challenged 
action has no ‘procompetitive’ effect”). 
 440. See, e.g., Kumar v. National Med. Enters., Inc., No. 93-16841, 1994 WL 
659031, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 22, 1994); Lie v. St. Joseph Hosp., 964 F.2d 567, 570 (6th 
Cir. 1992); Oksanen v. Page Mem’l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 709 (4th Cir. 1991); Guyon v. 
Chinese Shar-Pei Club, No. 89-15483, 1990 WL 121080, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 1990); 
Registered Physical Therapists, Inc. v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., No. 86-C-
0076J, 1988 WL 125788, at *7 (D. Utah Sept. 6, 1988); Mays v. Hosp. Auth., 596 F. 
Supp. 120, 122 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Merkle Press Inc. v. Merkle, 519 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D. 
Md. 1981). 
 441. See, e.g., Sitkin Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FMC Corp., 575 F.2d 440, 447 (3d Cir. 
1978); Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Unity Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 694, 707 
(D. Minn. 1998); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 814 F. Supp. 1254, 1265 (W.D. Pa. 1992). 
 442. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm’n v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 
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can determine if the defendant’s market share increased after 
implementing the restraint.443 The manifestations of output are 
readily observable and calculable. 
This conclusion comes with two caveats. First, a court 
might not be able to measure output in every case. For exam-
ple, the restraint may not have had time to take effect. Or the 
plaintiff may not have been able to discover such information. 
Or such information is not readily ascertainable. Granted. That 
the effect on output cannot always be calculated does not di-
minish the significance of the many instances in which it can 
be determined and in which it provides crucial information on 
the effects of a restraint. 
Second, it is not possible for economists, let alone courts, to 
distinguish precisely between the effects of a restraint and the 
effects of a number of other potential causes for observed re-
sults: macroeconomic factors, developments in the market un-
related to the defendant, or changes made by the defendant 
unrelated to the restraint, just to name a few. And not knowing 
which factors are responsible for a change in output could lead 
to deceptive conclusions. At a minimum, it will often lead only 
to guarded conclusions. In the end, however, even if the tracing 
of precise lines of causation is not possible, the examination of 
the effect on output is helpful and usually will be consistent 
with other indicators of competitive effect, such as price. 
2. Price 
Like output, courts can examine the price of a good affected 
by a restraint. Whether the price has risen or fallen is an un-
complicated matter of reading the (developed) record. Conse-
quently, courts have had no trouble in observing a restraint’s 
lack of effect on price444 or noting its effect either in raising445 or 
 
459 (1986); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984); National Soc’y of Prof’l 
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-95 (1978); Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. Part-
nership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 443. See New York v. Anheuser-Busch, 811 F. Supp. 848, 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (in-
creased market share after implementation of territorial restraints “is evidence of the 
procompetitive effects of the restraint and the resulting increase in consumer prefer-
ence for the product”); Posner, Per Se Legality, supra note 300, at 26 (“[I]f the defen-
dant’s output or market share rises as a result of the restraint, then, on balance, the 
restraint must promote consumer welfare and economic efficiency.”). 
 444. See, e.g., Oksanen v. Page Mem’l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 709 (4th Cir. 1991); 
Guyon v. Chinese Shar-Pei Club, No. 89-15483, 1990 WL 121080, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 
21, 1990); Sitkin Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FMC Corp., 575 F.2d 440, 447 (3d Cir. 1978); 
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lowering446 price. 
But again, like the inquiry regarding output, the examina-
tion of price may not be measurable in certain settings. More-
over, the effects of the restraint—as opposed to other, unre-
lated factors—on price may not be precisely traceable. 
Nonetheless, the courts can make, and have made, efforts to 
distinguish the effects of the restraint from other factors. As an 
initial matter, courts have appropriately required plaintiffs to 
show market power by focusing on increased pricing not in the 
defendant’s products, but in the overall context of the market 
or with reference to competitors’ pricing.447 They also have dis-
tinguished the effect of the restraint at issue from extraneous 
factors such as legislation, investment, costs, inflation, and ad-
vertising expenditures.448 And again the caveats, in the end, do 
not overcome the conclusion that courts can analyze the effect 
of a restraint on price. 
3. Other factors 
Courts may find other factors indicative of anticompetitive 
effect more difficult to measure than output or price. For ex-
ample, quality is not as readily ascertainable. Nonetheless, the 
courts have been able to determine whether a restraint ad-
versely affected quality.449 Whether more consumers buy a 
 
Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Giles Mem’l Hosp., 846 F. Supp. 488, 493 (W.D. 
Va. 1994); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 814 F. Supp. 1254, 1265 (W.D. Pa. 1992); Mays v. 
Hospital Auth., 596 F. Supp. 120, 122 (N.D. Ga. 1984). 
 445. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984); Associated Ra-
dio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342, 1353 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 446. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. 
Ct. 65 (1998); Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 770 F.2d 367, 375 (3d Cir. 
1985). 
 447. See, e.g., Southern Card & Novelty, Inc. v. Lawson Mardon Label, Inc., 138 
F.3d 869, 877 (11th Cir. 1998); Doctor’s Hosp. v. Southeast Med. Alliance, Inc., 123 
F.3d 301, 310 (5th Cir. 1997); Levine v. Central Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 
1552 (11th Cir. 1996); Godix Equip. Export Corp. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 
1570, 1582 (S.D. Fla. 1996). 
 448. See Levine, 72 F.3d at 1552 (noting insufficiency of increased prices in man-
aged care plan without information on fees charged by providers not in the plan, re-
source costs, and inflation); Anheuser-Busch, 811 F. Supp. at 865-66 (the “cumulative 
effect” of legislation, inflation, and investment “diminish the portion of any price in-
crease” attributable to the restraint; moreover, the increase in the defendant’s sales 
confirmed the reasonableness of price increases). 
 449. See, e.g., Southern Card, 138 F.3d at 877; Sitkin Smelting & Ref. Co., 575 
F.2d at 447; Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Unity Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 694, 
707 (D. Minn. 1998); Advanced Health-Care Servs., 846 F. Supp. at 493 & n.7; Miller, 
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product is one way of making this determination, though, 
again, differentiation of causation is inexact. In general, even if 
less objective manifestations of anticompetitive effect present 
slightly greater difficulty for courts, the conclusion still holds 
that courts can analyze anticompetitive effect, in particular, 
the primary building blocks of price and output.450 
An examination of the cases supports this conclusion. Of 
the cases in which courts found that there was no anticompeti-
tive effect, the overwhelming majority correctly analyzed this 
factor.451 Of 427 such cases, only 3—less than 1%—should have, 
most deferentially considered, found an anticompetitive ef-
fect.452 The courts in these three cases failed to recognize (at 
least for purposes of motions to dismiss) the potential anticom-
petitive effect presented by an increase in costs453 or a decrease 
in supply.454 Of the 28 cases in which courts discovered an anti-
competitive effect, 9 (32%) should not have done so.455 The uni-
 
814 F. Supp. at 1265. 
 450. In addition to measuring actual anticompetitive effect, courts can measure 
potential anticompetitive effect as revealed through market power. Courts can deter-
mine the markets in which products compete and calculate market share and other in-
dicators of market power, such as barriers to entry. See, e.g., Midwest Underground 
Storage, Inc. v. Porter, 717 F.2d 493, 499 (10th Cir. 1983); Godix Equip. Export Corp. v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 948 F.Supp. 1570, 1580-82 (S.D. Fla. 1996). 
 451. This Article deferentially examines the courts’ holdings. Where the result 
could legitimately go either way, the decision is regarded as correct. In addition, the 
determination of correctness does not presuppose a particular philosophy; that is, as 
long as the court articulates the basis for its decision—be it a focus on competition or 
on noneconomic factors (à la Post-Chicago School)—correctness is determined with ref-
erence to the paradigm selected. Because no courts, in applying the Rule of Reason, 
have explicitly invoked noneconomic rationales for their decisions, the Article looks to 
competition and treats decisions as incorrect only where the court flagrantly miscalcu-
lates the net effect on competition or on consumer welfare. 
 452. See Health First, Inc. v. Bronson Methodist Hosp., No. 1:89-CV-1191, 1990 
WL 157372 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 1990); Kling v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 626 F. 
Supp. 1285 (C.D. Ill. 1986); Alpha-Sentura Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 
No. HM 78-1549, 1979 WL 1706 (D. Md. Sept. 11, 1979). 
 453. See Health First, 1990 WL 157372, at *1, *4 (allegation that defendants’ con-
duct “tended to increase health care costs” could be broadly construed to allege anti-
competitive effect in market of hospital services); Kling, 626 F. Supp. at 1291 (allega-
tion by plaintiff that restraint would increase cost and decrease quality of health care 
services). 
 454. See Alpha-Sentura Bus. Servs., 1979 WL 1706, at *3 (banking associations 
denied credit card services to entire market of adult bookstores). 
 455. See Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996); Los An-
geles Mem’l Coliseum Comm. v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); NASL v. NFL, 670 
F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982); Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980); Smith v. 
Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. North Dakota Hosp. 
Ass’n, 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.N.D. 1986); Cantor v. Multiple Listing Serv., 568 F. Supp. 
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fying factor of these nine cases was the court’s focus on the ef-
fect of the restraint on a competitor—be it by focusing exclu-
sively on the effect on the competitor456 or on intrabrand com-
petition,457 or by emphasizing an overly narrow market.458 All 
together, of the 455 cases examining anticompetitive effect, 
courts correctly interpreted the factor in an impressive 443 
cases (97%). Since 1990, only one court incorrectly examined 
the factor.459 These incontrovertible figures support the hy-
pothesis that courts can examine anticompetitive effect. 
B. Procompetitive Justifications 
The courts also can consider a defendant’s procompetitive 
justifications. They can determine (1) whether the proffered 
justification, if true, would promote competition, and (2) 
whether there is evidence in the record to support the justifica-
tion. First, courts can recognize justifications that limit free-
riding,460 encourage dealer investment,461 foster market pene-
tration,462 allow a new product to be developed,463 foster qual-
 
424 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Countrie Butcher Shoppe, Inc. v. Foodarama Supermarkets, Inc., 
No. 81-5336, 1982 WL 1909 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1982); TV Signal Co. v. AT&T, No. CIV 
70-6N, 1981 WL 2049 (D.S.D. Mar. 13, 1981). 
 456. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319 (discussing effect of sanctions imposed by ath-
letic conference on university); North Dakota Hosp. Ass’n, 640 F. Supp. at 1039 (pur-
chaser harmed by hospital association’s rates); Cantor, 568 F. Supp. at 430 (association 
rule had adverse impact on business of plaintiffs—2 out of 600 licensed real estate bro-
kers in the market); Foodarama Supermarkets, 1982 WL 1909, at *3 (restrictive cove-
nant had adverse effect on competitor); AT&T, 1981 WL 2049, at *5 (focusing on effect 
of policy on plaintiff, who, incidentally, succeeded in competing in the market). 
 457. See Eiberger, 622 F.2d at 1081 (invalidating restraint by which party charged 
fees for sales outside territories that had effect only on intrabrand competition). 
 458. See Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm. v. NFL , 726 F.2d at 1392-95 (focus-
ing on effect of NFL rule in local market); NASL, 670 F.2d at 1259-61 (finding market 
of “sports capital and skill”); Smith, 593 F.2d at 1183 (“market for players’ services”). 
 459. See Hairston, 101 F.3d 1315. 
 460. See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 969, 972 (10th Cir. 
1994); Western Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-2063 (HHG), 
1994 WL 773361 (D.D.C. Jun. 16, 1994); Gemini Concerts, Inc. v. Triple-A Baseball 
Club Assocs., 664 F. Supp. 24, 27 (D. Me. 1987); Net Realty Holding Trust v. Franconia 
Properties, Inc., No. 82-0318-A, 1983 WL 1786, at *7 (E.D. Va. Jan. 20, 1983). 
 461. See, e.g., New York v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 848, 876 (E.D.N.Y. 
1993). 
 462. See, e.g., Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470, 475 (D.D.C. 
1977). 
 463. See, e.g., National Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 605 (11th 
Cir. 1986); Southtrust Corp. v. Plus Sys., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1517, 1524 (N.D. Ala. 
1995); National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 507 F. Supp. 1113, 1123 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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ity,464 and advance other procompetitive objectives.465 Second, 
they can comb the record to find evidence of the justification—
documentation to that effect, for example. They also can locate 
evidence of procompetitive effects. For the same reasons men-
tioned above, courts can observe a reduction in price or an ex-
pansion in output. Courts also can recognize the flip sides of 
these propositions—that certain alleged justifications really are 
not procompetitive or that there is no evidence that supports 
the justifications.466 
Courts must be careful. The key to the determination, of 
course, is whether the proffered justification has a beneficial 
effect on competition. The dangers here are that a court either 
does not credit a defendant’s legitimate justification or ap-
proves an explanation that does not promote competition. The 
likelihood of either danger occurring should be rare. As long as 
it is plausible that the restraint will promote competition, 
courts should not dismiss the justification. Even if courts view 
antitrust defendants askance, and consider justifications to be 
nothing more than post-hoc rationalizations, that does not 
mean that these courts will find that there is no procompetitive 
justification. Nor should the reverse hold: courts typically will 
not be blinded by an explanation that does not really benefit 
competition since they can distinguish between a benefit to 
competition and one inhering solely to the defendant. 
Courts’ consideration of procompetitive effects conforms to 
these conclusions. The courts found that the restraint in ques-
tion had a procompetitive effect in 34 cases. Although the con-
text varied—in 20 cases, the courts conducted balancing;467 in 
 
 464. See, e.g., Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998); Servicetrends, Inc. 
v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1042, 1066 (N.D. Ga. 1994); Robinson v. Ma-
govern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 919 (W.D. Pa. 1981). 
 465. See, e.g., Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru, 858 F.2d 792, 799 (1st Cir. 1998) (prevent-
ing parts shortages); Northeastern Educ. Television v. Educational Television Ass’n, 
758 F. Supp. 1568, 1578 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (increasing diversity of output); Net Realty 
Holding Trust v. Franconia Properties, Inc., No. 82-0318-A, 1983 WL 1786, at *8 (E.D. 
Va. Jan. 20, 1983) (promoting comparison shopping); Jetro Cash and Carry Enters., 
Inc. v. Food Distrib. Ctr., 569 F. Supp. 1404, 1416 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (same); Gunter Harz 
Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass’n, 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1117 (D. Neb. 1981) (pre-
serving integrity of game). 
 466. See infra notes 467-474 and accompanying text. 
 467. Three of the balancing cases barely found a procompetitive justification to 
weigh against an anticompetitive effect. See Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial 
Park Cemetery Ass’n, 666 F.2d 1130, 1140 (8th Cir. 1981); Cantor v. Multiple Listing 
Serv., 568 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); TV Signal Co. v. AT&T, No. Civ.70-6N, 1981 
WL 2049 (D.S.D. Mar. 13, 1981). 
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3, they determined whether the restraint was reasonably nec-
essary; and in 11, they summarily found the restraint to be 
reasonable or unreasonable—the result was the same. In every 
one of these 34 cases, the court reached the correct conclusion 
on the factor and was not blinded by the defendant’s explana-
tion. Even if the court ultimately struck down the restraint, it 
first found that the restraint had a procompetitive effect. 
 Consideration of cases in which courts found no procompeti-
tive effect—and therefore invalidated the restraint—confirms 
that courts can analyze this factor and that they do not im-
properly ignore procompetitive justifications. Of the 14 cases in 
which courts found no procompetitive effect, this finding—
again, most deferentially considered—was correct in 13 cases. 
The courts correctly found that there was no evidence to sup-
port the procompetitive effect;468 that the proffered justification 
was not legitimate because it questioned the necessity of com-
petition;469 that there was no viable free-riding justification;470 
or that the defendant explained its justification in the wrong 
market.471 The only case that misconstrued this factor was 
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,472 which found that the NFL draft 
of college players was procompetitive only “in its effect on the 
playing field.”473 The Smith court thus ignored a fundamental 
goal to which the draft contributed—competitive balance. This 
goal allows the NFL to put out a better product that competes 
 
 468. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. 
Ct. 65 (1998); In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, 955 F.2d 457, 471-72 (6th Cir. 1992); 
Wilk v. American Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352, 361 (7th Cir. 1990); Barber & Ross Co. v. 
Lifetime Doors, Inc., 810 F.2d 1276, 1280 (4th Cir. 1987); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. 
v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982); Countrie Butcher 
Shoppe, Inc. v. Foodarama Supermarkets, Inc., No. 81-5336, 1982 WL 1909, at *4 (E.D. 
Pa. Oct. 14, 1982). 
 469. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462-64 
(1986); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 114-20 (1984); National Soc’y of Prof’l 
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-95 (1978); United States v. Capitol Serv., 
Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 153 (E.D. Wisc. 1983), aff’d, 756 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1985); Mar-
dirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628, 648-49 (D.D.C. 1979). 
 470. See Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 675 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
 471. See International Wood Processors v. Power Dry, Inc. 593 F. Supp. 710, 722 
(D.S.C. 1984). 
 472. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 473. Id. at 1186. Earlier in its opinion, the court had conceded that “[s]ome form of 
player selection system may serve to regulate and thereby promote competition in what 
would otherwise be a chaotic bidding market for the services of college players.” Id. at 
1181. 
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more effectively against other forms of entertainment; in short, 
to enhance interbrand competition.474 The Smith case aside, 
courts’ consideration of procompetitive effect, in particular 
their correct analysis of the factor in 47 out of 48 cases (98%), 
provides cogent support for the conclusion that courts can ana-
lyze procompetitive effects. 
C. Reasonable Necessity or Less Restrictive Alternative 
The third stage of the Rule of Reason analysis calls for at 
least one of two determinations. This Section concludes that 
the courts cannot do one: the search for less restrictive alterna-
tives to the restraint.475 The Section further concludes that the 
other—examining whether the restraint is reasonably neces-
sary—would benefit from a shift in the burden of production 
from plaintiffs having to show that the restraint is not rea-
sonably necessary to defendants being required to show that it 
is reasonably necessary. Given the sources’ lukewarm support 
of the factors, these conclusions tilt the balance as to the pro-
priety of the factors. 
1. Less restrictive alternatives 
Courts cannot determine whether a restraint has alterna-
tives that are less restrictive of competition for three reasons. 
First, in conducting such an examination, the courts’ focus 
shifts naturally to whether an alternative restraint exists and 
whether this restraint is less restrictive of competition. The 
court does not focus on whether such a restraint would achieve 
the defendant’s objectives as well as the current restraint or 
whether it would attain all—as opposed to some—of the objec-
tives. The neglect of the link between the alternative restraint 
and the defendant’s objectives is an ominous sign.476 
 
 474. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 119-20 (1984) (“The hypothesis 
that legitimates the maintenance of competitive balance as a procompetitive justifica-
tion under the Rule of Reason is that equal competition will maximize consumer de-
mand for the product.”). 
 475. Of course, courts perform an analysis based on less restrictive alternatives in 
other fields, such as constitutional law. In antitrust law, however, it is difficult enough 
to determine whether an actual restraint promotes the defendant’s goals. Determining 
whether a hypothetical restraint would achieve the goals is a not workable test. More-
over, it is arguably more defensible to allow a more activist judicial role to protect con-
stitutional norms such as freedom of speech than to second-guess business judgments 
and intervene in the marketplace. 
 476. See Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1396-97 
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Second, and compounding this problem, courts can always 
find a less restrictive alternative. Unlike the defendant, who 
presumably decides in advance whether a particular restraint 
will achieve its objectives, a court looks post hoc at the re-
straint and its effects, and can always tinker at the margins. It 
can opine that a manufacturer should have had a few more 
dealers, that an exclusive dealing agreement should have fore-
closed a little less of the market, that an association’s rule 
should have had a little less of an effect on a competitor. The 
“imaginations of lawyers could [always] conjure up some 
method”477 of achieving the defendant’s objectives that would 
have a marginally lesser effect on competition.478 As a result, 
courts would second-guess legitimate business judgments made 
by defendants.479 
Third, and relatedly, courts looking for a less restrictive re-
straint will, in effect, conduct a least-restrictive-alternative 
analysis.480 The only type of restraint that will not have a less 
restrictive alternative is the least restrictive alternative. Any 
other restraint, by definition, will have a less restrictive alter-
native. So in looking for less restrictive alternatives, the courts 
actually are penalizing the defendants for not using the least 
restrictive alternative.481 Courts that promise that they are 
searching only for less (and not least) restrictive alternatives 
are only deceiving themselves. This is not constitutional law;482 
whether a restraint is the least restrictive alternative leads the 
court on a wild goose chase not appropriate in antitrust law.483 
 
(9th Cir. 1984); Cantor v. Multiple Listing Serv., 568 F. Supp. 424, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 477. American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1249 (3d Cir. 
1975). 
 478. See id.; see also Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 303 
(2d Cir. 1979). 
 479. See American Motor Inns, 521 F.2d at 1249-50. 
 480. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Sylvania court explained the dan-
gers of an analysis based on least restrictive alternatives: such a rule “would place an 
unreasonable and impractical burden on a manufacturer desiring to impose some verti-
cal restraint in order to promote its position vis-à-vis its competitors.” Continental 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 694 F.2d 1132, 1138 n.11 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 481. The only conceivable difference between the terms results when there exists 
a range of alternatives less restrictive than the restraint at issue. Then, the least re-
strictive alternative would be different from marginally-more-restrictive “less restric-
tive alternatives.” Stating this distinction demonstrates its irrelevance. 
 482. See NFL v. NASL, 459 U.S. 1074, 1079 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from 
denial of cert.) (“The antitrust laws impose a standard of reasonableness, not a stan-
dard of absolute necessity.”). 
 483. This Article does not dispute that, properly applied, the less restrictive alter-
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In practice, the courts’ consideration of the factor confirms 
that they should abandon all inquiry—as a separate step in the 
burden-shifting analysis or as a factor in balancing—as to 
whether the restraint at issue has less restrictive alternatives. 
Only one court has disposed of a case because no less restric-
tive alternative could be shown.484 Three courts considered the 
factor in their balancing analysis,485 and three did so in con-
cluding that a restraint was not unreasonable.486 Of the seven 
cases, the court in the case for which the factor was dispositive 
and the courts in the three balancing cases misanalyzed the 
factor. Thus, courts in only 3 out of 7 cases (43%) correctly de-
termined whether there were less restrictive alternatives. 
The one case in which the factor was dispositive illustrates 
the danger of the analysis. The court in Hairston v. Pacific 10 
Conference487 relied on the absence of less restrictive alterna-
tives in addressing an athletic association’s imposition of sanc-
tions on a university that committed violations in recruiting 
football players.488 The court found that the university’s inabil-
ity to participate in bowl games satisfied the threshold of anti-
competitive effect, and that the punishment of football pro-
grams that violate the conference’s amateurism rules had 
procompetitive effects.489 The court concluded that the plaintiffs 
failed to show “that the [association’s] procompetitive objectives 
could be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.”490 
The court’s opinion was flawed. 
First, the court never should have reached the third stage 
of the burden-shifting analysis. There was no anticompetitive 
effect. The court cursorily found such an effect despite its fail-
 
native analysis would be useful. After all, who could be against a test that allows the 
defendant to achieve all of its procompetitive objectives while having a less restrictive 
effect on competition? The recommendations of this Article, however, take into account 
courts’ capacities. The Article draws conclusions based not on best-case-keep-our-
fingers-crossed scenarios but on today’s courts, warts and all. 
 484. See Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 485. See Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm. v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 
1984); NASL v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982); Cantor v. Multiple Listing Serv., 
568 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 486. See Barry v. Blue Cross of California, 805 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1986); Foster v. 
Maryland State Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 590 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Hennessey v. 
NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 487. 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 488. See id. at 1317. 
 489. See id. at 1319. 
 490. Id. 
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ure to define the scope of the relevant market in which the re-
straint had an effect and to cite any adverse effect on competi-
tion, as opposed to one competitor.491 But it is the court’s dis-
cussion of less restrictive alternatives that raises a red flag. 
Most fundamentally, the court never examined whether a less 
restrictive alternative would promote the defendant’s goals. It 
rested its conclusion on the plaintiffs’ failure to provide evi-
dence supporting their claim that the penalties imposed were 
disproportionate.492 Even most broadly considered, this inquiry 
addresses only a range of penalties related to the actual re-
straint; it does not implicate other alternatives. As for the ob-
jectives themselves, the court graced them with only one sen-
tence.493 As an example of a court conducting a less restrictive 
alternative analysis without analyzing other alternatives and 
without examining the link between the restraint and the de-
fendant’s objectives, Hairston warns of the difficulties of the 
less restrictive alternative analysis. 
The three courts that examined the factor of less restrictive 
alternatives in their balancing analysis did not fare any better. 
In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL (“Raid-
ers”),494 a central factor in the court’s affirmance of a jury ver-
dict that the NFL’s relocation rules were unreasonable was the 
contention that the NFL’s “goals can be achieved in a variety of 
ways which are less harmful to competition.”495 The court con-
cluded that the League’s consideration of objective factors in 
determining whether franchises could relocate would be more 
“closely tailored” to its goals.496 It never explained, however, 
how the consideration of objective factors would have a less re-
strictive effect on competition. In fact, after lauding the bene-
fits of a less restrictive alternative analysis,497 the court never 
actually admitted that the consideration of objective factors 
was a less restrictive alternative at all. 
In NASL v. NFL,498 the court invalidated the NFL’s cross-
 
 491. See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319. Moreover, the court had stated, earlier in its 
opinion, that the plaintiffs had failed to show an anticompetitive effect. See id. at 1318. 
 492. See id. at 1319. 
 493. See id. 
 494. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 495. Id. at 1396. 
 496. Id. at 1397. The factors the court mentioned were population, economic pro-
jections, facilities, regional balance, fan loyalty, and location continuity. See id. 
 497. See id. at 1395. 
 498. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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ownership rules based in part on the existence of less restric-
tive alternatives. The court found, for example, that any con-
flict of interest between the sports leagues in selling broadcast 
rights could be remedied “by removing cross-owners from [the 
NFL’s] broadcast rights negotiating committee.”499 Similarly, 
the court rejected the NFL’s argument that the rules were nec-
essary to prevent the disclosure of confidential information to 
the rival league because there were “less restrictive means”500 
of attaining the goal. Yet the court incorrectly focused on the 
existence of less restrictive alternatives rather than whether 
the alternatives would achieve the NFL’s objectives.501 It did 
not show how removing owners from the broadcast rights 
committee achieved, at a minimum, the proffered goals outside 
this sphere—such as preventing conflict in the sale of game 
tickets.502 Nor did the court explain how preventing the disclo-
sure of confidential information could be achieved by “less re-
strictive means” that it did not even describe.503 
In Cantor v. Multiple Listing Service,504 the court invali-
dated a real estate association bylaw that prevented members 
from posting signs from other organizations on property that 
was for sale. The court devoted one sentence of its opinion to 
the defendant’s objectives, and summarily noted that the objec-
tives could be achieved by requiring the posting of association 
signs “no less conspicuously” than other signs.505 The court 
never explained how its alternative was less restrictive of com-
petition as a whole or how such an alternative would promote 
the defendant’s objectives. 
Three courts did not botch the less restrictive alternative 
analysis, but the role of the analysis in their opinions is not 
clear. In Hennessey v. NCAA,506 the court upheld a bylaw of the 
NCAA that limited the number of assistant football and bas-
ketball coaches that institutions could employ.507 The court did 
 
 499. Id. at 1261. 
 500. Id. 
 501. The court also misstated the governing law on the burden of production by 
requiring the NFL to “come forward with proof” of such alternatives. Id. 
 502. See id. 
 503. See id. 
 504. 568 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 505. Id. at 431. 
 506. 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 507. See id. at 1141. 
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not discern any effects of the bylaw, given its recent enactment, 
but it concluded that the restraint would achieve the NCAA’s 
objectives.508 The court correctly rejected plaintiffs’ proffered 
less restrictive alternatives (a longer grace period before the 
application of the bylaw and a compensation limit for 
coaches).509 In Barry v. Blue Cross of California,510 the court 
upheld an arrangement by which the Blue Cross reimbursed 
physicians that participated in a particular insurance package 
at a higher rate.511 The court found that the restraint had no 
anticompetitive effects, that it had procompetitive effects in 
lowering prices, and that a less restrictive alternative sug-
gested by the plaintiff—reimbursing nonparticipating doctors 
at the same rate that participating doctors received—was not a 
viable alternative since it would not have achieved the objec-
tive of encouraging doctors to join the insurance package.512 Fi-
nally, in Foster v. Maryland State Savings and Loan Ass’n,513 
the court upheld a practice of a savings and loan association to 
charge lenders a fee if they employed attorneys other than the 
association’s own counsel. After finding the restraint to be, at 
most, “de minimis”514 and reasonable, the court rejected plain-
tiffs’ claimed less restrictive alternatives. In particular, the 
court noted that the association had already—unsuccessfully—
tried the suggested alternative of relying on borrowers’ coun-
sel.515 
2. Reasonable necessity 
A court can, on the other hand, examine whether a re-
straint is reasonably necessary to achieve the defendant’s ob-
jectives. And it must make this assessment, as irrelevant pro-
competitive justifications having nothing to do with the 
restraint cannot be permitted to blind the court.516 Even so, the 
 
 508. See id. at 1153-54. 
 509. See id. at 1154. The grace period did not “support[] the objective” of the bylaw 
and the compensation limit was not “less [of] a restraint” than the bylaw at issue. Id. 
 510. 805 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 511. See id. at 867. 
 512. See id. at 872-73. 
 513. 590 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 514. Id. at 933. 
 515. The court explained that many attorneys employed by the borrowers were 
inexperienced, unqualified in the field at issue, and overly concerned with completing 
the sale. See id. at 934. 
 516. See Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1577 n.31 
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analysis of reasonable necessity would benefit from a shift in 
the burden of production. Better to let the defendant prove that 
the restraint is reasonably necessary than to have the plaintiff 
prove it is not. 
The standard of “reasonable necessity” ensures that courts 
can analyze this factor. For starters, courts can determine 
whether a defendant is pursuing legitimate procompetitive ob-
jectives.517 They also can determine whether a particular re-
straint is sufficiently connected to the goal to be “reasonably 
necessary.” They need not decide whether the restraint is the 
most effective means to achieve the objective. They need not 
examine whether there are less restrictive alternatives to the 
restraint. Nor do they have to prove that a restraint is, a priori, 
a logical predicate without which the objective could not be 
achieved. They only have to decide the easier inquiry of 
whether the restraint is reasonably required to attain the ob-
jective. Courts can do this. And they have. For example, courts 
have found to be reasonably necessary restraints that had the 
tendency to (and that did) create a product that would not oth-
erwise have been available and that improved service to cus-
tomers.518 Further, a court invalidated a restraint that did not 
appear necessary to promote servicing coverage for custom-
ers.519 Despite courts’ capacity on this issue, they would benefit 
from a shift in the burden of production. 
A restraint’s necessity can best be addressed by the defen-
dant. The defendant is most familiar with its chosen objectives, 
its capacities, the types of (successful and unsuccessful) re-
straints that it has used in the past, and the market in which 
the restraint is applied.520 In contrast, plaintiffs’ knowledge of 
 
(11th Cir. 1983) (the standard of reasonable necessity “helps to illuminate both the 
manufacturer’s motive in imposing the restrictions and the effects of the restriction on 
competition overall”); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750, 
758 (D. Md. 1980) (“A poor fit between means and ends suggests that the avowed pur-
pose is merely a pretext.”), aff’d, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 517. See supra notes 460-465 and accompanying text. 
 518. See infra notes 526-529 and accompanying text. 
 519. See infra note 530 and accompanying text. 
 520. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 961, 969 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(describing association’s reason for adopting and maintaining restraint); Justice v. 
NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983) (noting reason for restraint and link to objec-
tives); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 767 (D. Del. 1981) 
(explaining reason for restraint), aff’d, 691 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1982); Gunter Harz 
Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass’n, 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1117-21 (D. Neb. 1981) 
(noting relationship between restraint and objectives); Newberry v. Washington Post 
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such information is at best secondhand. Shifting the burden to 
the defendant thereby benefits the courts, which obtain better 
and more reliable information.521 
Shifting the burden to the defendant has three other bene-
fits. First, it emphasizes whether the restraint is necessary to 
achieve the defendant’s objectives, rather than necessary in 
comparison with other alternatives. The defendant would be 
more likely than the plaintiff to explain the link between the 
restraint and the objectives (or be unable to persuasively jus-
tify the link)522 and less likely to examine other alternatives.523 
Second, allowing the defendant to prove a positive makes 
more sense than requiring the plaintiff to prove a negative. It 
is an easier project to determine what is reasonably necessary 
than to prove what is not. How could a party ever prove this 
negative? Naturally, by putting forward alternatives that are 
necessary. And, chances are, those alternatives would suppos-
edly be less restrictive of competition. It is much more straight-
forward and reasonable to allow the defendant to show what is 
reasonably necessary than to set the plaintiff off on a hunt of 
no finite duration to show what is not reasonably necessary. 
Third (and relatedly), courts’ misapplication of this factor 
supports the burden shift and reveals the difficulty courts have 
had with proving the negative. Stated bluntly, no court has ac-
curately observed the effect of the plaintiff’s satisfaction of the 
factor.524 The courts seem not to have noticed that proving this 
 
Co., 438 F. Supp. 470, 475 (D.D.C. 1977) (describing purpose of objective and market in 
which restraint operated). 
 521. Because the plaintiff’s proof of anticompetitive effect precedes the defendant’s 
showing, the burden shift would be less consequential than the one proposed by Assis-
tant Attorney General Joel Klein as part of a “stepwise” approach. See Joel I. Klein, 
Point: A “Stepwise” Approach for Analyzing Horizontal Agreements Will Provide a 
Much Needed Structure for Antitrust Review, ANTITRUST 41, 42 (Spring 1998) (if 
agreement directly limits competition, “the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer a 
procompetitive justification”). 
 522. See Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1578 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (finding that defendant presented “no evidence” demonstrating that use of 
restraint was “important to the goal of improved service coverage”). 
 523. See, e.g., SCFC, 36 F.3d at 969; Broadcast Music, 527 F. Supp. at 769-72; 
Gunter Harz, 511 F. Supp. at 1117-21; Newberry, 438 F. Supp. at 475. For an argument 
that assigning the burden to the party with lower costs of proof “economizes on both 
direct costs and error costs,” see Thomas R. Lee, Pleading and Proof: The Economics of 
Legal Burdens, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17. 
 524. The court in Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 
S. Ct. 65 (1998), explained that “if [the] steps [of the burden-shifting construct],” in-
cluding the plaintiff’s burden to show that the restraint was not reasonably necessary, 
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factor leads to the opposite result of proving either of the prior 
two factors. That is, if the plaintiff cannot meet the initial bur-
den of demonstrating an anticompetitive effect, he loses; and if 
the defendant cannot meet the second burden of showing pro-
competitive justifications, then she loses. But if the plaintiff 
cannot prove the third factor—that the restraint is not rea-
sonably necessary—then he does not lose. Rather, the case pro-
ceeds to balancing.525 The case is only disposed of at the third 
stage if the plaintiff can show that the restraint is not reasona-
bly necessary. Then, the plaintiff wins. 
Although six courts have considered the reasonable neces-
sity of restraints, none disposed of them in the context pre-
sented in this Article and recently articulated by some courts—
the third stage of the burden-shifting analysis. As a result, the 
courts that explained incorrectly the effect of the plaintiff’s 
demonstration of the third factor did not actually apply the fac-
tor. In any event, the conclusion that courts can determine rea-
sonable necessity is confirmed by reference to the cases. Each 
of the six courts (100%) correctly analyzed the factor. Courts 
correctly found restraints to be reasonably necessary where 
they created a product that would not otherwise have been 
available,526 where they increased market penetration and im-
proved service to customers,527 and where they furthered pro-
fessional528 or amateur529 athletic endeavors. A court also 
found, as part of a balancing analysis, that a defendant failed 
to show that its territorial restraints were reasonably neces-
 
are met, then the court proceeds to balancing. To the contrary, if the plaintiff satisfies 
its burden at the third stage, it wins. 
Similarly, the court in United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 
1993), was misguided in finding that in order “[t]o rebut” the defendant’s demonstra-
tion of procompetitive justifications, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the restraint 
is not reasonably necessary.” Id. at 669. But again, the plaintiff need not demonstrate 
such; if it does not make this showing, then the court balances. Two other courts veered 
off track in following the court in Brown. See, e.g., Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 
79 F.3d 1358, 1368 (3d Cir. 1996); Yeager’s Fuel, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light 
Co., 953 F. Supp. 617, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
 525. See VII AREEDA, supra note 3, ¶ 1507, at 397. 
 526. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994); Broadcast 
Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758 (D. Del. 1981). 
 527. See Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470 (D.D.C. 1977). 
 528. See Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass’n, 511 F. Supp. 
1103 (D. Neb. 1981). 
 529. See Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983). 
CAR-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:24 AM 
1265] THE REAL RULE OF REASON 1345 
sary to promote servicing of its product.530 
Despite the failure to consider the restraints in the context 
of the third stage of the Rule of Reason analysis, the cases still 
confirm the benefits of shifting the burden to the defendants to 
show reasonable necessity. The courts benefitted from defen-
dants’ explanations of how various restraints would be effective 
means of serving consumers,531 preventing free-riding,532 and 
preserving amateurism533 and the integrity of a sport.534 For 
example, the court in Gunter Harz, in upholding a restraint 
prohibiting the use of particular equipment, considered expert 
testimony proffered by the defendants that revealed the neces-
sity of the restraint and adverse consequences that had already 
resulted from the use of the equipment to be prohibited.535 Such 
evidence naturally is revealed more by the defendant showing 
the necessity of the restraint than the plaintiff demonstrating 
the opposite. It is noteworthy that many of the courts that have 
required a restraint to be reasonably necessary have explicitly 
rejected the analysis of whether the restraint was the least re-
strictive alternative.536 
Thus, courts can examine whether a restraint is reasonably 
necessary, but they would benefit from a shift in the burden of 
production from the plaintiff proving it is not necessary to the 
defendant proving it is. Taken with the elimination of the less 
restrictive alternative analysis as a factor in the Rule of Rea-
son, this Article proposes that the third stage be merged into 
the second. The new second stage would require the defendant 
to prove that the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve a 
 
 530. See Graphic Products Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 
1983). 
 531. See Broadcast Music, 527 F. Supp. at 767. 
 532. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 969 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 533. See Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 382. 
 534. See Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass’n, 511 F. Supp. 
1103, 1117-21 (D. Neb. 1981). 
 535. See id. at 1118-21. 
 536. See Broadcast Music, 527 F. Supp. at 769 (“[T]he test is not whether the de-
fendant deployed the least restrictive alternative. Rather the issue is whether the re-
striction actually implemented is ‘fairly necessary’ . . . .”) (quoting American Motor 
Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1248-49 (3d Cir. 1975)); Consolidated 
Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Anchor Sav. Ass’n, 480 F. Supp. 640, 653 (D. Kan. 1979) 
(“So long as the defendants’ actions are reasonable, they need not constitute the ‘least 
restrictive alternative’ available.”) (citation omitted); Newberry v. Washington Post 
Co., 438 F. Supp. 470, 475 (D.D.C. 1977) (citation omitted) (restraint was not “the least 
restrictive alternative imaginable, but such a showing need not be made”). 
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legitimate procompetitive objective. 
D. Balancing 
1. Theory 
Can the courts balance anticompetitive and procompetitive 
effects? The odds are against them. For courts rarely will be 
able to sum up a restraint’s net effect on output or price. By no 
stretch can we be assured of the results of balancing with 
mathematical exactitude. It is no surprise, then, that courts 
are not confident that they can tackle balancing under the Rule 
of Reason, calling it a task that is “extremely awkward to ap-
ply,”537 that lacks an analytical framework,538 and that is “be-
yond judicial capabilities.”539 
But that is not to say it cannot be done. Or that the check-
list of factors cited by courts from the landmark case of Board 
of Trade of Chicago v. United States,540 often cited by courts to 
show their incapacity, cannot be ordered to comport with to-
day’s Rule of Reason analysis. The Court in Board of Trade 
recommended that courts consider 
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is ap-
plied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; 
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable[, 
as well as] [t]he history of the restraint, the evil believed to 
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, [and] the 
purpose or end sought to be attained.541 
 
 537. New York v. Anheuser Busch, 811 F. Supp. 848, 872 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (“Com-
petitive effects are not susceptible to any kind of numerical valuation, making the 
Court’s task a daunting one.”); see also National Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 
F.2d 592, 597 (11th Cir. 1986) (the Rule of Reason is “a time-consuming process that 
entails significant costs” and is hampered by “the general lack of judicial expertise in 
sophisticated economic analysis as well as the lack of certainty that such case law pro-
duces”). 
 538. See Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1568 n.10 
(11th Cir. 1983) (also noting the “exceedingly general nature” of the factors cited in the 
Chicago Board of Trade analysis). 
 539. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 230 n.11 
(D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 
(1982) (citation omitted) (“Judges often lack the expert understanding of industrial 
market structures and behavior to determine with any confidence a practice’s effect on 
competition.”). 
 540. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
 541. Id. at 238. 
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Although courts throw up their hands in despair when con-
fronted with such a seemingly orderless litany,542 the checklist, 
on closer analysis, is not so intimidating. 
Most of the factors in the Board of Trade checklist are con-
sistent with an examination of the effect of a restraint on in-
terbrand competition. Several factors conform with the initial 
burden in today’s Rule of Reason analysis of demonstrating an-
ticompetitive effect: the actual effect of the restraint (akin to 
actual adverse effect in today’s analysis), the probable effect 
(akin to market power), and the condition before and after the 
imposition of the restraint (generally corresponding with anti-
competitive effect). The defendant’s proof of procompetitive jus-
tifications is mirrored most closely in the factor of the Board of 
Trade checklist addressing the “purpose or end sought to be at-
tained,” and it also encompasses the reason for adopting the re-
straint and the evil believed to exist. 
Having addressed the first two factors of today’s Rule of 
Reason analysis, what factors from the Board of Trade test are 
left? First, the nature of the restraint, which today’s courts 
consider in placing the restraint into a particular category that 
governs, among other things, whether they will apply the Rule 
of Reason or per se treatment. Second, courts consider the 
“facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied” 
in their examinations of the relevant market. Third, the history 
of the restraint and “facts peculiar to the business” that are un-
related to the market are relevant in determining the reason-
able necessity of the restraint. Thus, the impenetrable Board of 
Trade checklist is brought down to size. 
But we are still left with balancing. How can courts do it? 
Doesn’t it require the comparing of apples (e.g., an increase in 
interbrand competition) and oranges (e.g., a decrease in in-
trabrand competition)? This Article does not pretend to offer 
the secret to successful balancing. Rather, it offers only a mod-
est reminder that, in analyzing the effects of a restraint, courts 
should be riveted on the effects on consumers and interbrand 
competition. While the legislative history may be consistent 
with other—namely, noncompetition—goals for the antitrust 
laws, and while some (in particular, members of the Post-
Chicago School) have argued that such goals should be in-
 
 542. See, e.g., Visa, 779 F.2d at 597; Itek, 717 F.2d at 1568 n.10. 
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cluded in the Rule of Reason analysis,543 even these proponents 
must recognize the significance of the consumer in the analysis. 
Relatedly, there can be no doubt that the consumer benefits 
from an increase in interbrand competition. Remembering and 
applying these simple maxims will add substantial credibility 
to courts’ balancing. There will, of course, always be cases at 
the margins where it will not be self-evident whether a re-
straint would increase consumer welfare or interbrand compe-
tition. But judging from the nearly five hundred Rule of Reason 
cases in the modern era, in which the overwhelming majority of 
courts found no restraint on competition, let alone an unrea-
sonable restraint, such cases should be few and far between. 
Moreover, not all cases in which courts utilize balancing 
will be difficult. Courts should have no problem, for example, 
invalidating an association standard that provides, at most, a 
marginal benefit for consumers while substantially raising 
price or restricting output. Nor should they have difficulty with 
an exclusive dealing arrangement that forecloses nearly all of 
the relevant market. On the other hand, courts should uphold 
such an arrangement that forecloses a small percentage of the 
market but that reduces free-riding. They also should uphold a 
vertical restraint that enhances investment, quality, or out-
put.544 
And any concerns about balancing should be diminished by 
the paucity of such cases. Only 4% of cases in the modern era 
have balanced, with only 6 cases in the past 10 years,545 and 1 
case in the past 4 years.546 
As an aside, it should be noted that there must be some 
method for the court to consider anticompetitive and procom-
petitive effects when both are present. Now, other types of bal-
ancing can be postulated. A narrower test than the current 
balancing, for example, may look only to the net effect of the 
restraint on output. But such an approach will not solve most 
cases since the competitive effects of restraints do not usually 
 
 543. See supra notes 304-07 and accompanying text. 
 544. The 1997 revisions to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines provide support for 
the conclusion that courts can balance, particularly in their consideration of both effi-
ciencies and adverse competitive effects resulting from mergers. See Department of 
Justice & Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“4. Efficiencies”) 
(1997 Revision). 
 545. See infra note 548 and accompanying text. 
 546. See infra note 549 and accompanying text. 
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manifest themselves so clearly as to lead to a “net result.” Ad-
ditionally, other, broader tests can be imagined by which the 
parties are free to introduce any concerns they feel relevant. 
Yet such tests would be characterized by administrative un-
workability and a lack of guidance for the parties, courts, 
scholars, and future defendants. There also could be broader 
tests that focus primarily on other delineated goals—such as 
the dispersal of power or the promotion of competition as proc-
ess. But it is still not clear how such tests would mesh with the 
goal of consumer welfare. Could a little consumer welfare be 
sacrificed for other objectives? How much? What if consumer 
welfare and the other goals tilt in different directions? Al-
though such a construct is not inconceivable, this Article would 
not recommend such an approach unless and until it becomes 
clear what role and significance would be accorded to each of 
the goals in the analysis and how the various goals would in-
terrelate.547 Even beneficial ends would do more harm than 
good without direction to the courts as to how they are to be 
weighed. 
Like it or not, balancing is with us. And as long as we do 
not expect mathematical precision—which, in any event, is im-
possible—balancing is not necessarily a bad thing. It is essen-
tial, however, that the stages preceding balancing be faithfully 
applied. No skipping to balancing because of some overriding 
political goals. Or because we want the court to have discretion 
to rely on its “gut feeling” to arrive at the right result. Balanc-
ing should occur only in the rarest of cases. And when it does 
occur, the brooding omnipresence of consumers and interbrand 
competition should serve as a beacon to courts, guiding them in 
the right direction. 
2. The cases 
Before exploring the instances in which courts have con-
ducted balancing, it is worth pausing to reflect on the infre-
quency with which courts in the 1990s have decided Rule of 
Reason cases by balancing anticompetitive and procompetitive 
effects. Of the 20 cases in the modern era in which courts con-
 
 547. In addition, pursuing the goal of consumer welfare often will promote noneffi-
ciency goals. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52 
ANTITRUST L.J. 523, 534-35 (1983); Brodley, supra note 292, at 1021. 
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ducted balancing, only 6 were decided in the last 10 years,548 
and only 1 of these was decided in the last 4 years.549 In short, 
as we enter the twenty-first century, courts almost never bal-
ance. 
Further diminishing the significance of balancing, the 
courts could have disposed of 10 of the 20 cases in which they 
balanced simply by finding that the plaintiff had failed to dem-
onstrate a significant anticompetitive effect. In seven cases, the 
courts explicitly found that there was no adverse effect on com-
petition.550 In three other cases, they could have found a lack of 
anticompetitive effect.551 For the 10 cases in which balancing 
was unnecessary, the courts in 9 cases concluded, consistent 
with the absence of anticompetitive effect, that the procompeti-
tive effects outweighed the anticompetitive effects.552 In one 
 
 548. See Eleven Line, Inc. v. North Tex. State Soccer Ass’n, No. CA-3-95-CV-3120-
R, 1998 WL 574893 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 1998); NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995); Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med. 
Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1042, 1066 (N.D. Ga. 1994); New York v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 
811 F. Supp. 848, 873 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Williamson v. Sacred Heart Hosp., No. 89-
30084-RV, 1993 WL 543002, at *50 (N.D. Fla. May 28, 1993); Eureka Urethane, Inc. v. 
PBA, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Mo. 1990). 
 549. See Eleven Line, Inc., 1998 WL 574893. 
 550. See Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru, 858 F.2d 792, 797, 799 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding 
defendant’s market share was “miniscule,” there was no demonstrated “actual anti-
competitive effect” in the tied product market, and “the tie shows no more than trivial 
effects”); National Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 605 (11th Cir. 
1986) (defendant “does not possess market power”); Plueckhahn v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 
749 F.2d 241, 247 (5th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff failed to demonstrate “substantial adverse 
effect”); Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811 F. Supp. at 873 (defendant lacks market power be-
cause of its “relatively small market share, [the] lack of entry barriers and the intense 
price competition”); Sacred Heart Hosp., 1993 WL 543002 at *50 (noting defendant’s 
“small share” of market and the absence of any “detriment to competition”); Net Realty 
Holding Trust v. Franconia Properties, Inc., No. 82-0318-A, 1983 WL 1786, at *7 (E.D. 
Va. Jan. 20, 1983) (noting “very slight” anticompetitive effect because only a fraction of 
1% of the relevant market was affected); Jetro Cash and Carry Enters., Inc. v. Food 
Distrib. Ctr., 569 F. Supp. 1404, 1416 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting restraint “simply does not 
have a significant adverse effect on competition”). 
 551. See Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1042, 1065 
(N.D. Ga. 1994) (exclusive dealing arrangement foreclosed only 32 to 38% of relevant 
market); Cantor v. Multiple Listing Serv., 568 F. Supp. 424, 430-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(finding anticompetitive effect because of “substantial adverse impact on plaintiffs’ 
businesses” where plaintiffs were two out of more than six hundred licensed real estate 
brokers in the market); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 919 (W.D. Pa. 1981) 
(anticompetitive effects were “not severe” and the affected doctors “almost certainly 
[would] have access” to facilities in relevant market). 
 552. See Grappone, 858 F.2d 792; National Bancard, 779 F.2d 592; Plueckhahn, 
749 F.2d 241; Siemens, 870 F. Supp. 1042; Anheuser-Busch, 811 F. Supp. 848; Sacred 
Heart Hosp., 1993 WL 543002; Net Realty Holding Trust, 1983 WL 1786; Jetro Cash 
and Carry Enters., 569 F. Supp. 1404; Robinson, 521 F. Supp. 842. 
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case, however, the court concluded that the anticompetitive ef-
fects predominated even though it should have found that 
there was no anticompetitive effect at all.553 
The courts’ success in balancing was related to the type of 
restraint at issue. The courts correctly decided cases involving 
vertical nonprice restraints. However, they often did not reach 
the right result when addressing rules of associations or re-
straints imposed by a supplier on a purchaser. 
In addressing vertical restraints, courts generally arrived 
at the correct result. They appropriately found that vertical in-
tegration in the newspaper industry—an industry in which a 
defendant likely would not restrict output because of its de-
pendence on advertising revenues, which benefit from high cir-
culation resulting from low prices—had procompetitive effi-
ciencies that outweighed any anticompetitive effect resulting 
from the elimination of a potential competitor;554 that territo-
rial restraints that encourage investment, promotion, and im-
proved servicing outweighed limited intrabrand effects caused 
by territorial restrictions;555 and that a defendant with a sev-
enty percent market share failed to show that territorial re-
straints were sufficiently justified and reasonably necessary to 
achieve objectives of servicing and market penetration that 
would outweigh its anticompetitive effects.556 Fact scenarios 
falling most broadly in the realm of vertical restraints confirm 
this conclusion, as courts correctly analyzed cases involving ex-
clusive dealing agreements,557 tying arrangements,558 and re-
fusals to deal.559 
 
 553. See Cantor, 568 F. Supp. 424. 
 554. See Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692, 701, 704 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 555. See Anheuser-Busch, 811 F. Supp. at 875-77. 
 556. See Graphic Products Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1577-78 
(11th Cir. 1983). Although the court in Itek found that there was no evidence in the re-
cord demonstrating that the restraint was reasonably necessary to achieve the defen-
dant’s objectives, another record could have revealed the defendant’s need for territo-
rial restrictions to ensure that servicers were spread out, thereby enhancing servicing 
and increasing market penetration. 
 557. See Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1042, 1066 
(N.D. Ga. 1994) (finding no substantial foreclosure based on foreclosure of less than 
38% of market and justifications for restraint). 
 558. See Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru, 858 F.2d 792, 799 (1st Cir. 1988) (procompeti-
tive justifications of tying arrangement by which automobile distributor required deal-
ers to take relatively inexpensive spare parts kits outweighed “trivial” anticompetitive 
effects). 
 559. See Williamson v. Sacred Heart Hosp., No. 89-30084-RV, 1993 WL 543002, at 
*50 (N.D. Fla. May 28, 1993); (procompetitive benefit of allowing consumers the choice 
CAR-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:24 AM 
1352 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
Cases under the expansive heading “unfair competition” 
presented a problem for courts. Two of these cases, dealing 
with restrictive covenants, were correctly analyzed. One court 
found that the procompetitive benefits of enhanced comparison 
shopping resulting from a market limited in location and hours 
outweighed an “insignificant” anticompetitive effect.560 A sec-
ond court held that a restrictive covenant requiring certain oc-
cupants in a mall to operate as department stores served le-
gitimate purposes such as preventing free riding561 that 
outweighed the minimal anticompetitive effect in a fraction of 
one percent of the relevant market.562 
The courts in the other two cases in the category, those in 
which purchasers complained of actions taken by suppliers,563 
both balanced incorrectly. In United States v. North Dakota 
Hospital Ass’n,564 a purchaser challenged the actions of non-
profit hospitals and a hospital association in billing customers 
based on their actual costs rather than granting discounts.565 
The hospitals, with average operating margins 2 to 3% above 
cost, refused to grant discounts, which did not cover the hospi-
tals’ costs, and which required patients to absorb the costs of 
the discounts when the plaintiff, a governmental agency, ran 
out of money, as it repeatedly had in past years.566 The court’s 
balancing under the Rule of Reason was flawed in a number of 
respects: (1) it failed to define a market; (2) it found anticom-
petitive harm even where the plaintiff actually received dis-
counts and did not suffer an “adverse effect on . . . price”;567 and 
 
of an additional HMO outweighed effect of exclusion of doctor, who, in any event, “was 
a highly effective competitor”); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 919 (W.D. Pa. 
1981) (by creating a high-quality staff, hospital contributed to “[v]igorous competition” 
among hospitals, thereby raising level of care for the public, and outweighing any anti-
competitive effects suffered by doctor who was denied staff privileges at hospital). 
 560. Jetro Cash and Carry Enters., Inc. v. Food Distrib. Ctr., 569 F. Supp. 1404, 
1415-16 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
 561. The free riding concern was that, once the mall was operating, a department 
store could be tempted to subdivide and survive because of consumer traffic generated 
by other department stores in the mall. 
 562. See Net Realty Holding Trust v. Franconia Properties, Inc., No. 82-0318-A, 
1983 WL 1786, at *7-*8 (E.D. Va. Jan. 20, 1983). 
 563. This Article groups the cases with horizontal restraints because of the ad-
verse impact on competitors; the cases could also be viewed as refusals to deal. 
 564. 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.N.D. 1986). 
 565. See id. at 1030-31, 1039. 
 566. See id. at 1031, 1038. 
 567. Id. at 1039. 
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(3) it failed to adequately consider the restraint’s procompeti-
tive effects in creating a standardized reimbursement system, 
thereby facilitating cost comparison and protecting other pa-
tients and buyers “from having to absorb the costs of granting 
discounts”568 to the plaintiff.569 The court summarily concluded 
that the “anticompetitive harm of [the restraint] outweigh[ed] 
the procompetitive benefits.”570 The court should have come to 
the opposite conclusion based on the presumed lack of market 
power, absence of harm suffered by the plaintiff, and signifi-
cant procompetitive benefits.571 
In the second case, TV Signal Co. of Aberdeen v. AT&T,572 
the defendant telephone company enforced a policy of attaching 
a maximum of one cable per telephone pole to the detriment of 
the plaintiff cable television company.573 The court’s opinion in-
validating the restraint is flawed for three reasons. First, the 
court provided no support for its conclusory definitions of prod-
uct and geographic markets and failed to examine the re-
straint’s effect on competition. Second, it misconstrued injury 
to the plaintiff—even assuming that harm suffered by the 
plaintiff could demonstrate anticompetitive effect—by down-
playing the plaintiff’s success in entering the market and 
extraneously claiming that its success came “in spite of”574 de-
fendant’s policy. Third, the court ignored the defendant’s justi-
fications, cryptically claiming that the justifications “cannot 
sanitize”575 the restraint “when they travel in company with a 
significant anti-competitive purpose and effect.”576 The AT&T 
court should have decided the case either by finding no anti-
competitive effect or at least considering the procompetitive 
justifications, which would have outweighed any perceived 
anticompetitive effect. 
Association rules presented the context in which courts bal-
 
 568. Id. at 1038. 
 569. See id. at 1039. 
 570. Id. 
 571. The court also noted that the reimbursement method proposed by IHS “is in-
herently anticompetitive” because it “removes the financial incentive for price competi-
tion and cost containment.” See id. at 1039. 
 572. No. Civ.70-6N, 1981 WL 2049 (D.S.D. Mar. 13, 1981). 
 573. See id. at *2; see also TV Signal Co. v. AT&T, 617 F.2d 1302, 1305 (8th Cir. 
1980). 
 574. AT&T, 1981 WL 2049, at *5. 
 575. Id. 
 576. Id. 
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anced most frequently. In such cases, the courts correctly found 
that two association restraints did not violate the antitrust 
laws. One court upheld an interchange fee imposed by an asso-
ciation of financial institutions that allowed the operation of a 
credit card system that would not otherwise have been possi-
ble.577 A second court sustained an employment policy of an in-
surance company group that limited conflicts of interest and 
did not have a substantial adverse effect on competition.578 A 
court also correctly struck down a rule adopted by an associa-
tion of cemetery owners that limited the preparation of the 
foundation for grave markers and monuments to the cemetery 
owning the lot.579 This court based its decision upon a finding 
that the policy prevented grave memorial companies and 
neighboring cemeteries from competing in the foundation 
preparation market, thereby “limit[ing] consumer choice.”580 
On the other hand, a court incorrectly invalidated a bylaw 
of a real estate multiple listing service that allowed only one 
type of sign to be posted on a property for sale.581 The court 
found that the “adverse impact on plaintiffs’ businesses”582 
outweighed the justifications of distributing commissions 
among members of a service that benefitted home buyers.583 
Given that the plaintiffs were only two of over six hundred li-
censed real estate brokers in the market, it is difficult to see 
how there was any adverse effect on competition, let alone an 
effect sufficient to outweigh procompetitive justifications.584 
The court’s decision also was plagued by the less restrictive al-
ternative analysis.585 
Rules of sports leagues seem to have presented unparal-
 
 577. See National Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 601-02, 605 
(11th Cir. 1986). 
 578. See Plueckhahn v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 749 F.2d 241, 247 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 579. See Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Ass’n, 666 F.2d 
1130, 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 580. Id. at 1138, 1139. 
 581. See Cantor v. Multiple Listing Serv., 568 F. Supp. 424, 427-28 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983). 
 582. Id. at 430. 
 583. See id. at 426, 431 (association compilation of home listings provides pur-
chasers with “a ready source of information”). 
 584. Even if injury to a competitor were the relevant inquiry, there would be no 
anticompetitive effect here: the plaintiffs were not excluded from the association, they 
only were restricted in the type of sign they could post. 
 585. See Cantor, 568 F. Supp. at 431 (opining that association could have required 
brokers to display their association signs “no less conspicuously” than other signs). 
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leled difficulties for the courts. Such rules occur in a unique 
setting. Unlike most associations, which are made up of com-
petitors, individual sports teams generally are not economic 
competitors.586 Rather, the competition that takes place on the 
playing field is of a contrary variety—no team has an economic 
interest in vanquishing all the other teams. Rather, teams 
benefit when the league has competitive balance and the sport-
ing contests are close, thereby maximizing fan interest. Re-
straints such as the draft, the salary cap, cross-ownership 
rules, and relocation guidelines thus help the leagues compete 
in a sports and entertainment market by putting out the best 
product possible. 
Treating sports leagues as associations of competitors often 
leads to undesirable results. Admittedly, some courts arrive at 
the correct result. One court correctly found that a sports 
league’s tools for competitive balance (the draft, right of first 
refusal, and salary cap) have procompetitive effects that out-
weigh any anticompetitive effects.587 Another court found that a 
bowling association’s ability “to administer the sport of profes-
sional bowling”588 by adopting and enforcing product standards 
outweighs any anticompetitive effect on a particular product 
adversely affected by application of the standards.589 Another 
court correctly held that a soccer association’s strict rules on 
player registration—which led to an 80% decrease in the num-
ber of teams playing indoor soccer in a particular area—
decreased options for consumers and was an unreasonable re-
straint.590 
But other courts treated league rules with excessive hostil-
ity. In Los Angeles Memorial Commission Coliseum v. NFL 
 
 586. Courts have recognized this reality. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 
U.S. 85, 101 (1984); Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 598-99 
(7th Cir. 1996) (“cooperation is essential” for a sports league: “a league with one team 
would be like one hand clapping”); Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm. v. NFL (“Raid-
ers”), 726 F.2d 1381, 1391 (9th Cir. 1984) (“the NFL teams are not true competitors, 
nor can they be”). 
 587. See NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 45 F.3d 
684 (2d Cir. 1995). Because the NBA court held that the nonstatutory labor exemption 
covered the restraints at issue, the court’s cursory Rule of Reason analysis was dicta. 
 588. Eureka Urethane, Inc. v. PBA, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 915, 933 (E.D. Mo. 1990). 
 589. See id. at 933. 
 590. See Eleven Line, Inc. v. North Tex. State Soccer Ass’n, No. CA-3-95-CV-3120-
R, 1998 WL 574893, at *3, *4-*5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 1998); Eleven Line, Inc. v. North 
Tex. State Soccer Ass’n, No. CA-3-95-CV-3120-R, 1997 WL 135684, at *1-*3 (N.D. Tex. 
Mar. 12, 1997). 
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(“Raiders”),591 the Ninth Circuit invalidated the NFL’s reloca-
tion rules that required approval by three-fourths of the mem-
ber clubs before a franchise could relocate to another team’s 
home territory.592 The court hypothesized that less restrictive 
alternatives could have achieved the League’s objectives of 
achieving financial stability, recovering expenditures invested 
in stadiums and other facilities, and promoting fan loyalty.593 
The court thus recommended the incorporation of objective fac-
tors into the relocation decision.594 The Raiders decision is 
flawed. First, the court trumpeted the effect of the relocation 
rules on intrabrand competition while downplaying the crucial 
benefits for interbrand competition. League rules that prevent 
teams from moving at will into each other’s territory and that 
increase fan loyalty and financial stability promote consumer 
welfare.595 The court failed to recognize the undeniable net 
benefit of the rules for consumers. Second, the court unwit-
tingly illustrated the dangers of a less restrictive alternative 
analysis in showing that a court, post hoc, can always come up 
with a restraint that appears a little less restrictive even as it 
fails to link the alternative to the defendant’s objectives. 
In NASL v. NFL,596 the court invalidated the NFL’s “cross-
ownership” rule that was designed to prevent owners of NFL 
franchises from holding an ownership interest in another “ma-
jor team sport” such as baseball, basketball, hockey, or soc-
cer.597 The court found that this rule had an anticompetitive ef-
fect in what it found to be a market of “sports capital and 
skill.”598 Although the court recognized various procompetitive 
benefits of the rule—preventing dilution of goodwill, avoiding 
disruption of NFL operations, and preventing inter-league col-
lusion—it summarily found that these were “not substantial”599 
and that they were “clearly outweighed by [the rule’s] anticom-
petitive purpose and effect.”600 The court’s conclusion that the 
 
 591. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 592. See id. at 1384-85. 
 593. See id. at 1396-97. 
 594. See id. at 1397. 
 595. See id. at 1394 (“In the early days of professional football, numerous fran-
chises failed and many changed location in the hope of achieving economic success.”). 
 596. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 597. Id. at 1255. 
 598. Id. at 1259. 
 599. Id. at 1261. 
 600. Id. 
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rule’s “net effect is substantially to restrain competition, not 
merely competitors”601 was more a blanket assertion than a 
reasoned conclusion. Again, the court took its eye off the ball of 
enhancing interbrand competition: the court never even con-
sidered whether the consumer would benefit from the rule. The 
court also demonstrated the pitfalls of a less restrictive alter-
native analysis. In rejecting the NFL’s proffered justifications 
of maintaining undivided loyalty and preventing the disclosure 
of confidential information, the court erroneously put the bur-
den on the NFL to show the absence of less restrictive alterna-
tives and failed to connect the alternatives it hypothecated 
with the defendant’s goals.602 
Summing up, in five out of twenty balancing cases—or 
25%—the courts came to the wrong result. But a simple re-
minder to focus on consumers and interbrand competition 
would have led to correct balancing by the courts. First, an em-
phasis on interbrand competition would ensure that courts up-
hold arrangements that do not have an anticompetitive effect. 
By following this simple reminder, the Cantor, North Dakota 
Hospital Ass’n, and AT&T cases would have come out the other 
way. Second, by also eliminating the less restrictive alternative 
test, the Raiders and NASL cases likely would have come out 
differently, as the NFL’s rules appeared to be reasonably nec-
essary to achieve the recognized procompetitive objectives. 
Despite a few mistakes, courts can balance. They generally 
can weigh the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of a 
restraint and arrive at a defensible result. Keeping the focus on 
interbrand competition and the effect on the consumer will 
provide even greater legitimacy for the balancing analysis.603 
E. Taking Stock 
It is time to synthesize the results of what courts should do 
and what they can do. The first inquiry necessarily comes first. 
For if the courts should not (according to whatever criteria we 
deem sufficient to make the determination) examine a particu-
lar factor, then it is simply irrelevant whether they can exam-
 
 601. Id. 
 602. See id. 
 603. That the conclusion as to balancing is strengthened by the heeding of the re-
minder distinguishes the inquiry as to less restrictive alternatives. For there is no 
modest hint that can be offered that would have led the Raiders and NASL courts, for 
example, to conduct a correct less restrictive alternative analysis. 
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ine the factor. Stated differently, a court’s mandate precedes its 
capacity. 
1. Anticompetitive effect 
Each of the inquiries converges in the conclusion that 
courts should and can examine anticompetitive effect. The four 
sources—the legislative history, common law, Chicago School, 
and Post-Chicago School—all support consideration of the fac-
tor. Moreover, as a matter of theory, courts can assess the fac-
tor, and in practice, they correctly analyzed it in 97% of the 
cases. This obviously is a beneficial result: there cannot be a 
viable Rule of Reason case today without an adverse effect on 
competition. In short, it is beyond debate that anticompetitive 
effect should be a factor in the Rule of Reason analysis. 
2. Procompetitive justifications 
It is also clear that courts should consider a defendant’s 
procompetitive justifications. Three of the sources—the legisla-
tive history, Chicago School, and Post-Chicago School—support 
its consideration, and the fourth, the common law, is neutral. 
In addition, as a matter of hypothesis, courts can examine pro-
competitive justifications, and they have done so correctly in 
98% of the cases. Courts should consider a defendant’s procom-
petitive justifications as an element of the Rule of Reason. 
3. Reasonable necessity/less restrictive alternatives 
The factors of reasonable necessity and less restrictive al-
ternatives bear tenuous support in the sources. Only one 
source—the common law—would provide substantial support 
for consideration of the factors, while one—the Chicago 
School—would proscribe such consideration. The other two fac-
tors would be of marginal significance: the legislative history is 
neutral, and the Post-Chicago School would provide, at most, a 
limited endorsement. 
Given this indeterminacy, we must look to the capacities of 
courts to resolve the issue. As a matter of theory, courts can de-
termine whether a restraint is reasonably necessary, and in 
practice, 100% of the courts correctly analyzed this factor. Fur-
ther supporting the inclusion of this factor is its critical role in 
ensuring a link between the restraint and the defendant’s prof-
fered justification. There must be some way to dismiss the 
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loftiest of objectives that are not connected with the restraint 
at issue, and demonstrating reasonable necessity is a compel-
ling way to do so. 
The factor of less restrictive alternatives suffers a different 
fate. As a matter of theory, courts cannot examine the factor. 
And in practice, they have not accurately examined it, reaching 
the correct conclusion in only 43% of the cases. Because courts 
cannot examine the factor of less restrictive alternatives, and 
because the sources provide, at most, limited support, the fac-
tor should be eliminated from the Rule of Reason analysis. 
Such an omission would not have significant consequences, in 
particular because the inquiry into reasonable necessity forges 
the link between the restraint and the defendant’s justifica-
tions. 
4. Balancing 
The sources provide some support for balancing as a factor 
in the Rule of Reason analysis. While the legislative history 
and common law are neutral, the contemporary schools would 
endorse (very different types of) balancing. The Chicago School 
would promote a limited type of balancing—akin to a calcula-
tion of the net effect of the restraint on output. The Post-
Chicago School, in contrast, would carve out a significant role 
for balancing that would incorporate the myriad goals champi-
oned by the members of the Post-Chicago School. With the key 
building blocks of legislative history and common law neutral 
on the issue, the sources provide only limited support for bal-
ancing. 
Although the confidence level on this factor is not as high as 
with others, courts can conduct balancing. They are capable of 
weighing a restraint’s anticompetitive and procompetitive ef-
fects, and as long as precision is not expected, they generally 
can balance. The results of the cases provide some support, as 
courts in 75% of the cases correctly balanced. Keeping the focus 
on the consumer and interbrand competition would increase 
the rate of success. (In fact, all of the cases would have been 
decided correctly if the courts had adequately heeded these 
guideposts.) In short, courts should continue to balance in the 
finite subset of cases in which it is necessary, but they must do 
so cautiously and continually focus on the effect of the restraint 
on the consumer and on interbrand competition. 
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IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISCONNECT AND THE 
MODIFICATION 
A large divide, or “disconnect,” separates courts’ and par-
ties’ conceptions of a Rule of Reason analysis, on the one hand, 
from what courts actually do, on the other. Everyone assumes 
that the Rule of Reason calls for balancing. But courts typically 
dispose of a case under the Rule at a prior stage, typically when 
the plaintiff fails to demonstrate a significant anticompetitive 
effect. In addition to discovering the disconnect, this Article 
recommends a modification in the current Rule of Reason 
analysis, eliminating courts’ consideration of less restrictive al-
ternatives and shifting the burden of production on a re-
straint’s reasonable necessity from the plaintiff to the defen-
dant. What consequences would result from the recognition of 
the disconnect and the proposed modifications? For the parties, 
the consequences would include fewer cases and more focused 
litigation. For the courts, the consequences would be judicial 
opinions more consistent with the outcomes of cases and less 
post hoc second-guessing of legitimate business judgments. 
A. Parties 
1. Fewer cases 
First and foremost, plaintiffs would be most affected by dis-
covering the disconnect. In the modern era, courts dismissed 
84% of Rule of Reason cases because plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate a significant anticompetitive effect. Plaintiffs’ realization 
of this reality should counsel caution and decrease the number 
of antitrust lawsuits.604 If plaintiffs knew the importance of the 
initial threshold of demonstrating a significant anticompetitive 
effect, and if they realized the frequency with which courts 
have found that an injury to a competitor is not an injury to 
 
 604. Admittedly, the number of Rule of Reason cases currently brought is cabined 
by the expense of such a lawsuit and by the plaintiffs’ limited chances of success. See, 
e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1755, 1761-63 (1994). To the extent the 
plaintiff under the construct advocated by this Article has to prove anticompetitive ef-
fect (which will in most instances require a showing of market power), the expense will 
continue to dissuade some potential plaintiffs. And to the extent that plaintiffs bring 
cases alleging a per se violation in addition to a claim under the Rule of Reason, the 
discovery of the disconnect would have marginally less profound consequences. 
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competition, then they might conclude that an antitrust law-
suit is not the wisest course of action. Similarly, their recogni-
tion of the infrequency of balancing would remove from their 
calculations their visions—in sprinting to the courthouse—of 
balancing their concrete injury against the defendant’s suppos-
edly pretextual justification. In some cases, plaintiffs could 
pursue other litigation, alleging, for example, state-law claims 
of breach of contract, unfair competition, or business torts. In 
other cases, they could devote their resources to competition 
rather than litigation. The realization of the disconnect would, 
in effect, eliminate from plaintiffs’ decisionmaking calculus the 
tool of balancing.605 
Supporting this result, the proposed modification of elimi-
nating courts’ consideration of less restrictive alternatives 
would remove another instrument from the plaintiff’s arsenal. 
No longer could a plaintiff pontificate on hypothetical alterna-
tives that a defendant could have implemented that would 
have affected them less directly.606 This modification, combined 
with the removal of the incentive for plaintiffs to ponder the 
benefits of balancing from the start of the case, could reduce 
the number of antitrust lawsuits. 
Skeptics would argue that the plaintiff would not be af-
fected by the disconnect. Every plaintiff would believe that, de-
spite the early dismissal of most of their compatriots’ lawsuits, 
their suit is different. They can demonstrate an unreasonable 
restraint. Although this may be true for a small subset of plain-
tiffs, rational-actor plaintiffs should vary their conduct accord-
ing to their recognition of what courts actually do. For these 
plaintiffs—presumably a larger category—the disconnect would 
matter and could change their conduct. Moreover, rational ac-
tors recognizing the disconnect would continue to bring plausi-
ble antitrust cases.607 But it would primarily be the cases in 
which there is obviously no adverse effect on competition that 
would not be pursued. 
 
 605. Such a recognition also could increase the likelihood (and decrease the mag-
nitude) of settlement. 
 606. Shifting the burden of proving reasonable necessity from the plaintiff to the 
defendant should not have a marked effect on the plaintiff’s decision to file suit. 
 607. There is always the chance that the recognition of the disconnect will have an 
overbroad impact, with plaintiffs not bringing potentially meritorious antitrust cases. 
Yet because of the relative paucity of cases that are meritorious and because plaintiffs 
presumably have a general idea as to the merits of their case, this effect should not be 
substantial. 
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If this hypothesis is correct, substantial benefits would fol-
low. Courts would face fewer potentially-complex-but-frivolous 
antitrust lawsuits and thus be able to devote needed resources 
where they would be more useful. They might even be able to 
spend more time on the more legitimate antitrust cases they do 
consider. In addition, defendants would not be confronted with 
as many onerous lawsuits, thereby reducing their legal expen-
ditures (the benefit of which, at some point, could filter down to 
the consumer), and, more significantly, encouraging them to 
take actions that could benefit competition.608 In short, to the 
extent that litigation concerning practices that clearly do not 
have an anticompetitive effect is diminished, courts, defen-
dants, and consumers would benefit. 
2. More focused litigation 
In addition to fewer antitrust lawsuits, those brought would 
be better litigated. As the parties’ knowledge of the type of 
analysis actually used by courts increases, so does the likeli-
hood that all of the participants will speak the same language 
and address the same tests from opposite perspectives. Al-
though parties might address balancing issues, they would 
start at the beginning. Anticompetitive effect comes first in or-
der and importance. A summary judgment brief or a jury in-
struction would start by examining the effect of the restraint 
on the market. And the opposing party would address the same 
issue from the diametric perspective. The court (or jury) would 
then benefit from having two presentations focused directly on 
the relevant issues. The same would hold for demonstrating a 
procompetitive objective and a reasonably necessary restraint. 
Assuming such showings could be made in a particular case, 
courts would no longer have to divine actual adverse effect, 
market impact, or procompetitive justifications without the in-
put of the parties. In short, the most significant issues in litiga-
tion under the Rule of Reason would be addressed in an effi-
cient and effective manner. 
 
 608. If a reduction in the number of suits would lead defendants to pursue compe-
tition-preventing acts, they still would remain subject to challenge, and the plaintiffs 
presumably would clear the initial threshold when challenging anticompetitive re-
straints. 
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B. Courts 
The benefits anticipated for the parties will carry over to 
the courts. As discussed above, a decrease in the number of 
suits would benefit the courts, as would a more direct focus by 
the parties on the factors most relevant to the Rule of Reason 
analysis. 
The effect of recognizing the disconnect admittedly would 
be less profound for the courts than for the parties. Although 
courts are fond of reciting the language of balancing whenever 
they are confronted with a case under the Rule of Reason, they 
do not proceed directly to such balancing. In the overwhelming 
majority of cases, the courts begin their Rule of Reason analy-
sis by examining the plaintiff’s initial burden of demonstrating 
a significant anticompetitive effect. They generally reach bal-
ancing only at the end of a process that ensures that there are 
competitive effects to be weighed on both sides of the scale. 
But even if the bridging of the disconnect does not have sig-
nificant consequences in the results of Rule of Reason cases, it 
should increase the clarity (and perhaps legitimacy) of anti-
trust courts by bringing their actions into conformity with their 
language. Courts that discuss balancing as the intended course 
of action but then do not conduct balancing invite questions by 
the plaintiff who never gets to present her arguments relating 
to balancing; by attorneys for the parties, who are not certain if 
the courts will practice what they say or what they do; and by 
all who have an interest in the courts’ legitimacy that results in 
part from the expectations created by their language. 
Articulating the burden-shifting approach, as recent courts 
have done more frequently,609 has a number of benefits, from 
implicitly nudging the court to the correct application of the 
Rule of Reason, to sharing with the parties the construct the 
court will in fact apply, to inviting argument on the relevant 
factors. Additionally, such an approach fosters judicial effi-
ciency, as courts often will be able to dispose of a case before it 
is faced with the consuming and costly process of balancing.610 
 
 609. See, e.g., Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997); 
K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Flegel v. Christian Hosp., 4 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 1993); Nationwide R.A.C. Sales, Inc. 
v. Ford Motor Co., No. C 96-2877 FMS, 1997 WL 88399, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 1997); 
Ginzburg v. Memorial Healthcare Sys., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 998 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
 610. As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent in California Dental Ass’n v. Federal 
Trade Commission, 119 S.Ct. 1604, 1624 (1999), a burden-shifting approach  
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Following the burden-shifting approach recommended by this 
Article would provide even greater assistance to courts, which 
would amass more helpful information on the link between the 
restraint and the justification, and which would withdraw from 
the distracting goose chase of less restrictive alternatives. 
Finally, modifying the Rule of Reason construct would bring 
the courts further into line with the history and theory under-
lying the antitrust laws. Requiring the plaintiff first to show a 
significant anticompetitive effect, then the defendant to show 
that the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve legitimate 
procompetitive objectives, and then to balance is a logical, sup-
portable, and legitimate analysis. In particular, the collapsing 
of the second and third stages of the current Rule of Reason 
analysis minimizes confusion and second-guessing. In short, 
recognizing the disconnect and making a couple of modifica-
tions to the Rule of Reason promises benefits for courts and 
parties alike. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has surveyed the universe of Rule of Reason 
cases in the modern era to determine what courts presently do. 
It has explored the legislative history, common law, and con-
temporary schools of antitrust philosophy to determine what 
courts should do. It has examined what courts can do. Finally, 
it has identified some of the benefits that would flow from the 
recognition of the disconnect and a modification to the Rule of 
Reason analysis. 
First, the Article has found that courts rarely conduct the 
balancing that everyone thinks they do. Out of the 495 cases 
decided in the modern era under the Rule of Reason, courts in 
only 20 (4%) of the cases balanced the anticompetitive and pro-
competitive effects. Most of the cases (84%) were disposed of on 
the ground that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a significant 
anticompetitive effect. 
Second, the Article has concluded that most of the factors in 
today’s Rule of Reason analysis are supported by the legislative 
 
reflects a gradual evolution within the courts over a period of many years. That 
evolution represents an effort carefully to blend the procompetitive objectives of 
the law of antitrust with administrative necessity. It represents a considerable ad-
vance, both from the days when the [Federal Trade] Commission had to present 
and/or refute every possible fact and theory, and from antitrust theories so abbre-
viated as to prevent proper analysis. 
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history of the Sherman Act, the common law preceding the Act, 
and contemporary schools of antitrust philosophy—the Chicago 
School and Post-Chicago School. These sources provide potent 
support for courts’ consideration of anticompetitive effect and 
procompetitive justifications. On the other hand, the remaining 
factors—balancing, reasonable necessity, and less restrictive 
alternatives—have more tenuous support, magnifying the sig-
nificance of the inquiry into the capacities of courts. 
Third, confirming the results from the application of the 
sources, courts, as a matter of theory and practice, can examine 
anticompetitive effect and procompetitive justifications. Distin-
guishing among factors for which the sources provide only at-
tenuated support, the capacities of courts (1) recommend the 
inclusion of the inquiry as to whether a restraint is reasonably 
necessary, (2) cautiously endorse balancing, and (3) reject an 
analysis based on less restrictive alternatives. Further, the ca-
pacities of courts recommend shifting the burden of producing 
evidence of reasonable necessity from the plaintiff (to show its 
absence) to the defendant (to show its presence). The Article 
thus proposes collapsing the second and third stages of the cur-
rent Rule of Reason analysis, requiring the defendant to prove 
that a restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate 
procompetitive objective. 
Finally, a recognition of the disconnect between what courts 
actually do and what everyone thinks they do promises benefits 
for parties and for the courts: fewer meritless antitrust law-
suits, increased settlements, more effective litigation, and en-
hanced judicial legitimacy. Turning to the prescriptive recom-
mendations, abandoning the analysis based on less restrictive 
alternatives and shifting the burden on reasonable necessity 
would only amplify these trends. 
In conclusion, the Rule of Reason generally works. But it 
can work better. It can be brought more into line with the legis-
lative history, common law, contemporary schools of antitrust 
thought, and capacities of courts. It can be reconciled with 
what courts applying it actually do. Then, the Rule of Reason 
would be even stronger. It would enhance judicial legitimacy 
and would focus the parties’ attention on the relevant issues. 
Finally, it would allow parties, scholars, and courts all to talk 
the same language and to pursue the goals of antitrust law to-
gether, rather than from opposite sides of the disconnect. 
